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ABSTRACT
One agency o f  the F ederal Government h o ld s on e-e igh th  o f  the  
n a tio n a l d eb t, purchases and s e l l s  about a b i l l i o n  d o lla r s  worth o f  
government s e c u r it ie s  m onthly, and e x e r ts  a s ig n if ic a n t  in flu e n c e  over  
th e  f in a n c ia l  co n d itio n s  o f  t h is  country. Y et, th e  decision-m aking  
p ro cess  o f  t h i s  agency has remained a t  le a s t  a  p a r t ia l  m ystery to  both  
laymen and p r o fe ss io n a l econom ists a l ik e .  T his study i s  devoted to  
examining th e gu ides which one p o rtio n  o f  the Federal Reserve System—  
th e  Federal Open Market Committee—u se s  in  decision-m aking a s  w e ll  a s  to  
examining th e Committee's la g  in  response to  economic change.
Previous an a lyses o f  the F ederal Open Market Committee have had to  
r e ly  on the Annual Report o f  the Board o f  Governors o f  th e  Federal 
R eserve System . testim ony o f  the Committee members b efore C ongressional 
com m ittees, and other p u b lic  statem ents by System  o f f i c i a l s .  The 
p u b lic a tio n  o f  the m inutes o f  the Federal Open Market Committee has made 
i t  p o s s ib le  fo r  o u tsid e  sch o lars to  examine p re v io u s ly  in a c c e s s ib le  
segments o f  i t s  decision-m aking p r o ce ss . T his study draws e x te n s iv e ly  
from those m inutes.
At th e  o u tse t  i t  i s  important to  d is t in g u ish  between the g o a ls ,  
in d ic a to r s , and ta r g e ts  which the Committee r e c o g n ize s . The g o a ls  o f  
th e  Federal R eserve System are the broad o b je c t iv e s  which th e  System i s  
attem pting t o  ach ieve or promote, such as p r ic e  s t a b i l i t y ,  a high l e v e l  
o f  employment, economic growth, and a reasonab le balance in  our in te r ­
n a tio n a l payments. Economic in d ic a to r s  re v ea l changes in  the economic 
s itu a t io n . V ariab les  which the System attem pts to  a l t e r  or to  m aintain
viii
a t some p a r tic u la r  l e v e l  are c a lle d  t a r g e t s .
T h is study a lso  co n sid ers  the " in s id e 11 la g  o f  monetary p o l ic y . The 
in s id e  la g  i s  composed o f  ( l )  a r e c o g n it io n  la g — th e  tim e between a need  
fo r  a change and th e  r e c o g n it io n  o f th a t need; (2 )  a d e c is io n  la g —th e  
tim e i t  tak es to  d ecid e on a course o f  a c tio n ; and (3 )  an a c t io n  la g —  
th e  tim e n ecessary  to  put th e  course o f  a c tio n  in to  op era tion .
Chapter I I  o f  t h i s  study f i r s t  surveys the gen era l procedure 
fo llow ed  in  Federal Open Market Committee m eetings. N ext, i t  examines 
th e  v a r io u s economic in d ic a to r s  used by th e  Committee as an in d ic a tio n  
o f  ou tpu t, employment, and p r ic e  l e v e l s ,  a s  w e ll a s  th e  co n d itio n  o f  
f in a n c ia l  m arkets. Chapter I I I  i s  devoted  to  an a n a ly s is  o f  the ta r g e t s  
used by the Committee in  p o l ic y  a c tio n . S p e c i f ic a l ly ,  such v a r ia b le s  as  
in t e r e s t  r a te s ,  fr e e  r e s e r v e s , t o t a l  r e s e r v e s , th e  money supp ly , and 
tone and f e e l  o f  th e  market are con sid ered .
Chapter IV concerns i t s e l f  w ith m onetary la g s .  The chapter b eg in s  
w ith  an a n a ly s is  o f  problems in vo lved  in  la g  determ ination . Next, 
ev id en ce o f  the in s id e  la g  during upturns and downturns in  the period  
1951-1960 i s  con sid ered . The m inutes o f  th e  F ederal Open Market 
Committee rev ea l th a t the Committee u su a lly  responded to  th e  changes in  
th e  economic s itu a t io n  w ith in  three months. F in a l ly ,  the evidence o f  
la g s  found in  t h i s  study i s  compared w ith  the le n g th  o f la g s  reported by 
oth er  s tu d ie s . Chapter V i s  devoted t o  answering m isce llan eou s q u estio n s  
r a is e d  by the study.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
One agency o f th e  Federal Government h o ld s  on e-eighth  o f  th e
n a tio n a l debt,"'" purchases and s e l l s  about a b i l l i o n  d o lla r s  worth o f
2
government s e c u r it ie s  m onthly, and ex erts  a s ig n if ic a n t  in flu en ce  over
3
th e  f in a n c ia l con d ition s o f th is  country. Y et, the decision-m aking  
p rocess o f  t h i s  agency has remained a t l e a s t  a p a r t ia l mystery t o  both  
laymen and p ro fess io n a l econom ists a lik e .^  T his study i s  devoted to  
examining th e  guides which one p o rtio n  o f  th e  Federal Reserve System— 
th e  Federal Open Market Committee (o fte n  id e n t i f ie d  in  t h i s  study a s  
FOMC)—u ses in  decision-m aking a s  w e l l  a s  to  examining the Committee’ s 
la g  in  response to  economic change. . .
^Board o f  Governors o f  the Federal R eserve System, Federal Reserve 
B u lle t in . H I  (June, 1 9 6 6 ) , 862.
2Ib id . . p . 839.
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The ex ten t o f t h i s  in flu en ce  i s ,  o f  cou rse, a m atter o f con sid er­
a b le  controversy. Some econom ists, such a s  M ilton Friedman, f e e l  that  
changes in  monetary p o l ic y  r e s u lt  in  s ig n if ic a n t  changes in  economic 
a c t iv i t y .  Other econom ists, such a s  Abba Lerner, f e e l  monetary p o lic y  
t o  be o f l e s s  importance. Perhaps the m ajority  view i s  b est expressed  
by Paul A. Samuel son: "Contrary to  the op in ion s o f  many contemporary 
econom ists (and to some o f  my e a r l ie r  v ie w s ), I  b e lie v e  that monetary 
and cred it  p o l ic ie s  have great potency to  s tim u la te , s t a b i l iz e ,  or 
depress a modern economy." See h i s  " R eflection s on C entral Banking,” 
The N ational Banking R eview . I  (September, 1963), 15-28 .
^"The m ysterious w orld  o f  th e  Fed i s  r e a l ly  known on ly  to  i t s  
employees and i t s  alumni— the in s id e r s ,  as  i t  were. No amount o f  
exam ination, no amount o f  Congressional testim on y , no amount o f  study  
by sch o lars tem porarily connected with th e  System can rev ea l the inner  
workings o f  Fed m en ta lity . Only years o f p a r t ic ip a t io n  . . . provide
Previous a n a ly ses o f  th e  Federal Open Market Committee have had to
r e ly  on th e  Annual Report o f  the Board o f  Governors o f  the Federal
Reserve System, testim ony o f  th e Committee members before C ongressional
5
com m ittees, and o th er  p u b lic  statem ents by System o f f i c i a l s .  The 
p u b lica tio n  o f th e  minutes o f  the Federal Open Market Committee has made 
i t  p o s s ib le  for o u tsid e  sch o la rs  to  examine p rev iou sly  in a c c e s s ib le  
segments o f  i t s  decision-m aking p rocess. This study draws e x te n s iv e ly  
from th o se  m inutes.
At th e  o u tse t i t  i s  important to  d is t in g u ish  between th e  g o a ls ,  
in d ic a to r s , and ta r g e ts  which the Committee reco g n izes . The g o a ls  o f  
the F ederal Reserve System are the broad o b je c tiv e s  which th e  System i s  
attem pting to  ach ieve or promote, such as p rice  s t a b i l i t y ,  a high le v e l  
o f  employment, economic growth, and a reasonable balance in  our in te r ­
n a tio n a l payments.^ Economic in d ica to rs  reveal changes in  the economic
s itu a t io n . The current market in te r e s t  ra te s  are an example o f  a
7primary in d ica to r  used by th e  Committee. In a d d itio n  to  in d ic a to r s ,
the sen se o f  System m otivation  so e s s e n t ia l  to  an in te r p r e ta tio n  o f  Fed 
dogma . . .,"  from D elbert C. Hastings and Ross M. Robertson, "The 
M ysterious World o f  the F ed ,” Business Horizons. V (Spring, 1962), 98.
5
H astings and Robertson, "The M ysterious World o f  the Fed," p. 98. 
A lso, see  W illiam  P. Yohe, "The Open Market Committee D ecision  Process  
and th e  1964 Patman H earings," N ational Banking Review. I l l  (March, 
1965), 351-2 .
Board o f  Governors o f  th e  Federal Reserve System, The Federal 
Reserve System: Purposes and Functions (Washington, D. C.s Board o f
Governor s ,1 9 o 5 ) , pp. 1- 2 .
n ......................
W oodlief Thomas, Operation o f th e  Monetary System in  the U. S. A ., 
Memorandum Submitted at th e  Request o f  th e  Royal Commission on Banking 
and F inance, Ottawa, Canada, May 1962 (Washington: Federal Reserve
Board, 1962), p . 29.
th e Committee attem pts to  a l t e r  the magnitude o f some economic v a r ia b le s  
or to  s e t  them a t  some p a r t ic u la r  l e v e l .  These v a r ia b le s  are c a lle d  
ta r g e t s .  The l e v e l  o f  fr e e  reserv es  i s  an example o f  such a ta r g e t .
The reader must be warned, however, th a t th e  FQMC members in  r e fe r r in g  
to  the Committee's ta r g e t  o fte n  c a l l  i t  a guide. This usage seems to  
occur s in c e  the Committee's ta r g e t  serv es  to  "guide" the Account Manager 
in  h is  o p era tio n s. This study u t i l i z e s  th e  above d e f in it io n s  o f  g o a ls ,  
in d ic a to r s , and ta r g e ts .  The Committee members' term inology i s  a lte r e d  
where n ecessary  to  m aintain co n s is ten cy . The c la s s i f i c a t io n  o f  an 
economic v a r ia b le  as  e ith e r  a g o a l, in d ic a to r , or  ta r g e t  does not 
m utually exclude i t  from appearing in  th e  other c la s s i f i c a t i o n s .  Indeed, 
t h i s  stu d y  shows th a t some economic v a r ia b le s  fu n c tio n  in  more than one 
ca p a c ity .
Contemporary economic th eory  seems to  reco g n ize  two g en era l ty p es  
o f  la g s .  F ir s t ,  th ere  i s  a la g  between th e  need fo r  a change in  
economic p o lic y  and th e  in i t i a t io n  o f  a new course o f  a c tio n  by proper 
a u th o r it ie s .  This i s  termed th e  " in sid e  la g ."  Second, th ere  i s  a la g  
between th e  tim e a u th o r it ie s  tak e a c t io n  and the tim e when th a t  a c tio n  
e x e r ts  an in flu en c e  on th e economy. T h is i s  termed th e  " ou tsid e  la g ."  
Each o f  th ese  la g s  may be fu r th er  subdivided . The in s id e  la g  i s  
composed o f  ( l )  a reco g n itio n  la g — the tim e between a need fo r  a change 
and th e  re c o g n it io n  o f  th a t need; (2) a d e c is io n  la g — the tim e i t  tak es  
to  d ecid e on a course o f  a c tio n ; and (3 )  an a c tio n  la g —the time 
n ecessa ry  to  put the course o f  a c tio n  in to  op eration . Once a c t io n  by 
monetary a u th o r it ie s  has been taken , i t  may be a w h ile  b efo re  co n d itio n s
4
are changed in  th e  banking system; t h i s  i s  one part o f  the o u ts id e  la g .  
The remainder o f  th e  o u ts id e  la g  i s  th e  p eriod  from th e  time the banking 
system  i s  faced  w ith  changed co n d itio n s  to  th e  tim e when the economy 
b eg in s  to  respond.**
Chapter I I  o f  t h is  stu d y  f i r s t  surveys th e  general procedure 
fo llo w ed  in  F ederal Open Market Committee m eetin gs. N ext, i t  examines 
the v a r io u s  economic in d ic a to r s  used by the Committee a s  an in d ic a tio n  
o f  ou tpu t, employment, and p r ic e  l e v e l s ,  a s  w e ll a s  the con d ition  o f  
f in a n c ia l  m arkets. Chapter I I I  i s  devoted  to  an a n a ly s is  o f  th e  ta r g e ts  
used by the Committee in  p o l ic y  a c t io n . S p e c i f ic a l ly ,  such v a r ia b le s  a s  
in t e r e s t  r a te s ,  fr e e  r e s e r v e s , t o t a l  r e s e r v e s , th e  money supply, and 
tone and f e e l  o f  th e  market are con sid ered .
In  1948 M ilton  Friedman recogn ized  th ree  ty p es  o f  la g s :  " ( l )  th e
la g  between th e  need fo r  a c t io n  and th e r e c o g n it io n  o f  t h i s  need; (2) 
th e la g  between re c o g n it io n  o f  th e  need fo r  a c t io n  and th e tak in g  o f  
a ctio n ; and (3 )  th e  la g  between th e  a c tio n  and i t s  e f f e c t s . ” M ilton  
Friedman, "A Monetary and F is c a l  Framework fo r  Economic S t a b i l i t y ,"  The 
American Economic Review. XXXVIII (June, 19 4 8 ), 255. The Ando e t  a l .  
study reco g n izes  the in s id e  la g  as d efin ed  above, but th e ir  o u ts id e  la g  
in c lu d e s  only  th e  la g  between the change in  banking co n d itio n s  and the  
change in  re a l output. However, an unnamed in term ed iate la g  which f a l l s  
between the in s id e  and o u ts id e  la g s  i s  a lso  con sid ered . This author has 
in clu d ed  t h is  in term ed iate  la g  a s  th e  f i r s t  p art o f  h is  o u ts id e  la g  as  
d efin ed  in  th e  t e x t  above. See A lbert Ando, e t  a l . . "Lags in  F is c a l  and 
Monetary P o lic y ,"  S ta b il iz a t io n  P o l i c i e s : A S e r ie s  o f  Research S tu d ies
Prepared fo r  t h e .Commission on Money and C red it (Englewood C l i f f s :  
P r e n tic e -H a ll, I n c . ,  1 9 6 3 ), p . 3 .
In  a study by Johnson and Winder th e in s id e  la g  i s  sa id  to  c o n s is t  
o f  a r e c o g n it io n  la g ,  a d e c is io n  la g ,  and an a c t io n  la g .  The o u tsid e  
la g  i s  d efin ed  a s  ", . . th e  la g  between the ta k in g  o f  a c t io n  and the  
r e a l iz a t io n  o f  i t s , e f f e c t s  on .th e  economy. . . ." See Harry G. Johnson 
and John W. L. Winder, Lags in  the E f fe c t s  o f  Monetary P o lic y  in  Canada. 
Working Paper Prepared fo r  the Royal Commission on Banking and Finance 
(Ottawa: Queen’ s P r in te r , 1962), p . 6 . Hence, t h i s  author’ s d escr ip ­
t io n  o f  the la g s  i s  a com bination o f  th e  elem ents provided by the above­
n oted  a r t i c l e s .
Chapter IV concerns i t s e l f  w ith monetary la g s .  The chapter b eg in s  
w ith  an a n a ly s is  o f  the problems in v o lv ed  in  la g  determ ination , i . e . ,  
th e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  in vo lved  in  p in p o in tin g  la g s .  Next, ev id en ce o f  th e  
in s id e  la g  during upturns and downturns in  th e period  1951-1960 i s  
con sid ered . F in a lly ,  the evidence o f  la g s  found in  t h is  study i s  
compared w ith  th e  len g th  o f  la g s  rep orted  by o th er s tu d ie s . Chapter V 
i s  devoted to  a summary o f  evidence presen ted  a s  w e ll a s  th e  con clu sion s  
which have been drawn.
CHAPTER II
FOMC MEETING PROCEDURE AND ECONOMIC 
INDICATORS USED BY THE COMMITTEE
Chapter I I  f i r s t  b r ie f ly  surveys the h isto ry  o f  the System 's Open 
Market Committee. Second, i t  d escrib es th e  general procedure fo llow ed  
in  th e  FOMC m eetings. This in clu d es the approval o f  standard rep o rts , 
the p resen tation  o f economic reports by the s t a f f ,  the "go-around,B the 
consensus, and th e  approval o f  the d ir e c t iv e .^  Third, t h is  chapter 
examines the variou s economic in d ica to rs  used by the Committee as an 
in d ica tio n  o f  output, employment, and p r ice  le v e ls  as  w e ll  as the  
con d ition  o f f in a n c ia l markets. Both s t a f f  reports and committee member 
rep orts  are considered.
I .  DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOMC
The Federal Open Market Committee has been q u ite  m alleable in  i t s  
development. Open market a c t i v i t i e s  evolved from a h ig h ly  d ecen tra lized , 
p r o fit -o r ie n te d  beginning to  the present-day cen tra lized  structure with  
economic s ta b il iz a t io n  as a prime goal. The o r ig in a l Federal Reserve 
Act o f  1913 gave Reserve banks the au thority  to  purchase or s e l l  govern­
ment s e c u r it ie s ;  however, i t  f a i le d  to  provide for a committee to  
coordinate th ese  a c t iv i t i e s .  The discount mechanism was regarded as the
-̂The term "go-around" r e fe r s  to  the seq uentia l d iscu ssion  which 
ta k es p lace in  th e FOMC m eetings in  which the Committee members and 
oth er Federal Reserve Bank P resid en ts in  attendance have an opportunity  
to  express th e ir  opinion as to  the present s ta te  o f  the economy as w e ll  
as to  what a c t io n , i f  any, should be taken.
main to o l o f  the Federal R eserve System. With d e f i c i t  fin an cin g  in
World War I ,  th e  n a tio n a l debt rap id ly  in crea sed  from l e s s  than one
b i l l i o n  d o lla r s  to  over tw en ty -fiv e  b i l l i o n  d o lla r s , which provided a
2
b a s is  fo r  in crea sed  open market a c t iv it y .  In  1922 th e  Federal Reserve
Banks purchased approximately 400 m illio n  d o lla r s  o f  government
3
s e c u r it ie s  in  order to  in crea se  th e ir  earn in gs. The market
d isturbances which follow ed  th e s e  uncoordinated purchases r e su lte d  in
th e  form ation o f  an ad hoc committee composed of f iv e  p res id en ts  o f
ea stern  Reserve banks to  coord inate open market op era tio n s. I t  was now
f u l l y  r e a liz e d  th a t open market operations resu lted  i n  a s ig n if ic a n t
4
change in  member bank r e se rv es .
In 1923 th e  Federal R eserve Board acknowledged th e  f iv e  p res id en ts
by naming t h e ir  organ ization  th e  Open Market Investment Committee. The
Committee was expanded in  1930 to  include rep re se n ta tiv e s  from each of
5
th e  Federal R eserve Banks. In  a d d itio n , i t  was renamed the Open Market 
P o lic y  Conference and an E xecutive Committee was e s ta b lish e d  to  carry
^Board o f  Governors o f th e  Federal Reserve System , H isto r ic a l Chart 
Book (Washington, D. C.: Board o f  Governors, 1966), p . 40.
3
U. S. Congress, House o f  R ep resen ta tiv es, Committee on Banking and 
Currency, Subcommittee on Dom estic Finance, "The Development o f  Open 
Market Powers and P o l ic ie s ,” A S ta ff  Memorandum, H earings. The Federal 
Reserve System A fter  F if ty  Y ears. 88th Congress, 2nd S ession  (Washington, 
D. C.: U. S. Government P r in t in g  O ffic e , 1964), pp. 1985-2001.
T̂bid. A lso , see Paul M. Warburg, The Federal Reserve System: I t s
O rig in  and Growth (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1930), I I ,  851.
5 ............  .....................................................  ..............................................
Hearings, The Federal R eserve System A fter F i f t y  Years, p . 1988.
A lso , see C. Richard Youngdahl, "Open-Market O perations," The Federal
Reserve System, ed . Herbert V . Prochnow (New York: Harper & B rothers,
I 9 6 0 ), pp. 113-140.
out Conference p o l ic ie s .  Congress, in  1933> recognized  th e  Committee
7
by p ressin g  th e  e x is t in g  arrangements in to  law . As a u th o r ity  fo r  th e
execu tion  o f  open market op erations was s t i l l  not c e n tr a liz e d , the
in d iv id u a l R eserve banks reta in ed  th e  r ig h t to  refu se  to  p a r t ic ip a te  in
open market op eration s recommended by the Committee. The Banking Act o f
1933 r e c t i f ie d  t h is  error by forb idding Reserve banks to  p a r t ic ip a te  in
open market op erations except as d irec ted  by th e  Committee, now c a lle d
8th e  Federal Open Market Committee. A lso, th e  a c t o f 1935 amended th e
organ ization  o f  the Committee. The a c t  p laced  the seven members o f  the
Board o f Governors on the FCMC along with f iv e  rep resen ta tiv es  from the  
9
R eserve banks. The same organ iza tion  o f th e  Committee stands tod ay .
The rep resen ta tiv es  must be p res id en ts  or f i r s t  v ic e -p r e s id e n ts  o f  
R eserve banks. These members are e le c te d  an n ually  by th e  boards o f  
d ir e c to r s  o f  th e  Reserve banks, one from each o f  the fo llo w in g  groups; 
th e Federal Reserve Bank o f  New York; the Federal Reserve Banks o f  
B oston, P h ila d e lp h ia , and Richmond; th e  Federal Reserve Banks of 
C leveland and Chicago; the Federal Reserve Banks o f  A tla n ta , D a lla s , and
£
H earings. The Federal Reserve System A fter  F if ty  Y ears. p. 1990.
7I b id . . pp. 1990-1994.
8I b id . ,  pp. 1994-2001. A lso , see U. S . Congress, House o f  Repre­
s e n ta t iv e s , Committee on Banking and Currency, Subcommittee on Domestic 
Finance, Proposals fo r  improvement o f  the F ederal Reserve and S t a f f  
Report on Hearings B efore the Subcommittee on Domestic Finance o f  the  
Committee on Banking and Currency. 88th C ongress, 2nd S ession  
(W ashington, D. C .i U. S. Government P r in tin g  O ff ic e , 1964), PP« 1 -5 .  
A lso , see A. Jerome C lif fo r d , The Independence o f  the Federal Re serve  
System (P h ilad elp h ia : U n iv ersity  o f  P h ilad elp h ia  P r e ss , 19^5), pp.
103-111, 131-135.
9F if ty  Years o f the Federal Reserve Act (P h ilad elp h ia : Federal
Reserve Bank o f  P h ila d e lp h ia , 19 6 4 ), p . 15.
9
S t .  Louis; and the Federal R eserve Banks o f  M inneapolis, Kansas C ity ,
and San F ran cisco . In p r a c t ic e , the p res id en ts  o f  the Federal Reserve
Banks in  th e  l a s t  four groups serv e  on a ro ta tin g  b a s is .  In  a d d itio n
a l l  o f  th e  p res id en ts  a tten d  th e  FOMC m eetings and p a r t ic ip a te  in  th e
10
d isc u ss io n . Of cou rse , on ly  th e  o f f i c i a l  members may c a s t  v o te s .
The Banking Act o f  1935 a lso  made p ro v is io n  fo r  an E xecutive  
Committee. U n til i t s  abandonment in  1955, the E xecutive Committee, 
which c o n s is te d  o f  th ree  members o f th e  Board o f  Governors and two 
Federal Reserve Bank P r e s id e n ts , u su a lly  met each two w eeks. I t  is su e d  
d ir e c t iv e s  to  the Federal R eserve Bank o f New York in  an attem pt to  
carry out th e economic p o lic y  d ir e c t iv e  from the f u l l  F ederal Open 
Market Committee which then met on ly  fou r tim es a year. Follow ing th e  
abandonment o f  the E xecutive Committee th e  FOMC began m eeting each 
th ree week s .
For th e  purposes o f  t h i s  stu d y , w ith  but l im ite d  ex cep tio n s, i t  i s  
not n ecessa ry  to  draw a c le a r  d is t in c t io n  between the a c t io n s  o f  th e  
E xecutive Committee and th o se  o f  th e  FQMC. W hile the E xecutive  
Committee was expected  to  con fin e  i t s  a c t io n s  to  w ith in  th e  d ir e c t iv e  
from the FOMC, i t s  c lo se n e ss  to  th e  economic s itu a t io n  and i t s  frequency  
o f  m eeting le d  to  more than t h i s .  The FOMC, m eeting but four tim es a  
y ea r , n e c e s sa r ily  is su e d  ra th er  broadly s ta te d  d ir e c t iv e s .  The 
E xecutive Committee was a b le , to  a c e r ta in  d egree, to  make minor s h i f t s
^ Jam es N. Land, "The Federal R eserve A ct,"  The F ederal Reserve 
System , ed . Herbert V.~Prochnow (New York: Harper and B rothers, 1 9^ 0),
p . 28,
11Board o f  Governors o f  the Federal Reserve System, Annual R ep ort. 
1955 (W ashington, D. C.s Board o f  Governors, 1 9 5 6 ), p . 4 8 .
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in  p o l ic y  w ithout exceeding the l im ita t io n s  o f  the d ir e c t iv e .  This so rt  
o f  s h i f t in g  le d  th e  FOMC members to  q u estion  ju s t  which Committee was 
a c tu a lly  making p o lic y . S h o rtly  th e r e a fte r  th e  E xecutive Committee was 
abandoned. . .
I I .  THE CONDUCT OF FOMC MEETINGS
The Federal Open Market Committee, during the years 1951-1960,
fo llo w e d  e s s e n t ia l ly  the same format in  th e conduct o f i t s  m eetings.
12
The major elem ents o f th e  m eetings are as fo llo w s:
I .  Approval o f Standard R eports
A. Approval o f  the M inutes
B. Approval o f  E xecutive Committee A ctions
C. Open Market Account A c t iv i t ie s
1 .  A b r ie f  statem ent by the account manager
2 . Approval o f account tr a n sa c tio n s  by Committee members
I I .  Economic R eports by the S ta f f
A. General Economic A c t iv ity  Report
B. C red it Market Report
C. In te r n a tio n a l Economic S itu a tio n  Report
I I I .  Economic D iscu ssio n  by Committee Members and V is it in g  
P resid en ts
A. D iscu ssio n  by the P resid en t o f  th e  New York R eserve Bank
—
The v a l id i t y  o f  t h i s  o u tlin e  cannot be confirmed by re feren ce  to  
a s in g le  page or date in  th e  m inutes o f  th e  Committee. R ather, the  
p a tter n  o f  th e  Committee m eetings ta k e s  form o n ly  a f t e r  read ing through 
th e  m inutes o f  sev era l o f  th e  m eetings. S h if t s  in  the format o f  the  
m eetin g s can be d iscerned  o n ly  by sampling th e  m inutes o f  v a r io u s  m eeting  
d a te s  or by read in g  through the m inutes in  ch ron o log ica l sequence.
11
B. The '’Go-around."
C. Consensus o f  Members S ta ted  by th e  Chairman
D. D iscu ss io n  and R eso lu tio n
IV. C onsideration  o f  the D ir e c t iv e
A. D iscu ss io n  o f  th e  Wording
B. Approval o f  th e  D ir e c t iv e
V. Other B u sin ess
A. I n i t ia t io n  o f  D iscu ssio n  by the Chairman or Members
B. D iscu ss io n  by Members
C. D isp osa l o f  th e  M atter.
The approval o f  standard rep o rts  d id  not change s ig n i f ic a n t ly
during the p eriod  o f  ob servation . G enerally , th e  m eetings would open
w ith  the approval o f  the m inutes. Members o f  th e  Committee were
normally sen t co p ies  p r io r  to  the m eeting; th e r e fo r e , an o r a l  reading o f
th e  m inutes by the se cr e ta r y  was not n ecessa ry . I f  the m inutes had not
been d is tr ib u te d  p r io r  to  the m eeting, then approval was postponed u n t i l
13th e  fo llo w in g  m eeting . Only r a r e ly  was th ere a q u estion  concerning  
th e  wording o f  the m inutes . ^
The approval o f  E xecutive Committee a c t io n s  was u su a lly  without 
comment. One f in d s , however, th a t during c r i t i c a l  p er io d s , i . e . ,  
p eriod s o f  economic change, or p o lic y  change, th e  E xecutive Committee
•^M inutes o f  th e  F ederal Open Market Committee, 1936-60 and o f  I t s  
E xecutive Committee. 1936-55. R o ll No. 6 , Microcopy No. 591 , Record 
Group 82 (W ashington, D. C .: The N ation al A rch ives, 1965) ,  f .  244.
H enceforth, t h i s  p u b lic a tio n  w i l l  be re ferred  to  a s  M inutes, with the  
r o l l  and frame number ( f . )  or frame numbers ( f f . )  fo llo w in g .
^ F o r  examples o f  when th e  m inutes were q u estion ed , s e e  Minute3 , 
R o ll  6V >ff. 284-285, and R o ll 9 , f f -  271-272.
a ctio n s  were the subject o f  some d iscu ssio n . On January 11 , 1955, 
Chairman Martin c a lle d  a Federal Open Market Committee m eeting because 
he f e l t  there was a th in  l in e  between what the Executive Committee 
should handle and what should be done by the FOMC, e s p e c ia lly  when 
important economic changes were occurring. H eretofore, the Executive  
Committee was fr e e  to  conduct open market operations w ith in  the lim ita ­
t io n s  s e t  by the FCMC in  i t s  d irec tiv e  to  the E xecutive Committee. The 
E xecutive Committee was not to  in i t ia t e  an autonomous s h if t  in  p o licy . 
In the FCMC m eeting o f March 3 , 1955, i t  was decided to  m aintain about 
the same degree o f  r e s tr a in t  u n til  th e next m eeting, but i t  was not 
known whether ad d ition a l reserves would have to  be supplied in  case 
reserves tigh ten ed  e x c e ss iv e ly . Delos C. Johns, President o f  the 
Federal Reserve Bank o f S t . Louis, ra ise d  the q u estion  as to
. . . who would be making monetary p o lic y  i f  a 
d ir e c t iv e , worded in  the general terms s ta te d , were 
given to  the execu tive  committee with the suggestion  
that the execu tive  committee determine th e le v e l  o f  
free  reserv es  on th e b a sis  o f  i t s  ap p ra isa l o f  th e  
needs o f  the economy.
In further d iscu ssion
Chairman Martin s ta ted  that he had not intended to  
bring the question  up at t h i s  point but th a t he had 
contemplated suggesting la te r  in  t h is  m eeting that 
the f u l l  Committee consider whether the executive  
committee should be abolished .
At the June 22, 1955, meeting o f  th e  FOMC, Chairman M artin again 
brought up the subject o f  ab o lish in g  the Executive Committee. Martin 
f e l t  i t  d esirab le  fo r  the FOMC to  . . take the r e s p o n s ib il ity  for
15I b id . ,  R o ll 9 , f f .  108-109.
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d ec is io n s  not only o f  p o licy  but a lso  as to  open market o p era tio n s .11
Chairman Martin explained that m eetings o f  the FOMC would be held  every  
th ree  weeks, in stead  o f  each two weeks as fo r  the E xecutive Committee, 
and that a l l  the p resid en ts  o f  the Federal Reserve Banks would be in v ite d .  
In  ad d itio n ,
Chairman Martin sta ted  th at he f e l t  i t  important for  
a l l  members o f  the Board and a l l  Reserve Bank P residents  
to  be more abreast than they have been a t tim es in  the  
p a st o f developments which might a f fe c t  p o lic y . This 
was the o b je c tiv e  and purpose o f h is  suggestion  for  
a b o lish in g  th e  executive committee. There were cases in  
which Congressmen and others f e l t  th a t “is la n d s  o f  
r e s p o n s ib il i ty 11 developed in  the System, not on ly  a t the  
New York Bank but a t  other places.-*-®
The fo llow in g  statement by A llan Sproul, President o f the Federal
Reserve Bank o f New York, exposes further ram ifica tion s:
I  am overlooking—or a t  le a s t  disregarding—the r e ite r a te d  
charge o f Congressman Patman th a t Congress gave t h is  
great power o f  d irec tin g  open market operations o f the 
Federal Reserve Banks to  tw elve men, the tw elve men gave 
i t  to  f iv e ,  and the f iv e  gave i t  to  one, and i t  ended up 
in  the hands o f  Wall S tr e e t , I  continue to  c l in g  to  th e  
b e l i e f  that we shouldn't change our organ izational 
structure in  order to  tr y  to  accommodate o u rse lves to 
th e a ttack s o f the Congressman. '
President Sproul went on to  say th a t he favored continuing the Committee
in  order to  have a properly co n stitu ted  body which could meet on short
n o tice  to  r e f in e , not to  make, p o lic y , on a temporary b a s is .
Governor A. L. M ills ,  J r . ,  on the other hand, was in  favor o f  
ab o lish in g  the Committee as a de facto  procedure but not de ju re . Thus,
14
20experim entation could take p la ce . The m inutes show that a l l  o f th e
Committee members and Federal Reserve Bank P resid en ts favored th e change
except fo r  Sproul and M ills}  they accepted i t  w ith  re lu ctan ce. Malcolm
Bryan, President o f the Federal Reserve Bank o f  A tlanta, preferred  not
21to  express an opin ion . The 1955 Annual Report o f  the Board o f
Governors carried  the fo llow in g  very  b r ie f  ob ituary n o tice :
Executive Committee d iscontinued . The Federal Open Market 
Committee, comprising the seven members o f the Board o f  
Governors and f iv e  o f the p resid en ts  o f  th e  Federal 
Reserve Banks, amended i t s  regu la tion  r e la t in g  to  open 
market operations o f Federal Reserve Banks, e f f e c t iv e  June 
22, 1955, so as to  d iscontinue i t s  execu tive  committee, 
which was a standing committee co n s is t in g  o f three members 
o f  the Board and two Reserve Bank p res id en ts . The 
execu tive  committee, which was e s ta b lish ed  fo llow in g  th e  
Banking Act o f 1935, was d iscontinued in  view  o f  the  
a v a ila b i l i t y  o f  more sw ift and certa in  tr a v e l f a c i l i t i e s  
th at f a c i l i t a t e  the attendance o f the members o f the  
Federal Open Market Committee a t regu lar m eetings and make 
i t  p o ss ib le  to  gather members for  sp e c ia l m eetings on 
short n o tice  when necessary. ^
Of course, the rep orts on Executive Committee a c tio n  disappeared w ith
i t s  abolishm ent.
The Manager o f  the Open Market Account gen era lly  sent a d e ta ile d  
summary o f account a c t i v i t i e s  to  the Committee members prior to  each 
m eeting. He would then report in  the m eeting on th e most recent market 
a c t iv i t i e s .  O ccasion a lly , c la r i f ic a t io n  o f open market tran saction s  
was asked for by the members. A lso , the manager was q u ite  o ften  asked 
h is  opin ion  concerning the s ta te  o f the market. Some ou tsid e econom ists
20I b id . , f .  337.
21
Ib id . . f f .  340-341.
22Board o f Governors, Annual R eport. 1955. p . 48.
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m aintain th a t  the Account Manager, owing to  the la ck  o f  agreement among
Committee members as to  appropriate ta r g e ts , i s  r e la t iv e ly  free  to pursue
short-run ta rg e ts  as he w ishes and thus cannot be reprimanded for  h is  
23a c tio n s . Robert G. Rouse, the Account Manager during the period o f  
t h i s  study, has sta ted  th a t he was never blamed fo r  f a i l in g  to  fo llo w  
Committee in s tr u c t io n s .2 4̂, Even on those rare occasions when the appro­
p r ia te n e ss  o f  the a c t io n s  o f  the Account Manager were questioned, h is  
in te g r ity  was not. C erta in ly  the most frequent complainant o f  the 
handling o f  the Open Market Account, i f  not the on ly  ob jector  from 1951- 
1960, was Governor J . L. Robertson. However, even Robertson s ta te s ,
” . . . Without in  any way ch allen gin g  the m otives or in te n tio n s  o f the  
Manager o f  the Account, i t  i s  my b e l i e f  th a t what was done, was done in  
the wrong w ay."^
Robertson a lso  attacked  th e p ra ctice  o f approving, r a t ify in g , and 
confirming account tra n sa c tio n s . To Robertson, ’’approval" o f account 
tra n sa ctio n s  im plied approving a l l  th a t the Account Manager had done.
He preferred  only a r a t i f ic a t io n .  Chairman Martin said that
. . .  he had not considered th a t "approval” o f the  
tra n sa ctio n s n e c e ssa r ily  carried  an in d ica tio n  o f  
approval o f  the judgment used by the Manager o f the  
System Open Market Account in  carrying out the  
com m ittee's d ir e c t iv e s ;  rath er, i t  in d ica ted  an 
acceptance and r a t i f ic a t io n  o f  the a c tio n s  as being  
w ith in  the d ir e c t iv e s  issu ed . He could v is u a liz e
% a rl Brunner and Allan H. M eltzer, The Federal R eserve’ s Attach­
ment to  the Free Re serve Concept, Subcommittee on Domestic Finance, House 
Committee on Banking and Currency, 88th Congress, 2nd S ession , May 1964, 
p . 34.
^ I b i d .
2 M̂ inutes. R oll 16 , f .  361. For h is  other o b jec tio n s , see ib id . ,  
R o ll 8 , f f . 160-161, R o ll 11, f f .  81 and 180.
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the committee d isagreeing with th e  judgment o f  the 
Manager o f  the System Account and yet f e e l in g  that i t  
wished to  r a t i f y  the actions a s having been taken in  
an e ffo r t  to  carry out the p o lic y  o f the committee.
Chairman Martin went on to suggest that th e  minutes 
o f  t h is  m eeting record the view s expressed, namely, 
th at the word "approval" in  th e actions r a t ify in g  
open market tra n sa ctio n s  was not intended n e ce ssa r ily  
to  in d ica te  agreement with p rev iou sly  e s ta b lish ed  
p o lic ie s  o f  the Committee or w ith  actions and judg­
ments o f the Manager o f  the System Account in  under­
tak ing to  carry out such p o l ic ie s  but was intended to  
show agreement that th e action s taken by the Manager 
had been in  accord and w ithin th e  scope o f  the  
com m ittee's p o l ic ie s  and d ir e c t iv e s .
The Committee members unanimously agreed, includ ing  Robertson, that
Chairman M artin’ s statement accurately  r e f le c te d  t h e ir  own v iew s. They
27a lso  unanimously agreed to continue the same form o f  action .
N everth eless, a t  the November 22, I9 6 0 , m eeting of the FOMC
Robertson sa id ,
. . .  I  f in d  m yself in  a p o s it io n  where although I 
must vote to  r a t i fy  and confirm the tran saction s o f  
the Account during the past four weeks, because they  
have taken p lace and nothing can now be done about 
i t ,  I  cannot "approve" them. °
At t h is  meeting the Account Operations were then approved, r a t i f ie d ,  and
29confirmed with Robertson v o tin g  only to  r a t i f y  and confirm.
U sually economic reports by the s t a f f  follow ed the approval o f the  
standard rep orts. I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  d iscern  the content o f  some of th e  
e a r lie r  economic rep orts  owing to  the la ck  o f complete Committee m inutes.
26Ib id . . R oll 8 , f .  333.
27I b id .
28
I b id . ,  R oll 16 , f .  364.
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O ften the economic rep orts  were on ly  b r ie f ly  mentioned w ith no attempt 
being made to  summarize the p resen tation . This d e fic ien cy  dim inishes as  
th e  years progress. The minutes toward the end o f  the p eriod , I960, 
appear to  be more complete in  th e ir  e lu c id a tio n  o f the economic rep o rts. 
G enerally during the e n t ir e  period fialph A. Young, s t a f f  econom ist, pre­
sented a report on the rea l fa c to r s  in  the economy. W oodlief Thomas, 
s t a f f  econom ist, then u su a lly  fo llow ed  with a report on c r e d it  condi­
t io n s .  In  th e  la te  1950 's  when the in tern a tio n a l imbalance of payments
problem appeared to  be acute, a th ird  economic report, which concerned
30th e  imbalance problem, was quite o ften  entered in  the m eeting.
Following the s t a f f  economic rep orts, u n less  the Chairman wished 
th e  Committee to  consider some other to p ic , th e  President of the Federal 
Reserve Bank o f  New York u su a lly  presented h is  view s and recommendations 
concerning th e present economic s itu a tio n . The other members o f  th e  
Committee, as w ell a s  the Federal Reserve Bank p resid en ts who were not 
p resen tly  members o f th e  committee, then expressed th e ir  views and 
recommendations in  the so -c a lle d  11 go-around." Informal debates on areas 
o f  disagreement u su a lly  did not begin  u n t il  everyone had a chance to  
express h is  v ie w s .^
30S ta rtin g  at th e  May 5, 1959, meeting o f  the FOMC, and qu ite  fr e ­
quently th er ea fte r , Arthur W. Marget, A ssociate Economist, presented an 
economic report on the balance o f payments s itu a tio n . Ib id . . R o ll 14, 
f f .  3 U -3 1 2 .
3*1 .....................................'
 ̂ In ad d ition  to  th e  Minutes, severa l o ther sources may be o f value  
to  the student o f Committee procedure. For example, see . H astings and 
Robertson, "The M ysterious World o f  the Fed," Business Horizons, V 
(Spring, 1962), 97-104; Peter M. K eir, "The Open Market P o licy  Process,"  
Federal Reserve B u lle t in . XXIX (October, 1963), 1359-1370; Board o f  
Governors, The Federal Reserve System. Chapter XV; or Paul Meek, Open 
Market Operations (New Yorks Federal Reserve Bank o f  New York, 1964), 
p . 25.
id
At t h i s  juncture i t  i s  necessary to  make a d is t in c t io n  between the  
reaching o f a "consensus" as to  what the Committee's future economic 
p o lic y  should be and a lte r in g  or re ta in in g  the " p olicy  d irectiv e"  which 
i s  g iven  e ith e r  to  th e Executive Committee (p r io r  to  i t s  abandonment), 
or to  th e  New York Bank. Most o f the tim e, a f te r  the "go-around," 
debate on the proper economic p o lic y  did not occur. The Chairman would 
simply s ta te  what he f e l t  was the consensus o f  the Committee. U sually  
none o f  the members disagreed with h is  statem ent. This consensus 
statement served to  guide the Account Manager in  attem pting to  carry out 
the Committee’ s  w ishes. Separately and d is t in c t ly  from the consensus, 
the Committee would vote on a formal d ir e c t iv e . During the period under 
study v o tin g  on the consensus was a rare a c t , found in  the minutes only  
for  the year 1959.
The in s t i tu t io n  of v o tin g  on the consensus seems to  have occurred  
a f te r  Governor M ills  sta ted  th a t he f e l t  that the Record o f  P o lic y  
A ction did not tr u ly  r e f le c t  the in ten tio n  or a c tio n  of the Committee.
Nor did M ills  b e lie v e  th a t the statement o f  the consensus and lack  of  
ob jectio n  to  i t  co n stitu ted  a v o te . M ills  a lso  f e l t  that i t  was
im possib le to  vo te  on the typ es of problems th a t the Committee faced.
32
Only a general area o f agreement could be reached. At th e  next m eeting  
o f  the FOMC,
The Chairman . . . referred  to  a memorandum . . . which 
sta ted  th a t in  order t o  help t ig h te n  up the fa c ts  o f  
v o te s  on p o licy  d ec is io n s  in  open market m eetings, he 
proposed to  take the fo llo w in g  formal step s  at each 
meeting a f te r  the go-around. F ir s t ,  the Chair, a s  a t  
present would guide the d iscu ssio n  to  a statem ent o f the
^^Minutes, R o ll 14, f f .  659-660.
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consensus. Second, the Chair would c a l l  fo r  a record  
vo te  on th e p o lic y  in d ic a ted  by the consensus. Third, 
the Chair would c a l l  fo r  a v o te  on th e  d ir e c t iv e  to  be 
is su e d  to  the Agent Bank form ally  in s tr u c t in g  th a t Bank 
to  execu te tr a n sa c t io n s  fo r  the Open Market Account in  
accordance w ith  th e  wording o f  the d ir e c t iv e .  W hile th e  
substance o f  the suggested  procedure d id  not d i f f e r  from 
what had been understood to  be the s ig n if ic a n c e .o f  th e  
v o te  on the d ir e c t iv e  over th e y e a r s , i t  was in tended  to  
make a more com plete record  and r e so lv e  any q u estion  
whatever as to  whether the Committee a c tu a lly  voted  on 
th e p o l ic y  d e c is io n s  a s  w e ll  a s  on th e d ir e c t iv e .33
Chairman M artin went on to  say th a t a f te r  th e  consensus was s ta te d ,
". . . th e  absence o f  o b je c tio n  . . . would be regarded as th e  consensus
O i
o f  m ajority  p o s i t io n .”
At th e October 13 , 1959* and November 4 , 1959, m eetings o f  the FOMC, 
a form al v o te  on the consensus, in  a d d itio n  to  the d ir e c t iv e ,  was taken. 
In d isc u ss io n  on November 4 ,  sev era l members o f  th e  Committee in d ica ted  
th ey  p referred  the o ld  procedure. The p r a c t ic e  o f  form ally  v o tin g  on 
th e  consensus was e v id e n tly  dropped because a v o te  was not taken  a t  the  
fo llo w in g  m eeting.
The co n sid era tio n  o f  the d ir e c t iv e  alm ost always fo llo w ed  the
reach in g  o f  an understanding. A recen t study by W illiam  P. Yohe has
concentrated  on th e  record o f  v o tin g  on the p o lic y  d ir e c t iv e  in  an
attem pt to  d iscern  some o f  th e  behavior p a ttern s  and o th er ch a ra cter-
35i s t i c s  o f  th e  FOMC. I t  i s  in te r e s t in g  to  note th a t  th e consensus 
sometimes c a l le d .f o r  a s l ig h t  s h i f t  in  p o lic y  a c t io n , but th e  members o f
33I b id . . f .  700.
3^I b id . , f .  701.
33llChairman M artin commented th a t th ere  had been only one su g g estio n  
fo r  a change in  the d ir e c t iv e  during to d a y 's  d isc u ss io n . When i t  came to  
th e  l e v e l  o f  n et borrowed r e se r v e s , a t a l l y  ju s t  handed to  him by the
20
th e Committee t a c i t l y  decided not to  have t h i s  s h i f t  o f f i c i a l l y  shown by
changing the d ir e c t iv e .  I f  the understanding in vo lved  a decided s h i f t
from p r io r  p o l ic y ,  the wording o f  the d ir e c t iv e  was u su a lly  changed. Of
co u rse , the nominal amounts s ta te d  in  the d ir e c t iv e  were freq u en tly
changed, but t h i s  change d id  not r e f l e c t  a change in  th e  p o lic y  a tt itu d e
o f  th e  Committee. Not a l l  o f  th e  members o f  the FOMC recogn ized  th a t
the consensus reached o fte n  d if fe r e d  a t l e a s t  s l ig h t ly  from th e p o lic y
d ir e c t iv e  p r e se n tly  in  fo r c e . T his was revea led  in  Committee d isc u ss io n
on whether to  v o te  on th e  consensus or n o t. D elos C. Johns, P resid en t
o f  the Federal Reserve Bank o f  S t .  L ou is, sa id  th a t
. . .  he was a l i t t l e  confused by the id ea  th a t  the  
Committee would have two p o l ic y  d eterm in ation s, one 
on th e p o lic y  in d ic a ted  by the consensus and the  
oth er on the d ir e c t iv e .  He in q u ired  in  what resp ect  
th e se  two determ in ation s were thought to  be d if f e r e n t .
In  r e p ly , Mr. R ie f le r  sa id  th a t th e  Committee had 
alw ays assumed th a t th e v o te  on the d ir e c t iv e  to  
be issu e d  to  th e  Agent Bank was the v o te  on the  
p o lic y  to  be ca rr ied  out and th a t  op eration s must 
alw ays be w ith in  th a t p o lic y  fo r  the period  u n t i l  
th e next m eetin g . T his had been challen ged  w ith in  
th e p ast year or tw o, and i t  had been suggested  
th a t the Committee was n ot r e a l ly  tak in g  a  v o te  on 
p o lic y  and th a t  th e m inutes were not tr u ly  r e f l e c t ­
in g  th e  Committee's d e c is io n s  on p o lic y . As a 
r e s u lt  o f  t h i s  q u estion  having been r a is e d , th e  
procedure suggested  in  Chairman M artin’ s l e t t e r  o f  
October 9 , £  1959J  was d ev ised  as a procedure 
th a t would meet th e l e g a l  requirem ents fo r  a v o te  
which would g iv e  an a d d itio n a l chance fo r  any
S ecreta ry  in d ic a te d  th a t  a la r g e  m a jo r ity  o f  th ose  who had spoken 
appeared to  favor moving downward." Ib id . . R o ll 1 5 , f . 367. T his  
q u otation  answers a q u estio n  r a is e d  by W illiam  P. Yohe, "Whether Martin 
p r iv a te ly  keeps a scorecard and th u s i s  a b le  to  d e te c t  a c lea r  m ajority
p r io r  to  th e  v o tin g  i s  not known." "A Study o f  Federal Open Market 
Committee V otin g , 1955-64,"  The Southern Economic Journal. XXXII 
(A p r il, 1 9 6 6 ), 397.
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member who w ished to  do so to  v o te  ag a in st th e  p o lic y  
a s  s ta te d  in  the consensus. T h is was in  a d d itio n  t o  
th e v o te  on th e d ir e c t iv e  to  th e  Agent B a n k .3 °
P resid en t Johns went on to  s t a t e  th at i t  seemed th a t  proposed procedure
im p lied  an adm ission th a t th ere  was a d iffe r e n c e  between the d ir e c t iv e
and Committee p o l ic y  and th a t th e Committee was g u i l t y  o f  not having
37recorded i t s  p a st p o lic y  a c t io n s  c o r r e c t ly . A lfred  Hayes, P resid en t
o f  th e  Federal R eserve Bank o f  New York, commented th a t  such an
in te r p r e ta t io n  m ight be p o s s ib le  but th a t  an a lte r n a t iv e  in te r p r e ta t io n
was th a t " . . .  th e  d ir e c t iv e  s ta te s  p o l ic y  in  very  broad terms and th a t
t h i s  ^~new procedure_7 was a step  to  r e f in e  i t  more d e f in i t e ly  w ith in
38th a t  broad p o lic y ."
P resid en t Hayes’ in te r p r e ta t io n , th a t  the consensus serv es  to  
r e f in e  th e  d ir e c t iv e  but a c ts  w ith in  th e  d ir e c t iv e ,  i s  in te r e s t in g ,  but 
perhaps n ot always c o rr ec t . At severa l turn ing p o in ts  in  System p o lic y ,  
th e consensus reached c a lle d  fo r  a change from ease  toward r e s t r ic t io n  
or v ic e  v ersa , but th e d ir e c t iv e  was n o t changed. In f a c t ,  the  
d ir e c t iv e  was u su a lly  changed only some months a f t e r  th e  f i r s t  s h i f t  in  
p o lic y . Perhaps t h i s  d elay  was due to  th e  re lu ctan ce  o f  th e  Committee 
to  commit i t s e l f  p u b lic ly  concerning economic changes u n t i l  i t  was 
p o s i t iv e ly  sure o f  a change in  the economic trend . S tu d ies  o f  th e  FOMC 
which have dated la g s  from th e  changes in  the d ir e c t iv e  can on ly  be in  
er ro r . T his p o in t i s  d iscu ssed  in  con sid erab le  d e t a i l  in  Chapter IV o f  
t h i s  study.
3 M in u te s . R o ll  14 , f f .  7 8 6 -7 8 8 ."
37I b id .
38Ib id .
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One may surmise th a t  th e con troversy  over consensus changes v s .
d ir e c t iv e  changes le d  t o  th e  r e v is io n  in  th e form o f  the d ir e c t iv e  which
39took  p lace  in  December 1961. The present in s tr u c t io n s  fo r  open market 
o p era tio n s are contained  in  two d ir e c t iv e s .  As exp la in ed  by Systan  
o f f i c i a l s ,
One i s  a "continu ing a u th o r ity  d ir e c t iv e ,"  which i s  
review ed a t l e a s t  once a y ea r . I t  s e t s  the te c h n ic a l  
l i m i t s  on o p era tio n s—in d ic a t in g  such th in g s  a s  the  
ty p e s  o f  s e c u r it ie s  th a t may be bought or so ld , the  
procedures to  be fo llow ed  in  tr a n sa c tio n s , and th e  
co n d itio n s  under which repurchase agreements may be 
made w ith  d e a le r s . The o th er  i s  th e  current p o l ic y  
d ir e c t iv e  v o ted  a t each m eeting. T h is s ta te s  th e  
p resen t o b je c t iv e s  o f open market p o l ic y  and g iv e s  
guidance, in  l i g h t  o f th e  Committee’ s  d isc u s s io n s , to  
th e  Account Manager in  implementing Committee p o lic y  
u n t i l  the n ext m eeting,^
The "current economic p o l ic y  d ire c tiv e"  seems to  be changed rather
freq u en tly  whereas, during the period  under study, th e  o ld e r  s in g le
d ir e c t iv e  was not changed very o f te n . One may surmise th a t the
le th a r g ic  behavior o f th e  o ld er d ir e c t iv e  was due to th e  p a r t ia l
u su rp ation , by the con sen su s, o f  i t s  fu n ction  a s  a m irror o f the
Committee’ s economic th in k in g .
R elated  to  t h is  i s  th e  frequency o f d is s e n ts  found in  v o tin g  on th e
d ir e c t iv e .  When the m inutes o f  th e  FOMC are r e le a sed  fo r  more recen t
y ea rs  th ey  may rev e a l th a t  some o f  th e d iffe r e n c e s  o f  op in ion  which
norm ally were expressed  in  the reach in g  of a consensus are now r e f le c te d
in  th e v o t in g  on th e  "current economic p o lic y  d ir e c t iv e ."  This may be
30
Board o f  Governors, Annual R eport. 1961 . pp. 89 -9 9 .
^ B oard  o f  Governors o f  the Federal R eserve System, The Federal 
R eserve System s Purposes and Functions (W ashington, D. C .s Board o f  
Governors, 1 9 6 ? ), p . 245*
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one fa c to r  which accounts for Yohe’ s fin d in g  th at th ere have been an
in crea sin g  number o f  d isse n ts  recorded in  the p o lic y  d ec is io n s  by the  
41Committee. Table I  in  Yohe’ s study, which i s  reproduced here a s  Table 
I ,  in d ic a te s  th a t there was a sharp r i s e  in  d issen tin g  vo tes  beginning  
in  1962, the f i r s t  year in  which the new dual d ir e c t iv e  was in  operation. 
For example, the number o f  d issen tin g  v o tes  cast in  the year 1962 i s  
equal to  the t o ta l  number o f  d issen tin g  votes c a s t  in  a l l  o f  the prior  
years in  the ta b le , 1955-1961.
TABLE I
OPEN MARKET COMMITTEE POLICY DECISIONS AND DISSENTS, 1955-64&
Year D ecisions on 
economic p o lic y  
d ir e c t iv e s
S p lit
d ec is io n s
No. o f  d issen tin g  vot




1955 14 1 0 3 3
1956 19 0 0 0 0
1957 18 2 0 2 2
1958 23 2 1 2 3
1959 18 4 0 4 4
I960 17 4 1 6 7
1961 18 1 0 4 4
1962 18 12 6 17 23
1963 19 13 10 18 2S
1964 18 a 4 10 14
T o ta ls  182 47 22 66 88
Source: W illiam  P, Yohe, nA Study o f  Federal Open Market Committee
V oting, 1955-1964," Southern Economic Journal, XXXII (A p ril, 1966), 398.
^ W illiam  P. Yohe, WA Study o f  Federal Open Market Committee V oting, 
1955-1964," Southern Economic Journal. XXXII  (A p r il, 1966), 398.
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During the period o f  t h is  study d ir e c tiv e  changes were ty p ic a l ly
made in  the fo llo w in g  manner. During the "go-around" one or more
members o f  the Committee wculd suggest a change in  the wording o f  th e
d ir e c t iv e .  Chairman Martin would then add h is  own f e e l in g s .  The
s p e c if ic  change in  the wording o f  the d ir e c t iv e  would then  be in form ally
agreed upon a f te r  some d iscu ssio n  in  which d iffe re n ce s  o f opinion were
u su a lly  ironed ou t. F in a lly , a motion would be made and a formal vo te
taken. The fo llow in g  passage from the minutes captures th is  process:
Chairman Martin a lso  referred  to  the d ir e c t iv e , s ta t in g  
that th ere seemed to  be some d ifferen ce  o f f e e l in g  on the 
d e s ir a b il i ty  o f  a change. He r e ite r a te d  the comment that 
recogn ition  in  the d ir e c t iv e  o f  s h i f t s  in  p o lic y  had a 
good deal o f m erit, p a r tic u la r ly  a t a time l ik e  t h is  when 
the Committee had completed the f i r s t  two years o f a 
r e s tr ic t iv e  monetary p o lic y  during which the c a p ita l  
markets had been moving aga in st th at p o lic y . Chairman 
Martin went on to  say that he d iscu ssed  w ith Mr. R ie f le r  
the question  o f  the d ir e c t iv e  before th is  m eeting and 
that he was prepared to  suggest a change in  c la u se  (b) o f 
the d ir e c t iv e  to  d e le te  the present wording a f te r  the  
word "growth" and change i t  so that i t  would read "to 
restra in in g  in fla t io n a r y  developments in  th e  in te r e s t  o f  
susta in ab le economic growth, w hile recogn izin g  u n se ttled  
con d ition s in  the money, c r e d it ,  and ca p ita l m arkets.”
His in c lin a t io n  now was to  prefer the wording Mr. Hayes 
had suggested, but he d id  not th in k  the m atter was o f  
great importance. There fo llow ed a d iscu ss io n , in  the  
course o f  which Mr. Hayes expressed the view th a t th e  
wording prepared by the Chairman was e n t ir e ly  
sa tis fa c to r y . Out o f th is  d iscu ssio n  came agreement th a t  
clause (b) o f the d ir e c t iv e  should be changed to  d e le te  
the words "while recognizing a d d itio n a l pressures in  the 
money, c r e d it ,  and ca p ita l markets r e su lt in g  from seasonal 
fa c to rs  and in tern a tio n a l con d ition s,"  and th a t i t  should 
be r e s ta te d ,to  read . . . ^~as f i r s t  sta ted  by the  
Chairman. _7
The Manager o f  the Open Market Account must get h is  cue from the 
d ir e c t iv e ,  the consensus, and the economic d iscu ssio n  which tak es p lace
^ M inutes. R o ll 11 , f f .  37-38.
in  the Committee m eeting. Robert Rouse has in d icated  th a t the consensus 
i s  more sp e c if ic  than the d ir e c t iv e  but th a t i t  i s  s t i l l  general. He 
went on t o  say, "The view s expressed in  . . . £" the d iscu ssio n  during 
th e  go-around_7 serve as an important supplement to  th e  more formal 
statement o f  the d ir e c t iv e  and the consensus, and fu rn ish  a number of  
a d d ition a l gu ideposts ^"targets_7  fo r  day-to-day o p era tio n s ." ^
I I I .  ECONOMIC INDICATORS CONSIDERED BY THE COMMITTEE
Economic in d ica to rs  serve as an a id  in  d etec tin g  changes which may
44c a l l  fo r  dynamic or d efen sive  op erations. The Committee's s t a f f
p resen ts economic rep orts a t each m eeting which review  changes in
s ig n if ic a n t  economic v a r ia b le s . In a d d itio n , Committee members, during
the go-around, may bring up s p e c if ic  reg ion a l or other inform ation which
45they f e e l  to  be o f  importance. This portion  o f th e  study b r ie f ly  
surveys the in d ica to rs  presented by the s ta f f  which rev ea l output, 
employment, and p r ice  con d ition s as w e ll  as the con d ition  o f f in a n c ia l  
m arkets. A lso , in d ica to rs  presented by the Committee members which 
p erta in  to  reg ion al and n ation a l con d ition s are mentioned.
^ R ob ert G. Rouse, "Implementation o f the P o l ic ie s  o f the Federal 
Open Market Committee," Monthly Review. Federal Reserve Bank o f New York 
(J u ly , 1961), p. 127.
^ h i l e  the Federal Reserve System i s  attem pting to achieve lon g-  
run g o a ls , such as sta b le  p r ic e s , a high le v e l  o f output and income, and 
a reasonable balance in  our in ter n a tio n a l payments, i t  a lso  attem pts to  
o f f s e t  th e  impact o f  short-run d isru p tive  fo rces  in  th e  monetary system. 
This f i r s t  r e s p o n s ib il ity , th a t  o f economic s ta b il iz a t io n , i s  sometimes 
referred  to  as the dynamic r e s p o n s ib il ity  o f  the System. The second i s  
c a lle d  the d efen sive  r e s p o n s ib il ity . Robert V. Roosa, Federal Reserve 
Operations in  the Money and Government S e c u r it ie s  Market (NewYorks 
Federal Reserve Bank o f  New York, 1956), p . 105.
45Board o f Governors, The Federal Reserve System, pp. 242-243.
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In  reading th e  m inutes, one i s  overwhelmed by th e  m u lt ip l ic i ty  o f
in d ic a to r s  o f economic w e ll-b e in g  which are mentioned by s t a f f  members
during the ten  years covered by t h is  stu d y . Some o f  the in d ic a to r s  are
m entioned freq u en tly , such as the Federal Reserve index o f  in d u str ia l
production , p r ic e  in d ic e s ,  government spending, unemployment, and
in v e n to r ie s . Others appear l e s s  freq u e n tly , such a s  t e x t i l e  production,
46farm co n d itio n s , and b u sin ess  fa i lu r e s .  One can surmise th a t the
4 7
Committee i s  fo llo w in g  th e  "exception p r in c ip le"  o f management. That
i s ,  when op erations ( in d ic a to r s )  are continuing in  a normal fa sh io n , the
Committee i s  not to  be n o t if ie d .  But, when excep tion s appear, th e
Committee i s  to  be so inform ed.
Exceptions in  sev era l in d ica to rs  may give n o tic e  th at a turn ing
p o in t may be n ear. In such ca ses , most o f  the in d ic a to r s  are
sc ru tin iz ed . For example, a t the November 12 , 1957, meeting o f  th e
Committee, which took p la ce  four months a f te r  the date which th e
n a tio n a l Bureau o f  Economic Research p in p o in ts  a s  a business cy c le  peak,
Ralph A. Young, s ta f f  econom ist, d e liv e re d  an economic rep ort, a part o f
which fo llo w s below:
A fter f iv e  months o f l i t t l e  change, output a t fa c to r ie s  
and mines i s  expected to  show a drop o f  as much as 2 
index p o in ts  from September to  October. D eclin es in  
a c t iv i t y  were widespread, although most conspicuous 
in  durable goods l in e s .
Both fr e ig h t  car load ings and e le c t r ic  power generation  
in  October were o f f  m oderately fu r th er . The d ec lin e
See Appendix A fo r  a more complete l i s t  o f  economic in d ica to r s  
m entioned by th e  s t a f f  which reveal output, p r ic e , and employment 
co n d itio n s .
^ W illia m  H. Newman and Charles E. Summer, J r . ,  The Process o f  
Management (Englewood C l i f f s :  P r en tiee -H a ll, I n c . ,  1952), p . 406.
in  car lo a d in g s  exten d s a d e c lin e  that began in  A p r il,  
and th a t fo r  power gen eration  a d ec lin e  th a t  commenced 
in  August.
W hile t o t a l  new con stru ction  h o ld s  a t  a h igh  l e v e l ,  
in d u s tr ia l  co n stru ctio n  continued the d e c lin e  which 
se t  in  in  May.
B usiness in ven tory  accum ulation has slowed markedly in  
recent m onths. In m anufacturing, w ith d e c lin e s  
occurring in  new orders and s a le s ,  the in v e n to r y -sa le s  
r a t io  in  September was a t  l e v e l s  consid erab ly  above the  
average o f  th e  p ast two y ea rs .
B usiness c a p ita l  spending p lan s fo r  the y ea r  ahead are  
o f f  s ig n i f ic a n t ly ,  w ith  a d e c lin e  in  exp en d itu res o f  a 
ten th  or more from current l e v e l s  in d ic a te d  over th e  
next four q u arters.
Nonfarm employment receded fu rth er  in  October from th e  
August peak. R eductions in  b oth  m anufacturing and non­
m anufacturing l i n e s ,  though sm a ll, were w idespread.
Only S ta te  £ /s ic _ 7  and lo c a l  government employment 
r e g is te r e d  an in c r e a se , a lthough  serv ice  and trade  
employment held  about even.
Unemployment in  O ctober, a f te r  allow ance fo r  seasonal 
fa c to r s , ro se  to  4 .6  per cent o f  the la b o r  fo r c e , a f t e r  
holding a t  4 .2  per cen t for th r e e  months, and i n i t i a l  
claim s fo r  unemployment insurance averaged 45 per cent  
higher than  in  October of l a s t  year. The average  
len g th  o f  th e  work week in  m anufacturing, a f te r  
s t a b i l i t y  over recen t months, d ec lin ed  h a lf  an hour to  
39 .5  hours; red u ction s in  hours, though accen tu ated  by 
the f lu  epidem ic, were w idespread, and operated  to  
reduce w eekly ea rn in g s, the average fo r  which f e l l  one 
d o lla r .
T ota l r e t a i l  s a le s ,  w hich d e c lin e d  n early  1 per cent in  
September, f e l l  fu r th er  in  O ctober, p o s s ib ly  by 2 per  
cen t. P erson al income was apparently a ls o  down in  
October fo r  th e second co n secu tiv e  month, w ith  the  
d ec lin e  concentrated  in  wages and s a la r ie s .
U. S. exp orts  f e l l  sharply in  September t o  about 10 per  
cent under th e  average o f  th e  preceding th ree  months.
P r ic e s  o f  s e n s it iv e  or b a sic  in d u s tr ia l  m a te r ia ls
d eclin ed  somewhat fu rth er  in  recen t weeks and are now 
not much above the 1954 r e c e s s io n  low.
S in ce J u ly , b u sin ess  lo a n s  at c i t y  banks have been s ta b le ,  
compared w ith  su b s ta n tia l growth in  a l l  o th er recen t  
years excep t 1954. The d ec lin e  in  such lo a n s  during  
October, which was s iz a b le , was th e f i r s t  October 
d ec lin e  o f  th e postwar p eriod .
In  Canada, r e c e ss io n  te n d en c ie s  have become f a ir ly  c le a r .  
In Europe, in d u s tr ia l  a c t iv i t y  by la te  spring had 
ceased expanding and through September had tapered o f f
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m oderately. With the exchange p o s it io n  o f  many 
in f la t io n a r y  development econom ies t ig h t ,  world trade  
im pulses stemming from th e se  econom ies seem more , g
l ik e ly  to  be co n tra c tiv e  than su sta in in g  or expansive.
When economic co n d itio n s  are  l e s s  su sp ec t , th e economic rep ort may be 
49q u ite  b r ie f .
S ta f f  members a lso  p resen t a rep o rt on th e co n d itio n  o f  f in a n c ia l  
m arkets. A few major in d ic a to r s  are m entioned q u ite  o ften ; th ese  
in c lu d e in te r e s t  r a te s ,  bank r e se r v e s , th e  money supply, market f e e l ,  
Treasury b a lan ces, and Treasury f in a n c in g s . In a d d itio n , l iq u id i t y ,  
v e lo c i t y ,  the f l o a t ,  gold  f lo w s , monetary r e g u la tio n  changes, and 
market ex p ec ta tio n s  are fr eq u en tly  con sid ered . ̂
The importance o f  the rep ort on th e  co n d itio n  of f in a n c ia l  v a r ia b le s  
becomes c lea r  when one r e a l iz e s  th at th e  System attem pts to  reach i t s  
major g o a ls  by a lt e r in g  f in a n c ia l  v a r ia b le s .  Thus, the f in a n c ia l market 
i s  examined to  determine th e  impact o f  System o p eration s a s  w e ll  as  to  
lo c a te  and id e n t i f y  autonomous changes in  f in a n c ia l  v a r ia b le s  which may 
a id  or hinder system  p o lic y . I t  would seem im p ra ctica l to  concurrently  
use a f in a n c ia l v a r ia b le  a s  both an in d ic a to r  and a ta r g e t .  I f  a 
v a r ia b le  i s  b e in g  used as a ta r g e t , th e  impact o f  System op eration s w i l l  
c e r ta in ly  a lt e r  i t s  magnitude. However, the ta r g e t  v a r ia b le  can s t i l l  
measure or in d ic a te  the gap between i t s  present l e v e l  and the d esired  
l e v e l .  Thus, in  a  sense th e  v a r ia b le  i s  serv in g  as an in d ic a to r .
M i n u t e s . R o ll  11, f f .  666-668.
49
I b id . ,  R o ll  10 , f .  685.
50See Appendix B fo r  a more com plete l i s t  o f  economic in d ic a to r s  
which report th e  con d ition  o f  f in a n c ia l  markets a s  mentioned by the  
s t a f f .
29
W oodlief Thomas, s t a f f  econom ist, brought t h is  out in  the fo llo w in g  
statem ent:
The t o t a l  volume o f  r e se r v es  su p p lied  p resen ts  a goai 
ta rg et_ 7  and a measure o f  performance £ " in d ica to r_ 7  
th a t  i s  d ir e c t ly  r e la te d  to  the broader goa l /™ target_7  
o f  making a v a ila b le  an adequate volume o f  bank c r e d it  
and money.
A lso , th e  in te r r e la t io n  o f  d if f e r e n t  f in a n c ia l  v a r ia b le s  may cause
d i f f i c u l t y .  R ie f le r ,  in  defending the " b i l l s  on ly” d o c tr in e , brought
out t h i s  p o in t ,
The d i f f i c u l t y  o f  d ec id in g  on th e  appropriate volume
o f  r e se r v e s  i s  m agnified  when th e  most re lev a n t
in d ic a to r s  o f  co n d itio n s  in  the long-term  c a p ita l  
m arkets are d e f le c te d  by tr a n s ie n t  or short-run  
resp on ses to  th e  System 's own o p era tio n s .-’
The major v a r ia b le  in  th e  f in a n c ia l  system which the Federal
R eserve b e l ie v e s  i t  can co n tro l i s  the t o t a l  o f commercial bank r e ser v e s .
The importance o f  t h i s  v a r ia b le  to  the System can be seen from th e
fo llo w in g  statem ent:
Whatever broad in f lu e n c e s  may flow  from t h e ir  a c t io n s ,  
the Board o f  Governors and the Federal Open Market 
Committee are f u l ly  aware th a t th e  p a r tic u la r  economic 
or f in a n c ia l  v a r ia b le  over which they  have anything  
approaching f u l l  and d ir e c t  co n tro l i s  th e  t o t a l  o f  
commercial bank r e s e r v e s . Through t h is  c o n tr o l, th ey  
e x e r t  a stron g  in flu e n c e  d ir e c t ly  on t o t a l  lo a n s  and 
investm ents and t o t a l  d e p o s its  o f  banks and in d ir e c t ly  
some in flu e n c e  on spending, in vestm en t, and saving by 
th e p u b lic  in  g en era l. At any g iven  moment, th e r e fo r e ,  
th e  choice fo r  Federal Reserve p o l ic y  l i e s  between
^ T ood lief Thomas, O peration o f th e  Monetary System in  the U, S. A ., 
Memorandum Submitted a t  the Request o f  the Royal Commission on Banking 
and F inance, Ottawa, Canada, May 1962 (Washingtons Federal Reserve 
Board, 1 9 6 2 ), p . 35 .
52W. W. R ie f le r ,  "Open Market O perations in  Long-Term S e c u r it ie s ,"  
F ederal R eserve B u l le t in .XLIV (November, 195S)> 1274.
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various degrees o f  r e s tr a in t  upon or encouragement 
to  expansion o f  bank cr ed it  through a ltered  reserve  
a v a i la b i l i t y .^3
Hence, Committee members are in te r e ste d  in  the current l e v e l  o f  to ta l
bank re se rv es . While the appropriate le v e l  o f  bank reserv es  fo r  a g iven
economic s itu a t io n  i s  a su b jective  m atter, the Committee members seem to
match t h is  "desired" le v e l  which they  have in  mind against the present
le v e l  in  determining whether ad d ition a l reserves should be supplied or
n ot. In  keeping w ith t h i s  th e  s t a f f  rep orts  consider short-run
f in a n c ia l changes which might a f fe c t  t o ta l  bank reserves and thus the
economy. The d efen sive a sp ects  o f  System a ctio n  are aimed at ironing
out th ese  short-run f in a n c ia l changes. The System i s  most in te r e ste d  in
p ro jec tin g  th e impact o f  fu ture Treasury refunding op erations,
a n tic ip a ted  changes in  the f lo a t ,  cash drain , e t c . ,  so th at i t  may take
54o f f s e t t in g  a ctio n s i f  necessary.
One d i f f ic u l t y  encountered in  using f in a n c ia l in d ica to rs  i s  that 
o cca s io n a lly  they may g ive  c o n f lic t in g  s ig n a ls . For example, a r is in g  
l e v e l  o f  fr e e  reserv es  may in d ica te  market ease but a concomitant 
decrease in  t o ta l  bank reserv es  or the money supply, which i s  p o ss ib le ,  
would in d ica te  the op p osite . A lso , a constant free  reserve l e v e l  may 
take on d iffe r e n t  meaning depending upon i t s  d is tr ib u tio n  between c i ty  
and country banks. A constant money stock may have d iffe r e n t  meanings
C O ................................................................................................................................... ..................................................................
Commission on Money and C red it, The Federal Reserve and the 
Treasury; Answers to  Questions from the Commission on Money and Credit 
(Englewood C l i f f s :  P ren tice -H a ll, I n c .,  1963), p. 3 . Reprinted by
perm ission o f  the p u b lish er.
54The System may a lso  absta in  from tak ing o f f s e t t in g  a c tio n  when 
th e change in  autonomous fa c to r s  i s  in  the d irec tio n  d esired  by the 
System for p o lic y  purposes.
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depending upon the behavior o f  v e lo c i t y .  The m inutes re v ea l that th e  
Committee members are aware o f  many such l im ita t io n s .
I t  appears th a t a great deal o f  confusion  e x is t s  among econom ists  
as to  th e  ex ten t o f  fo r e ca stin g  used by the System. H astings and 
Robertson in d ica te  th a t th ere  i s  an unw ritten ru le  a g a in st fo r ec a stin g  
o f  b u sin ess co n d itio n s  in  the System w hile A llan  H. M eltzer in d ic a te s  
the Federal Reserve has been q u ite  su ccess fu l in  p red ic tin g  or observing  
economic changes. C o n flic t in g  statem ents by System o f f i c i a l s  have o n ly
t j f
added to  the con fu sion . In reading the m inutes, one cannot but note
56th a t f in a n c ia l  p ro jec tio n s  are th e ru le  rath er than th e excep tion . In
a co n fid e n tia l memorandum to  members o f  the E xecutive Committee t i t l e d
"Guides fo r  Open Market O perations, September-December 1952," W oodlief
Thomas, in  ad d ition  to  su ggestin g  severa l ta r g e ts  which the Committee
might u se , included  a ta b le  p a r t ia l ly  prefaced  by th ese  statem ents:
The fo llo w in g  ta b le  shows a se t  o f  p ro jected  f ig u r e s  
o f  c r e d it  and monetary expansion fo r  1952 as a whole 
and fo r  th e l a s t  four months o f the y ea r , compared with  
s im ila r  f ig u r e s  fo r  1951. While i t  i s  not p o ss ib le  to  
know p r e c is e ly  whether th e  projected  f ig u r e s  are la rg er  
or sm aller than reasonable needs w ithout in f la t io n  or 
undue r e s tr a in t ,  th ey  are b e liev ed  t o  be m oderate,57
^^William P. Yohe, "The Open Market Committee D ecisio n  P rocess and 
th e 1964 Patman Hearings," N ational Banking Review. I l l  (March, 1965) ,  
355.
56
For evidence o f  f in a n c ia l  p r o je c tio n s , see the m inutes o f  the  
fo llo w in g  Committee m eetings: August 8 , 1951j July  22, 1952; October 
22, 1952; September 8 , 1953; A pril 13 , 1954; A p ril 26, 1955; September 
1 , 1956; and May 5 , 1959.
57  ..........  ............................
W oodlief Thomas, Guides fo r  Open Market O perations, September-
December 1952. Memorandum Submitted to  the E xecutive Committee o f  the  
Federal Open Market Committee, August 28, 1952 (Washington: Board o f
Governors o f  the Federal Reserve System, 1 9 5 2 ), p . 3 .
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These p ro je c tio n s  are presented  not as fo r e c a s ts  but 
as an in d ic a tio n  o f  c r e d it  demands th at might 
reasonably be met w ithout con tribu tin g  to  in f la t io n .
The fo llo w in g  excerpt from the m inutes i s  evidence th a t the
E xecutive Committee considered the memorandum and recogn ized  th a t the
Account Manager should consider t h is  inform ation along w ith  th e p o lic y
d ir e c t iv e  o f  th e  Committee:
As an outgrowth o f  the d iscu ss io n , i t  was the consensus  
th a t a long-term  p ro jec tio n  o f  the demand fo r  bank 
reserv es  such a s  th e  assumption o f  a $2 b i l l i o n  in crease  
in  p r iv a te ly -h e ld  demand d ep o sits  during th e year 1952, 
could be u se fu l as a general guide to open market 
op era tio n s. I t  was a lso  the consensus th a t ,  having in  
mind t h i s  general p ro jec tio n  fo r  c re d it  demand, i t  would 
be h e lp fu l to  r e la te  open market purchases to  the amount 
o f  member bank borrowings. However, i t  was not p o ss ib le  
to  fo r e c a s t  on the b a s is  o f  p r o je c tio n s  the exact amount 
o f  re serv es  th a t should be put in to  the market over a 
given period  or to  use such fo r e c a s ts  as a b a s is  for  
determ ining r ig id ly  in  advance the volume o f  tra n sa ctio n s  
in  the System open market account, s in ce  i t  was necessary  
th a t the management o f  the account have day-to-day  
ad m in istra tive  d isc r e t io n  in  carrying out the d ir e c t io n s  
o f  the ex ecu tiv e  committee in  th e l ig h t  o f  the general 
p o l ic ie s  determined by the Open Market Committee. ^
Evidence i s  a lso  present in  the m inutes th a t GNP fo r e c a s ts  are made 
and presented to  th e C om m ittee.^  However, the Committee, during the  
period  o f  t h is  stu d y , remained wary o f  changing i t s  economic p o lic y  
pu rely  on the b a s is  o f  economic fo r e c a s ts . The usual course, as w i l l  be 
shown in  Chapter IV, was fo r  the Committee to a c t on the b a s is  o f  
s t a t i s t i c a l  ev idence o f  a change in  economic in d ic a to r s  which th e  
Committee considered to  be re le v a n t. S t r ic t ly  speaking, t h is  la t t e r
58
I b id . ,  p . 7 .
^ M in u tes. R o ll 6 , f .  491 . 
Ib id . . f f .  508-509.
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approach i s  a form o f economic fo reca stin g . The "barometric" method o f
economic fo reca stin g  u t i l i z e s  economic in d ica to r s , such as those
examined by the Federal Reserve and the N ational Bureau o f  Economic
Research. This barometric method i s  based on the premise that s in ce
th in g s  have happened in  the past in  a cer ta in  way they w i l l  probably
behave s im ila r ly  in  the fu tu re. While the Committee examines lead in g
in d ic a to r s , such as b u ild in g  co n tra cts , b u sin ess fa ilu r e s ,  and new
orders fo r  durable goods, i t  seems to  a c t  more on the changes in  the
coincident in d ica to rs . Chapter IV o f t h i s  study, in  i t s  examination o f
th e Committee's response to  economic changes, v e r i f ie s  t h is  p o in t. One
innovation in  the s t a f f  rep orts which occurs la t e  in  the period under
study i s  th e  appearance o f d iffu s io n  indexes. The fo llo w in g  passage i s
a sample o f  such use:
One way to  summarize the widespread nature o f  the  
s h i f t s  from March to  April i s  in  terms o f d iffu s io n  
indexes for  lead in g  and coincident in d ic a to rs ,  
v ir tu a l ly  a l l  o f  which increased  in  A pril . . . *0n
a month-to-month b a s is ,  a d iffu s io n  index for  f iv e
groups o f  lea d in g  s e r ie s  was above 50 per cent in
A p ril, a fte r  hovering in  the low 3 0 's in  February
and March. S im ila r ly , the index for  the three  
roughly co incident groups was up above.70 per cen t, 
from the 4 0 ' s in  the preceding months.
The Committee seems to  have eschewed a lte r n a tiv e  approaches to  
fo reca stin g — such as the a n a ly tic a l or econometric approaches. In the  
fu tu re , however, the Federal Reserve may w e ll attempt to  use th ese means. 
In  a recen t address Governor M itch ell sta ted  th at an econometric model
i s  under con stru ction  which w i l l  incorporate the causal chains which
respond to  system a c t io n s . Governor M itch ell sa id , "The main purposes
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o f  such a model are to  a id  in  short-term  fo re c a stin g  and to  e s ta b lis h
th e  l ik e ly  e f f e c t s  o f a lte r n a te  monetary p o l ic ie s  on major economic
aggregates. I t  w i l l  be used to  supplement, and in  conjunction  w ith , the
62judgmental models we cu rren tly  use in  our p o lic y  form ation .”
During the ”go-around,” th e Committee members spoke o f  c r e d it
demand, farm p r ic e s  and co n d itio n s , consumer buying, co n stru ctio n , and
63oth er in d ic a to r s  for th e ir  d i s t r i c t s .  However, t h is  inform ation  
seemed, fo r  the most p a r t , on ly  to  confirm the gen eral s t a t i s t i c s  
presented  by the s t a f f .  The one in d ica to r  presented  by the members but 
g en era lly  om itted  by the s t a f f  was the optimism o f  businessm en. By 
v ir tu e  o f  t h e ir  p o s it io n , the Reserve Bank P resid en ts  have the  
opportun ity  to  learn  the v iew s o f  the d ir ec to r s  o f  th e ir  r e sp ec tiv e  
banks as w e ll  a s  the v iew s o f  the lea d in g  bankers and businessmen in  
th e ir  reg io n . Some observers have argued th a t t h i s  in form ation  could
64ju s t  as w e l l  be presented  v ia  w r itten  rep ort.
This chapter o f th e  study, by tra c in g  the development o f  th e  
Federal Open Market Committee and b r ie f ly  surveying the economic
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George W. M itch e ll, "Some Current Problems o f Monetary P o licy ,"  
Remarks o f  George W. M itc h e ll, Member, Board o f  Governors o f the Federal 
R eserve System a t the J o in t  Luncheon Meeting o f  the Southern Economic 
A sso c ia tio n  and Southern Finance A sso c ia tio n , A tlan ta , Georgia, November 
1 1 , 1966 (Washington: Board o f  Governors, 1966), p . 6 .
63For example, see th e  m inutes o f  the fo llo w in g  Committee m eetings: 
December 6 ,  1952; March 4 ,  1953; June 11, 1953; March 3* 1954; December 
7 , 1954; January 11, 1955; and March 2 , 1955*
^ F o r  example, see M ichael D. Reagan, "The P o l i t i c a l  S tructure of  
th e Federal Reserve System," American P o l i t i c a l  Science Review, LV 
(March, 1 9 6 1 ), 64-76. Reagan argues for a b o lish in g  the Committee, 
p la c in g  open market op erations in  th e hands o f  the Chairman, and making 
th e  Chairman accountable to  the P resident o f  the United S ta te s .
in d ic a to r s  used by i t ,  paves the way fo r  Chapter I I I ,  which g iv e s  a 
d e ta ile d  exam ination o f  th e  development and use o f  some o f  th e  major 
ta r g e ts  used by the Committee. Chapter IV examines monetary la g s .
CHAPTER III
TARGETS USED BY THE FOMC IN POLICY ACTION
Chapter I I I  i s  devoted to  examining th e  major ta r g e ts  which have 
been used by the Committee during the p eriod  under study. S p e c if ic a l ly  
in te r e s t  r a te s ,  fr e e  re se r v e s , t o t a l  r e se r v e s , the money supply, and 
tone and f e e l  o f  the market w i l l  be considered. T his chapter in d ic a te s  
th e  degree o f  importance which the Committee p la ces  upon each o f  the 
in d ic a to r -ta r g e ts  as  w e ll as changes in  Committee a t t itu d e  toward and 
confidence in  them. These ta r g e ts  are most freq u en tly  revea led  in  the  
d iscu ss io n  by the Committee members during the "go-around." A lso , the  
ta r g e ts  may be mentioned in  the consensus statem ent. The d ir e c t iv e  i s  
u su a lly  s ta ted  in  terms too broad to  in clu d e them.
I .  INTEREST RATES AS A TARGET
The Federal Reserve has lon g  recogn ized  that in te r e s t  r a te s  not 
on ly  may fu n ctio n  as an in d ic a to r  o f  the con d ition  o f  f in a n c ia l  markets 
but a lso  may be used a s  a ta rg et.^ - The degree to  which in te r e s t  ra te s  
have been used as a ta r g e t , however, has varied  con sid erab ly  over the 
l a s t  tw en ty -fiv e  y ea rs .
■H/oodlief Thomas, Operation o f  the Monetary System in  th e U. S. A. 
Memorandum Submitted a t the Request o f  the Royal Commission on Banking 
and Finance, Ottawa, Canada, May 1962 (Washington, D. C .: Federal
Reserve Board, 1962), pp. 50-51. A lso , see the Commission on Money and 
C red it, The Federal Reserve and the Treasury; Answers to  Q uestions 
from the Commission on Money and Credit (Englewood C lif f s :  P r en tice -
H a ll, I n c . ,  1963), pp. 13-15* 21.
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During th e Second World War, th e  Federal Reserve began pegging th e
in te r e s t  r a te s  on government s e c u r it ie s  in  order to  help  th e  Treasury
fin a n ce  th e  War. At th e  end o f  h o s t i l i t i e s ,  Treasury o f f i c i a l s  were
r e lu c ta n t to  permit th e  Federal R eserve to  stop supporting the p r ic e  o f
government s e c u r i t ie s .  T his re lu cta n ce  was due to  the rap id  in crea se  in
th e  s iz e  o f  th e  debt during th e War and to  th e  u n certa in ty  a s  to  what
2d e s ta b il iz in g  in flu e n c e s  unpegging th e  debt would have.
With th e  economy b e se t  by in f la t io n a r y  p ressu res , th e Federal 
Reserve was anxious to  pursue independent monetary p o l ic y . The outbreak  
o f  Korean h o s t i l i t i e s  added to  the d i f f i c u l t y  a s  the P resid en t o f  th e  
United S ta te s  sided  w ith  th e Treasury in  wanting support o f  the govern­
ment bond market. F in a l ly ,  in  1951, a f te r  a s e r ie s  o f m eetings w ith
Treasury o f f i c i a l s  and th e  P r esid en t, the Treasury and th e  Federal
3
Reserve System reached an accord. The jo in t  announcement sta ted :
The Treasury and the Federal Reserve System have reached  
f u l l  accord w ith  resp ect to  debt management and monetary 
p o l ic i e s  to  be pursued in  fu r th er in g  th e ir  common 
purpose to  a ssu re  the su c c e ss fu l fin a n c in g  o f  the  
Government's requirem ents and, a t the same tim e, to  
m inim ize m on etization  o f  the p u b lic  d eb t. ^
The accord tr u ly  s ig n a led  the end o f  con tin u a l support o f govern­
ment s e c u r it ie s  p r ic e s  by the System. At the Federal Open Market 
Committee m eeting o f  March 8 , 1951, A llan  Sproul, P resid en t o f  the
p .............  .............
Henry C. Murphy, The N ational Debt in  War and T ra n sitio n  (New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 1 9 5 0 )7
3
For an e x c e lle n t  d isc u ss io n  o f  th e  e n t ir e  period .and  con tro v ersy , 
see A. Jerome C lif fo r d , The Independence o f  th e  Federal R eserve System  
(P h ila d e lp h ia : U n iv e r s ity  o f  Pennsylvania P r e ss , 1965), pp. 163-272.
^Board o f  Governors o f  the F ederal R eserve System, Annual R ep ort, 
1951 (W ashington, D. C ,: Board o f  Governors, 1952), p. 4 .
F ederal Reserve Bank o f  New York, announced th a t fo r  th e  f i r s t  tim e
in  ten  years th e market had been com pletely w ithout support th at
day*'’ The movement to  fr e e  markets and th e  de-emphasis o f  in te r e s t
r a te s  as a ta r g e t  was f a c i l i t a t e d  by the development o f  a new th eory  o f
c r e d it  c o n tr o l. Roosa*s th eory  s tressed  th e  importance o f  len d ers  and
th e  a v a i la b i l i t y  o f c r e d it  ra th er than th e  tr a d it io n a l approach which
measured th e  resp on siven ess o f  borrowers to  in te r e s t  r a te  changes.^
Thus, the Federal Reserve f e l t  th a t  i t  could  be an e f f e c t iv e  s ta b i l iz in g
fo r ce  on the economy by a lte r in g  the a v a i la b i l i t y  o f  c r e d it  w ith on ly
7
minor changes in  the in te r e s t  r a t e . ' The m inutes o f  th e  Committee 
during 1951-1952 provide evidence o f  the movement from the maintenance 
o f  a peg to  fr e e  m arkets. For example, a t  the September 25 , 1952, 
m eeting o f  th e  FCMC, Chairman Martin s ta te d  th at sooner or la t e r  the  
Committee must decide to  e ith e r  ” . . .  g iv e  up the underw riting o f  
Treasury o ffe r in g s  or . . . proceed in  more or l e s s  th e  manner th a t has
g
been fo llow ed  in  the past.** During t h is  m eeting, both Martin and 
Sproul mentioned th a t a t r a n s it io n  from pegged to  fr e e  markets was 
ta k in g  p la c e . The current p o lic y  d e c is io n  made in  t h is  m eeting was to  
continue r e s tr a in t  on undue c r e d it  expansion. In p r a c t ic a l term s, i t
M̂ inutes. R o ll 6 , f .  199.
^Robert V, Roosa, " In terest R ates and the C entral Bank," Money. 
Trade, and Economic Growth: E ssays in  Honor o f  John Henry W illiam s (New
York: Macmillan, 1 9 5 l ) ,  p . 271.
7For a  su ccin ct review  o f  th e  Roosa d o ctr in e , see  D aniel S . Ahearn, 
Federal R eserve P o iic y  Reappraised. 1951-1959 (New York: Columbia
U n iv ers ity  P r ess , 19 6 3 ), pp. 22-31.
^Minutes. R oll 6 , f .  510.
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meant th a t th e  Treasury would s u f fe r  some a t t r i t io n  during i t s  r e f i ­
nancing. However, the System d id  continue to  a s s i s t  th e  Treasury during
9
p er io d s  o f  refunding u n t i l  the end o f  1952.
On May 1 7 , 1951, th e  same m eeting in  which W illiam  McChesney M artin  
was e le c te d  Chairman o f  the Federal Open Market Committee, he recommended 
th e form ation o f  an ad hoc subcommittee to  study the government 
s e c u r i t ie s  m a r k e t.^  The recommendations o f  the ad hoc subcommittee, 
when approved in  March o f  1953, ushered in  th e  era in  Federal Reserve
^Thomas R. Beard, ’"Debt Management: I t s  R e la tio n sh ip  to Monetary
P o lic y ,  19 5 1 -1 9 6 2 ,” The N ation a l Banking Review. I I  (Septem ber, 19 6 4 ), 
63—64.
^ M in u te s , R o ll 6 , f f .  243-244 . The m inutes o f  th e  FOMC revea l 
th a t  Martin f i r s t  conceived  th e id e a  o f  th e  study w h ile  he was a s so c ia te d  
w ith  the Treasury. I b id . ,  R o ll 7 , f .  53. At the FCMC m eeting on May 1 7 ,
1951, he was authorized  to  appoint an ad hoc subcommittee. On A pril 2 1 ,
1952, Martin mentioned th e  d is tr ib u t io n  o f  an o u t lin e  o f  the suggested  
ad hoc subcommittee. A lso , th e  Committee members accep ted  h is  recommend­
a t io n  th a t Mr. Robert H. C raft, V ice  P resid en t and Treasurer o f  Guaranty 
T rust Company o f  New York, be on the ad hoc subcommittee. I b id . ,  f f .  
414-416 . At th e  May 9 , 1952, m eeting o f th e  E xecutive Committee, M artin  
announced th a t  arrangements had been made to  h ire  C raft a s  Technical 
C onsultant to  the FOMC fo r  four months. M artin a lso  appointed Malcolm 
Bryan, Abbot L. M ills ,  J r . ,  and h im se lf t o  th e  ad hoc subcommittee. 
D iscu ss io n  o f  th e  ad hoc subcom m ittee's p rogress and procedure i s  found  
i n  the m inutes o f th e  May 23, June 6 , and J u ly  22, 1952 , m eetings o f  th e  
E xecu tive  Committee. A lso , th e  FCMC rece iv ed  a rep ort on th e  ad hoc 
subcom m ittee's progress on June 1 9 , 1952. On August 2 9 , 1952, Chairman 
M artin asked th e  E xecutive Committee to  approve a l e t t e r  to  the Federal 
R eserve Bank P resid en ts  ex p la in in g  the s ig n if ic a n c e  o f  th e  rep o rt. Some 
o f  th e  d isc u s s io n  in  th e  October 6 ,  1952, m eeting o f  the Executive  
Committee was a forerunner o f  th e  coming ad hoc subcommittee rep ort.
The m inutes o f  th a t  m eeting record  the fo llo w in g  statem ent:
"The Chairman went on to  say th a t ,  as a g en era l pro­
p o s i t io n ,  he f e l t  o p era tio n s fo r  th e  System account 
should be in  terms o f  b i l l s  whenever the d e c is io n  was 
to  supply r e se r v e s  to  th e  m arket.” Ib id . . f .  52S.
At the December 23, 1 9 5 2 , E xecutive Committee m eeting , Chaiiman M artin  
announced th a t  the ad hoc subcommittee had completed i t s  report and th a t  
co p ie s  were being d is tr ib u te d .
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h is to r y  known a s  " b i l l s  o n ly ."  There w ere s e v e r a l major a rea s  o f
importance in  the ad hoc subcommittee rep ort: (A) R e la tio n s  w ith  the
Market; (B) R e la tio n s  w ith  D ealers; (C) O perating Techniques; and (D)
F ederal Reserve R eports. Under s e c tio n  A the ad hoc subcommittee
recommended th a t th e  Committee con fin e i t s  market tr a n sa c tio n s  to  th e
short-term  end o f  the government s e c u r i t ie s  market in  order to  reduce
government s e c u r ity  d e a le r s1 u n cer ta in ty  as to  th e  impact o f  System
a c t io n . The ad hoc subcommittee f e l t  th a t t h is  u n cer ta in ty  had hampered
the development o f  depth, breadth , and r e s i l i e n c y  in  the market.^’’*' Mr.
C ra ft, a s  sp e c ia l con su ltan t on th e ad hoc subcommittee, s ta te d  th a t he
f e l t  th e  advantage to  d ea lin g  in  Treasury b i l l s  would be in  p erm ittin g
f l e x i b i l i t y  o f  open market o p era tio n s w ithout d is tu rb in g  th e  long-term
m arket. As recorded in  th e  m inutes,
He sa id  th a t would perm it th e  market (a )  to  r e f l e c t  
the n a tu ra l fo r c e s  o f  demand and supply and (b) to  
fu rn ish  a s ig n a l o f  the e f f e c t iv e n e s s  o f  c r e d it  
p o lic y  aimed p r im a r ily  a t th e  volume and a v a i la b i l i t y  
o f  bank r e s e r v e s .^
In  a d d itio n ,
. . . The Subcommittee recommends th a t th e  Federal 
Open Market Committee mend i t s  presen t d ir e c t iv e  to  
th e ex ecu tiv e  committee by e lim in a tin g  th e  phrase 
to  m aintain  ord erly  c o n d itio n s  in  the Government 
s e c u r i t ie s  market, and by su b s t itu t in g  th e r e fo r  an
11The market i s  sa id  t o  have depth when government s e c u r it ie s  
d e a le r s  have rece iv ed  orders both above and below market p r ic e s .  Breadth  
occu rs when th e se  orders a re  in  volume and from d ivergen t in v e s to r  
groups. The market has r e s i l i e n c y  when new ord ers q u ick ly  appear to  
tak e advantage o f  unexpected changes in  p r ic e s .
12
I b id . ,  R o ll  7 , f .  66.
au th o r iza tio n  to  in terven e when n ecessary  to  co rrec t  
a d iso rd er ly  s itu a t io n  in  the Government s e c u r it ie s
market. ^
The id ea s presented  by th e  ad hoc subcommittee did n ot go unchal­
len ged . A llan Sproul f e l t  th a t  simply co n fin in g  op erations to  the short  
end o f  th e  market would not in crea se  th e market’ s depth, breadth, and 
r e s i l ie n c y .  He m aintained th a t the lack  o f  depth, breadth, and 
r e s i l ie n c y  was due to  the u n c e r ta in t ie s  from general c r e d it  p o lic y  and 
Treasury fin an cin g , not from concern th a t th e  Federal R eserve might 
in terven e in  the market. Sproul* s ob servation s seem to  have been 
confirmed by la te r  s tu d ie s . An em pirical study by Dudley Luckett found
th a t indeed " b i l ls  o n ly ” did not g ive  th e  market increased  depth,
14breadth, and r e s i l ie n c y .  However, th ese  f in d in g s  are in  sharp 
con trast to  those o f  Ira  0 , S c o t t .  S co tt m aintains th at System opera­
t io n s  in  the long-term  market cause f lu c tu a t io n s  in  th a t market. 
Government s e c u r it ie s  d ea lers f in d  th ese  f lu c tu a t io n s  in to le r a b le .
S co tt concludes t h a t ,  given in te r e s t  r a te  ex p ecta tio n s , d ea lers  w i l l  be
more l i k e l y  to  en ter  the long-term  bond market under a ’’b i l l s  only”
15
p o lic y  than not.
A llan  Sproul a lso  suggested that th ere  might be tim es  when the FQMC 
would w ish  to  a c t  in  other a rea s  o f  the market . . t o  g e t  d ir e c t
e f f e c t s  on the a v a i la b i l i t y  and co st o f  c r e d it  in  the c a p ita l  or th e
1:3Ib id . . f .  65 .
■^Dudley L uckett, 1,1 B i l l s  Only’ : A C r it ic a l  A ppraisal,"  Review o f
Economics and S t a t i s t i c s . XLII (August, I 9 6 0 ) , 301-306.
■^ir a 0 . S c o t t ,  J r . , Government S e c u r it ie s  Market (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1 9 6 5 ), PP* 162-163.
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mortgage market. . . Sproul went along w ith  th e adoption o f  " b i l l s
only" because he f e l t  the Committee was v o tin g  in  a p o licy  on ly  for the
17
current market s itu a t io n  and not a permanent philosophy. A fter  
considerable d iscu ssio n  the Committee unanimously agreed to  th e  fo llow ­
in g  p o in ts:
1 . Under present co n d itio n s , operations for  the  
System account should be confined to  the short 
end o f the market (not in clu d ing  correction  of  
d iso rd er ly  m arkets.)
2 . I t  i s  not now the p o lic y  o f  the Committee to  
support any pattern o f  p r ice s  and y ie ld s  in  the 
Government s e c u r it ie s  market and in terv en tio n  in  
th e Government s e c u r it ie s  market i s  s o le ly  to  
e f fe c tu a te  the o b je c tiv e s  o f monetary and cred it  
p o lic y  (in c lu d in g  the correction  o f d isord erly  
market s ) .
3 . Further study should be given  by the ad hoc 
subcommittee to  th e suggestion  th a t the Committee 
adopt a continuing p o lic y  o f  con fin in g  i t s  in te r ­
ven tion  in  the market to  the short-term  area, and 
to  the q u estion s whether some type o f assurance 
regarding th e  Committee1s procedure in  t h is  
resp ect should be given and, i f  so , how such 
assurance should be made a v a ila b le .
Point four concerned changing the d ir e c t iv e  as mentioned above. Point
f iv e  included the approval o f  the ad hoc subcommittee recommendation
th a t ,
. . . the Committee r e fr a in , during a period  o f  
Treasury fin a n cin g , from purchasing ( l )  any 
maturing is s u e s  fo r  which an exchange i s  being  
o ffe re d , (2 ) when-issued s e c u r it ie s ,  and (3 ) any
^Minutea, R o ll 7* ff*  68-69. 
17I b id . . f .  74.
1SIb id .
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outstanding i s s u e s  o f  comparable m aturity  to  th ose  
being o ffered  fo r  exchange.
The adoption o f  th ese  p o in ts  completed the tr a n s it io n  from pegged
20markets and support o f  Treasury fin an cin g  to  fr e e  m arkets.
The con tin u ation  o f  the " b i l l s  only" p o l ic y  did not go uncontested . 
A llan  Sproul remained a con tin u al fo e  o f the doctrine u n t i l  h is  r e t i r e ­
ment in  1956. In the FOMG m eeting o f  June 1 1 , 1953 > Sproul made a 
strong case fo r  abandonment o f  " b i l l s  only"':
19Ib id . , f .  65.
20
Deane Carson s ta te s  th at th e  main m otivation  fo r  the Committee's 
s h i f t  to  " b i l l s  only" was the d e s ir e  to  reg a in  or s o l id i f y  co n tro l over 
th e  System Account in  New York. He sees th e  in i t ia t io n  o f  " b i l l s  only"  
a s  th e  culm ination o f  a long s tru g g le  for a u th or ity  between the New York 
Bank and the Committee in  Washington. Deane Carson, "The B i l l s  Only 
D octrine in  R etrosp ect,"  P attern s o f  Market Behavior: Essays in  Honor
o f  P h il l ip  T a ft , E dited  by M ichael J . Brennan (Providence, Rhode Islan d :  
Brown U n iv ersity  P r ess , 1965) ,  pp. 155-156. This approach i s  an in te r ­
e s t in g  co n tra st to  Warren Smith’ s .  One reason  that Smith f e e l s  th e  
" b i l l s  only" doctrine was encouraged was because o f  th e  la rg e  number o f  
peop le a tten d in g  the Committee m eetings. I t  tended to  s im p lify  th e  
decision-m aking p ro cess. Warren L. Smith, Debt Management in  th e  United  
S t a te s . Study Paper No. 19 fo r  th e  Jo in t Economic Committee- ("Washington,
D. C.: Government P r in tin g  O ff ic e , I9 6 0 ), Chapter V.
While some o f  the ad hoc subcommittee recommendations were 
undoubtedly aimed a t d im inish ing th e  power o f  the Account Manager, i t  
seems presumptuous to  s ta te  th a t the e n tir e  " b i l l s  only" p o lic y  was 
aimed a t usurping New York a u th o r ity . A dditional co n tro l over th e  
Account Manager could have been gained by p la c in g  him d ir e c t ly  under the  
co n tro l o f  th e  Committee, in  th e  organ iza tion a l s tru ctu re , rather than 
le a v in g  him under the co n tro l o f  the New York Bank. T his was one o f  the 
p o in ts  made in  the ad hoc subcommittee study. M inutes, R o ll 7 , f f .  62-63.
Warren Sm ith 's p o in t l ik e w ise  has w eaknesses. When the " b i l l s  only" 
d octrin e was in i t ia t e d ,  the f u l l  Federal Open Market Committee, w ith  i t s .  
t h ir t y  or fo r ty  members, met o n ly  four or f iv e  tim es a year. Most o f the  
d e c is io n s  concerning rou tin e a c t iv i t y  were made by the Executive  
Committee, which was composed o f  f iv e  members. This body was su re ly  not 
to o  la rg e  fo r  e f f e c t iv e  d ec is io n  making. Even in  th e  FOMC m eetings, the 
v a s t  m ajority  o f  the con versation  was ca rr ied  on by a r e la t iv e ly  few  
members.
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On what grounds would we continue to  deprive o u rse lv e s  
o f  freedom o f  action?  With r e sp e c t  to  th e  p r o h ib it io n s  
we adopted a t  our l a s t  m eeting , (a ) we were to ld  th a t  
th e market should be r e lie v e d  o f  th e  th re a t  o f  our 
in te r v e n tio n  in  th e lo n g er  term areas so th a t i t  might 
develop breadth, depth, and r e s i l ie n c y ,  (b ) We have 
not in terven ed  in  th e se  areas fo r  some months and, in  
one way or another, th e  market has acquired the id ea  
th a t we are  not going to  in te r v en e . Yet seldom has 
th e  market shown l e s s  breadth and depth w h ile  q u otation s  
have shown, i f  anyth ing , too much r e s i l ie n c y .
We have been to ld  th a t  o p era tio n s in  b i l l s  would have 
prompt and p ervasive  e f f e c t  through the m arket. That 
was th e th eory  o f  p e r fe c t  f l u i d i t y —p e r fe c t  a r b itr a g e . 
I  think h is t o r ic a l  record s and current ob servation  
in d ic a te  th a t  a prompt and in v a r ia b le  response between 
short and lo n g  m arkets can not always be expected .
I t  seems to  me th a t we must e ith e r  s t i l l  be rea c tin g  
v io le n t ly  a g a in st market pegging or embracing a some­
what d o c tr in a ire  a t t itu d e  on f r e e  m a r k e ts .^
Mr. Sproul*s arguments were thoroughly d iscu ssed  by th e Committee 
members. His lo g ic  e v id e n tly  trium phed, a s  the " b i l l s  only" p o l ic y  was 
resc in d ed . However, h is  v ic to r y  was s h o r t - l iv e d . In the E xecutive  
Committee m eeting o f  the same day, th e  m ajority  v o ted  to  d ir e c t  th e  New
21I b id . . f .  20 7 . -■ '
22I b id . , f f . 207-208. In  t h is  passage Sproul seems to  a n t ic ip a te  
some o f  th e  arguments o f  Warren Smith in  h is  a tta c k  on th e  d o c tr in e  o f  
" b i l l s  on ly ."  See Smith, Debt Management in  the U nited S t a te s , Chapter 
V.
23M inutes. R o ll  7 , f .  208 .
I b id . , f . 245• For an in te r e s t in g  d isc u ss io n  o f  t h i s  occurrence, 
see  C lif fo r d , The Independence o f  the F ederal Re serve System , pp. 287- 
290. T h is ep isod e seems to  d es tro y  th e cliche~that~"M artin  i s  never on 
th e lo s in g  s id e ."  For exam ple, see  W illiam  P. Yohe, * "A Study o f  Federal 
Open Market Committee V oting, 1955-1964," Southern Economic Journal, 
m i l  (A p r il, 1966), 399. M artin was a ls o  on the lo s in g  s id e  o f  a 
Committee v o te  in  th e  September 25,1951, m eeting, which concerned  
Committee recommendations to  th e  Treasury.
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25York R eserve Bank to  deal in  b i l l s  o n ly . A lso , a t  the next FOMC
26m eeting , members v o ted  to  r e in s t a t e  th e  rescin d ed  " b i l l s  only" p o lic y .
T h erea fter , th e  System was f a ir ly  s u c c e ss fu l in  m aintain ing i t s
27p o lic y  o f  " b i l l s  o n ly ,"  w ith  but minor e x c ep tio n s . During most o f  the  
" b i l l s  only" p eriod  in te r e s t  r a te s  served  as a gu ide to  th e  co n d itio n  o f
2 M̂ inute3 , R o ll 7 , f f .  251-252.
2AI b id . ,  f .  356-370 . As a con tin u ation  o f  th e  b a t t le  by Sproul, 
the fo llo w in g  m eetin gs may be o f  in te r e s t :  June 23 , 1953; September 2 4 ,
1953; December 1 5 , 1953; and March 3 , 1954.
27'At the March 2 , 1955, m eeting o f  th e E xecutive Committee, owing 
to  a sh ortage o f  Treasury b i l l s ,  the System Account Manager was g iv en  
a u th o r ity  to  dea l in  short-term  Treasury s e c u r i t ie s ,  but p refera b ly  
b i l l s .  M inutes. R o ll  9, f .  16 9 . In p r a c t ic e ,  th e  Account Manager 
adhered to  the " b i l l s  only" p o l ic y .  I b id . ,  R o ll 1 0 , f .  235*
The Committee's f i r s t  major departure from " b i l l s  only" was made 
when two o b lig a tio n s  o f  th e  System , a primary one to  supply r e ser v e s  and 
a secondary one to  a s s i s t  th e  Treasury, overlapped. A fter  con sid erab le  
d isc u s s io n , the Committee au th orized  th e  Account Manager to  purchase 
$400 m il l io n  o f  w hen-issued s e c u r i t ie s  from the Treasury. I b id . , R o ll 
9 , f f .  643-645. The System a c tu a lly  purchased $167 m il l io n  o f  new 
Treasury c e r t i f i c a t e s .  Board o f  Governors, Annual R eport, 1955. p . 8 .
At th e  October 16 , 1956, m eeting, th e  Account Manager was autho­
r iz e d  t o  purchase new s p e c ia l  Treasury b i l l s  which were m aturing January 
16, 19 5 7 . Purchases such a s  t h i s  v io la te d  the March, 1953, agreement 
th a t th e  Committee would not d ea l w ith  r e c e n t ly  is su e d  Treasury 
s e c u r i t i e s .  M inutes, R o ll 1 0 , f f .  604-605 .
The m inutes o f  th e  January 28, 1957 , m eeting d is c lo s e  th a t  th e  
Treasury wanted th e  System t o  accept some 3 -year c e r t i f i c a t e s  in  
exchange fo r  m aturing b i l l s .  The System was not in  favor o f  such a 
tr a n sa c t io n . I b id . . R o ll 1 1 , f .  87.
On J u ly  9 , 1957 , the Committee a ls o  turned down a prop osa l to  buy 
some lon g-term  s e c u r i t ie s  d ir e c t ly  from th e Treasury and then  s e l l  some 
short-term  s e c u r i t ie s  on th e  market. I b id . , f .  447*
At the February 18, 19 5 7 , m eeting, the Account Manager n o t if ie d  the  
Committee th at due to  a sh ortage  o f System h o ld in gs o f  b i l l s  he had so ld  
some c e r t i f i c a t e s  o f  in d eb ted n ess and Treasury n o te s . I b id . ,  f f .  90-92 .
The second major departure from " b i l l s  only" occurred from J u ly  18
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28f in a n c ia l  m arkets, but were not an end unto th em selv es. G en erally ,
th e System p laced  dom estic c r e d it  r e s p o n s ib i l i t i e s  above the f in a n c in g
29 30needs o f  the Treasury. O cca sio n a lly  the two g o a ls  co in cid ed .
By 1959 the country’ s p e r s is te n t  balance o f  payments d e f i c i t  with  
i t s  concurrent g o ld  ou tflow  made the Federal R eserve sharply aware o f  
the in te r n a t io n a l a sp e c ts  o f  i t s  a c t io n s . At the January 6 , 1959 , 
m eeting o f  the FQMC, se v e ra l members commented th a t th e  Committee does 
have in te r n a t io n a l f in a n c ia l  r e s p o n s ib i l i t i e s .  Governor M ills  m entioned  
th a t  an in crea se  in  the d iscou n t ra te  might be regarded by the in t e r ­
n a tio n a l community as a s ig n a l th a t th e System recogn ized  the gold
to  J u ly  23 , 1958. Because o f  th e  in c r e a s in g  d iso rd er  in  the government 
s e c u r i t ie s  m arket, the Account Manager, on J u ly  18 , 1953, was authorized  
to  d ea l in  o th er than short-term  s e c u r i t ie s .  I b id . . R o ll 13, f* 30 .
T his a u th o r ity  was term inated  Ju ly  24 , 1958. I b id . , f .  60. During t h is  
p er io d , th e  System purchased $1 .2  b i l l i o n  o f  s e c u r i t ie s ,  m ainly "when- 
issued"  ones, p lu s  a few o th er n o tes and bonds. Board o f  Governors, 
Annual R eport. 1958 , p . 7 .
28 However, su g g estio n s  were made fo r  combining a range o f in te r e s t  
r a te s  w ith  a range o f  fr e e  r e s e r v e s . Governor B alderston  commented that 
he ’’would l ik e  to  see a ta r g e t  or goa l exp ressed  in  terms o f  a b i l l  ra te  
o f  from 2 .10  to  2 .15  combined w ith  n egative  fr e e  reserv es  ranging from 
$300 to  $400 m i l l io n .” M inutes. R o ll 9 , f .  512. A lso , see ib id . , R o ll 
11, f .  246 . T his su g g estio n  d id  not seem to  appeal to  th e  o th er members. 
G enerally  when a ch o ice  had to  be made between d istu rb in g  in te r e s t  r a te s  
or l e t t i n g  some ta r g e t  l e v e l  such a s  the ’’f e e l ” o f  the market or free  
r e se r v e s  change, the Committee chose to  m aintain  the ta r g e t  and to  allow  
in t e r e s t  r a te s  to  move a s  th ey  m ight. For exam ple, see  ib id . , R o ll 10 , 
f f .  575-605.
^ F o r  exam ple, see i b i d . ,  f f .  555-605.
30Such an example was examined in  fo o tn o te  27 o f  t h i s  chap ter.
T his co in cid en ce  occurred when the System made i t s  f i r s t  major departure 
from " b i l l s  o n ly .” The departure seems to  be in  l i n e  w ith Deane 
C arson's p o s it io n , i . e . ,  the System should take a ca se -b y -ca se  approach 
to  supporting Treasury refu n d in g . See Deane Carson, "Federal R eserve  
Support o f  Treasury Refunding O perations,"  Journal o f  F inance, XII 
(March, 1957), 51-63 .
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ou tflow  and intended to  su b ject the dom estic economy to  th e  r ig o r s
31
n ecessary  to  h a lt  i t .  At th e FOMC m eeting on January 27 , 1959, the  
Committee members seemed to  favor an in crease  in  the d iscount ra te  but 
th e  reasons c it e d  were not in te r n a tio n a l ones. The members f e l t  th a t  
th e  d iscount ra te  should be increased  fo r  te c h n ic a l reasons ( i t  was out 
o f  l in e  w ith  the b i l l  r a te )  as w e ll a s  to  t ig h te n  down on an expanding 
dom estic economy. F ortu n ately , a t t h i s  time th e  dom estic economy was 
expanding and the monetary goal o f  stemming in f la t io n a r y  p ressu res co in ­
cid ed  w ith the s te p s  n ecessary  on th e  in te r n a tio n a l scene.
Most o f  the fo llo w in g  Committee m eetings devoted some time to  th e
32
in te r n a tio n a l problem. A lso , growing pressure ou tsid e o f  the System
33demanded a r e tr e a t  from th e " b i l l s  only" p o lic y . W ithin th e System,
A lfred  Hayes, P resid en t o f  the Federal Reserve Bank o f New York, le d  the
34f ig h t  to  repeal " b i l l s  on ly ."  Members gradually  became aware th a t i f
“̂ M inutes. R o ll 14 , f .  21.
32
One in d ic a tio n  o f  th e  e le v a tio n  o f  the balance o f  payments s i t u ­
a t io n  in  the hierarchy o f  System problems was th e  appearance o f  a s t a f f  
econom ist a t the m eetings to  review th e  in te r n a tio n a l s itu a t io n . For 
example, see ib id . , f f . 311-312.
33I b id . ,  R o ll 12 , f .  226. For a few o f th e  c r it ic is m s  o f  " b i l l s  
on ly ,"  see Deane Carson, "Recent Open Market P o lic y  and Technique," 
Q uarterly Journal o f  Economics, LXIX (August, 1 9 5 5 ), 3 ? l-3 4 2 j A lvin  
Hansen, "Monetary P o lic y ,"  Review o f  Economics and S t a t i s t i c s . VII (May, 
19 5 5 ), 110-119j and Sidney Weintraub, "Monetary P o lic y , A Comment," 
Review o f  Economics and S t a t i s t i c s , XXXVII (A ugust, 1955), 292-296.
For System counters to  t h is  c r it ic is m , see W. W. R ie f le r ,  "Open 
Market O perations in  Long-Term S e c u r it ie s ,"  Federal Reserve B u lle t in  
(November, 1958), pp. 1260-1274, or R. A, Young and C. A. Yager, "The 
Economics o f  ' B i l l s  P refera b ly ',"  Q uarterly Journal o f Economics, LXXIV 
(A ugust, I9 6 0 ), 341-373.
^^For example, see Minutes, Roll 15, ff. 175-176.
4S
a domestic recess io n  were to  occur ad d ition a l problems in  coping with
35the balance o f  payments d e f ic i t  would a r is e .
Chairman Martin, in  the January 12 , I960 , m eeting, mentioned th a t
the Committee might consider changing operating techn iques, includ ing
36the " b i l l s  only" p o lic y . On March 22, he sta ted  th a t he f e l t  the
37Committee should not t i e  i t s e l f  to  a r ig id  p o lic y . A memorandum, d is ­
tr ib u ted  on March 18 by Rouse, Thomas, and Young, c a lle d  fo r  engaging in
3B
swap operations w ith the Treasury. A m ajority o f the Committee members
f e l t  th a t the swap suggestions would bring about frequent exceptions to
39th e  Committee’ s p o lic y . The swaps were not approved u n t i l  the fo llo w -
40ing m eeting.
At the May 24, I960 , m eeting o f the Committee, Arthur Marget, s t a f f
35I b id . ,  f f .  89-90, 210-213.
36I b id . ,  f f .  60-61.
37I b id . ,  f .  307. The minutes a lso  show that Martin had c ircu la ted  
a rev ised  d ra ft o f  the p ertin en t statem ents.
38"The s p e c if ic  su ggestion  d iscu ssed  in  the memorandum was th a t the  
Federal Open Market Committee cooperate in  smoothing the refin an cin gs o f  
one-year Treasury b i l l s  and November 1961 bonds by acquiring b locks o f  
th ose  is su e s  p rior  to  m aturity and then r o ll in g  them over at the time o f  
r e f in a n c in g s .” I b id . ,  f .  321.
3 9Ib id . . f f .  324-325.
^ T he fo llo w in g  suggestion  was approved, Robertson d issen tin g :
"Chairman Martin then suggested th a t the Committee act  
on the b a s is  th a t had been o u tlin ed : namely, to
authorize the Management o f the Account to  acquire up 
to  $150 m illio n  o f  the one-year b i l l s  maturing July  
15, I960, between now and the next Committee m eeting, 
e ith e r  through swaps or ou trigh t purchases, w ith the 
understanding th a t the m atter would be c a lle d  up again  
fo r  review a t th e next meeting o f  the Committee."
I b id . ,  f .  3S5.
49
econom ist, in  h is  in tern a tio n a l rep o rt, pointed out th at the fu ture  
balance of payments does not depend s o le ly  on short-term  c a p ita l move­
ments. The m atter o f trade must be considered. President Hayes pointed  
out th a t a reduction  in  th e discount ra te  would in crease  the flow  o f  
short-term  c a p ita l  a b ro a d .^  At the next Committee m eeting, Governor 
M ills  stated  th a t  there was in creasin g  evidence that the domestic 
economy was slow ing and th a t he did not b e lie v e  th a t in creasin g  bank 
reserv es  would so lve  the problem. He maintained th at ad d ition a l 
reserv es  would d rive down market r a te s ,  but he doubted th a t i t  would 
contribute to  increased  long-term  investm ent owing to  the present 
in d u str ia l e x c e ss  cap acity . A lso, he f e l t  the low ering o f sh o r t-te m
I p
r a te s  would le a d  to fu rth er  ca p ita l and gold outflow s.
On October 4 ,  I960, Marget con fessed  that the d e ter io ra tio n  in  the 
balance o f payments s itu a t io n  was caused mainly by c a p ita l ou tflow s  
which had been responding to  the in te r e s t  rate d if f e r e n t ia l  between the 
United S ta tes  and fore ign  nations. A lso , Guy Noyes, s t a f f  econom ist, 
sta ted  th at economic a c t iv i t y  was d ec lin in g  and would probably continue
I O
to  d ec lin e . In  the October 25, I9 6 0 , meeting o f  the Committee, Thomas,
in  h is  f in a n c ia l report presented th e  fo llow in g  statements
The suggestion  has been made that the System, by 
purchasing longer-term  s e c u r it ie s ,  could  a id  in
^ Ib id . , f f .  452-456, 457.
^ A lso  in  t h i s  m eeting, "Mr, Rouse commented on the l - l / 4  per cent 
ra te  d if f e r e n t ia l  in  favor o f .United Kingdom b i l l s ,  a f te r  forward 
exchange cover, that e x is te d  before the auction  yesterday and sa id  that  
money was beginning to  move to  that market." I b id . . R o ll 16, f f .
20-22 , 39.
^ I b i d . ,  f f .  253-267.
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brin gin g  about a d e s ira b le  downward adjustm ent in  
long-term  in te r e s t  r a te s  and stim u late borrowing in  
th at a rea , and a t  the same tim e avoid reducing shortj- 
term r a te s  and encouraging th e  flow  o f  funds abroad.
Thomas went on to  s ta te  th a t  he did not f e e l  th a t  such an operation
would be e f f e c t iv e .  Follow ing considerab le d isc u ss io n , the Committee
members g en era lly  agreed w ith  Thomas' s p o s it io n  and decided not to
45change th e ir  p o lic y , i . e . ,  not to  d ea l in  long-term  s e c u r it ie s .
Owing to  th e  in crea sin g  urgency o f  the in te r n a tio n a l balance of 
payments problem, the Committee, a t  th e  November 22 , I960 , m eeting, 
began to  look  more deeply in to  the suggestion  o f  "tw isting"  th e in te r e s t  
ra te  s tru ctu re . Evidence was presented  that i t  was p o s s ib le  to  achieve
some d i f f e r e n t ia l  e f f e c t s  on in te r e s t  r a te s , a t  l e a s t  b r i e f l y . ^  A lso ,
i t  was suggested that the c e i l in g  on time and sa v in g s  d e p o sit  r a te s  be
i n
ra ised  in  an e f f o r t  to  stem th e ou tflow . P resid en t Hayes urged opera­
t io n  in  long-term  s e c u r it ie s .  He a lso  suggested th a t the Committee 
consider whether i t  was going to  e s ta b lis h  a long-term  r a te  or ju st  
acquire long-term  bonds. Martin f e l t  that the Committee would be 
supplying r e se r v e s , not s e t t in g  a sh o r t-te m  in t e r e s t  r a te .
From reading the m inutes o f  th e  FCMC i t  i s  c le a r ly  ev id en t th a t th e  
Committee members were a g a in st  a s t r i c t  peg but th ey  did n ot want sh o r t-  
te r n  in te r e s t  r a te s  to  f a l l  below two per cen t. Some o f  th e  members 
expressed  the thought th a t th e  Account Manager cou ld  and would use
^ I b i d . . f .  310.
45Ib id . . f f .  310-347.
46I b id . . f .  374.
^ I b i d . . f f .  390-391.
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in te r e s t  r a te s  in  determ ining the " fee l"  o f  the market. The consensus
statem ent made by Chairman M artin a t the November 13 , I9 6 0 , FOMC m eeting
f o l l O W S .  . vt,
The Chairman then s ta te d  th a t the r e s u lt s  o f  th e  p o ll  
in d ica ted  th at the m ajority  was c le a r ly  in  favor o f  
continu ing the p resen t degree o f  ea se , w ith th e f e e l  
o f  th e market c o n s t itu t in g  th e  guiding fa c to r , A 
c lea r  m ajority  would l ik e  to  have the b i l l  ra te  stay  
as high a s  p o s s ib le .
49The " b i l l s  only" p o lic y  was abandoned in  February, 1961, System  
p o l ic ie s  and a c t io n s  during th e  remainder o f th e year were formulated  
w ith two o b je c t iv e s  in  mind— th e encouragement o f  dom estic economic 
expansion and a m itig a tio n  o f  th e  ou tflow  o f  short-term  liq u id  funds.
In summary, th e  Committee was o b lig a ted  to  use in te r e s t  r a te s  as a 
ta r g e t  during World War I I  and up u n t i l  the T reasury-Federal Reserve 
accord. Follow ing the accord , th e System ’ s immediate a c t io n  was to  
r e tr e a t  from th e use o f  in t e r e s t  r a te s  as a ta r g e t .  Even co n s is ten t  
support o f  Treasury refund ings was dropped w ith  the in i t i a t io n  o f  " b i l l s  
on ly ."  However, in te r n a tio n a l co n sid era tio n s coupled w ith  a slow ing  
dom estic economy im pelled  th e  System to  return  to  a co n sid eration  o f  
in te r e s t  ra te  l e v e l s  and th e  d e f in it e  use o f  in te r e s t  r a te s  in  determ in­
in g  th e " feel"  o f  the market. By la t e  I960 th e  im p lica tio n  was th a t i f  
b i l l  r a te s  approached the two per cen t l e v e l ,  the "feel" o f  the market
4S
I b id . ,  f .  449.
^B oard o f  Governors, Annual Report, 1961, p . 43. For a d d itio n a l 
inform ation on th e " b i l ls  only" p eriod , see M ilton  Friedman and Anna 
Jacobson Schwartz, A Monetary H istory o f  the United S t a te s , pp. 632-636, 
or Ahearn, pp. 64-120.
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would in d ic a te  th a t a c t io n  should be taken .
I I .  FREE RESERVES AS A TARGET
The concept o f  fr e e  reserv es  i s  o f  con sid erab le  importance to  th e
51
F ederal Reserve System. This importance seems to  stem from the a lle g e d
52
r o le  o f  f r e e  r e se r v e s  in  the cau sa l p ro cess  o f  monetary p o lic y . The
Though i t  i s  beyond the scope o f  t h i s  stu d y , not a l l  econom ists  
agree th a t  "Operation Twist" was a su c c e ss . For recen t comments, see  
Myron H. R oss, "•O peration Tw ist*: A M istaken P olicy?"  The Journal o f
P o l i t i c a l  Economy. IXXIV (A p r il, 1 9 6 6 ), 195-199, or Franco M odigliani 
and Richard Sutch, "Innovations in  I n te r e s t  Rate P o lic y ."  American 
Economic Review. LVI (May, 1966), 178-197.
R oss concludes th a t  "Operation Twist" was u n su ccess fu l because  
in v en to ry  demand f e l l  more than th e demand fo r  f ix e d  investm ent in c re a sed , 
r e s u lt in g  in  a low erin g  o f  GNP. A lso , he f e e l s  th a t  th e  in flo w  o f  funds 
was q u ite  sm all. M odiglian i and Sutch conclude th a t any su ccess which 
flow ed from "Operation Twist" was due to  an in crea se  in  th e c e i l in g  ra te  
o f  R egu lation  Q. which a llow ed  CD* s  to  ex er t a s ig n if ic a n t  in flu e n c e .
A lso , th ey  f e e l  th a t  th e  t w is t  in  th e in te r e s t  r a te  stru c tu re  was 
moderate a t  b e s t .
For o th er comments on "Operation T w ist,"  see  T ilfo r d  Gaines and 
Robert Van C leave, "The Success and F a ilu re  o f  •O peration Nudge*,"
Banking. LIV (A p r il,  1 9 6 2 ), 8 -1 2 , 1 4 , 74 | Edward M. B ern ste in , "Domestic 
and In te r n a tio n a l O b jec tiv es  o f  United S ta te s  Monetary P o lic y ,"  Journal 
o f  F inance. XVIII (May, 1 9 6 3 ), 161-173; J . M. C ulbertson , "The.Recent 
P o lic y  Mix and I t s  Im p lica tio n s ,"  P roceedings o f  th e  B u sin ess and 
Economic S t a t i s t i c s  S ec tio n  o f  th e  American S t a t i s t i c a l  A s so c ia t io n ,
1963 , pp. 3 6 2 - 3 6 6 ; and Beard, "Debt Management: I t s  R ela tio n sh ip  to
Monetary P o lic y , 1951-1962,"  pp. 70 -76 .
51"Free reserves"  i s  d efin ed  a s  ex ce ss  re serv es  minus member bank 
borrowing. I f  member-bank borrowing from th e  System exceed s e x c ess  
r e s e r v e s , th e r e s u lt in g  f ig u r e  i s  termed n et borrowed r e se r v e s .
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The concept o f  fr e e  r e se r v e s  seems to  have had i t s  o r ig in  w ith  
th e  i n i t i a t i o n  o f  System open market o p era tio n s . E arly  co n tr ib u to rs  to  
th e  concept in c lu d e  W. W. R ie f le r ,  W. R. B urgess, and E. A. G oldenweiser, 
For a  su c c in c t survey o f  th e  h is to r y  o f  th e  fr e e  reserv e  concept, see
K arl Brunner and A llan  H, M eltzer , The Federai R eserve * s  Attachment to  
th e  Free R eserve Concept. Subcommittee on Domestic Finance", House 
Committee on Banking and Currency, 88th  C ongress, 2nd S ess io n , May 1964,
pp. 2 -1 0 .
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fo llo w in g  statem ents i l l u s t r a t e  t h i s  p o in t:
The Federal R eserve e x e r ts  i t s  in flu e n c e  upon the  
a v a i la b i l i t y  o f  bank c r e d i t ,  upon th e  money supply, 
and upon in t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  alm ost w h olly  by in flu e n c in g  
bank l iq u id i t y .  . . .
Measurement o f  the primary l iq u id i t y  p o s it io n  o f  banks 
req u ires  co n sid era tio n  o f  both p o s i t iv e  and n eg a tiv e  
elem en ts. P o s it iv e  primary l iq u id i t y  a s s e t s  c o n s is t  
o f  balances h e ld  by banks w ith  F ederal R eserve banks. 
For l iq u id i t y  purposes, i . e . ,  fo r  m eeting d ra in s on 
d e p o s its  and r e s e r v e s , reserv e  b a la n ces  h eld  in  e x c e ss  
o f  requirem ents are g e n e r a lly  a more s ig n if ic a n t  and 
u se fu l measure than t o t a l  r e se r v e s .
The n egative  elem ent o f  primary l iq u id i t y  fo r  banks 
a r is e s  from member bank borrowings from th e  Federal 
R eserve.
The Federal Reserve r e s tr a in s  (o r  encourages) bank 
c r e d it  expansion by red u cin g  (or  in c r e a s in g )  the banks' 
primary l iq u id i t y .  T his i s  o r d in a r ily  accom plished  
through open market o p era tio n s . . . . The e f f e c t  o f  
th e se  a c t io n s , a f te r  allow ance fo r  th e v a r io u s  o th er  
fa c to r s  th a t  in flu en c e  th e  a v a i la b i l i t y  and use o f  
r e se r v e s , may be r e f le c te d  e ith e r  in  ex ce ss  r e se r v e s  
o r  in  member bank borrowings a t th e  R eserve Banks.
The o v e r -a l l  r e s u lt  fo r  bank l iq u id i t y  i s  commonly 
measured by th e  f ig u r e  o f  " free  reserves"  or "net 
borrowed r e se r v e s  . . .
The ca u sa l p o s it io n  o f  fr e e  r e se rv es  in v i t e s  i t s  u se a s  both an 
in d ic a to r  and a ta r g e t  by the Federal Open Market Committee. U n til  
a f t e r  th e accord, u se  o f  fr e e  r e se r v e s  a s  a ta r g e t  was p roscr ib ed . In  
f a c t ,  th e  term " free  reserves"  may not have been co in ed  u n t i l  sometime
53   - .................................
Commission.on Money an d ,C red it, The Federal R eserve and the
Treasury: Answers to  Q uestions from the Commission on Money and C redit
(Englewood C l i f f s :  P r e n tic e -H a ll, I n c . ,  1 9 6 3 ), pp. <5-8. R eprinted  by
p erm ission  o f  the p u b lish er .
54in  1952. However, the Committee, in  1952, was u sin g  the p o s it io n  o f
55member bank borrowing and e x ce ss  r e se rv es  sep a ra te ly  a s an in d ic a to r .
In  a  memorandum to  the E xecutive Committee for  th e  meeting o f  August 29,
1952, W oodlief Thomas o u tlin e d  severa l p o ss ib le  "guides" ( ta r g e ts )  fo r
open market op erations: ( l )  member bank borrowing, (2) in te r e s t  r a te s ,
(3 ) Treasury fin a n cin g  need s, and (4 ) normal c r e d it  and currency 
56demands. The p resen ta tio n  o f  t h is  memorandum and the E xecutive
Committee's response to  i t  shed some l i g h t  upon th e ta r g e ts  being used.
The fa c t  that fr e e  reserv es  was not mentioned seems to  in d ic a te  th a t th e
concept was not y e t  in  use by the Committee. However, the E xecutive
Committee did determ ine th a t  i t  would b e  h e lp fu l to  r e la te  open market
purchases to  member bank borrowing. The FOMG r e je c te d  th e  idea o f
57
pegging in te r e s t  r a te s  during Treasury fin a n cin g .
Subsequent m eetings show that th e Committee was co n sc io u sly  or 
unconsciously  stru g g lin g  to  develop a s p e c if ic  ta r g e t .  S h ortly  a f te r  
th e  in i t ia t io n  o f  " b i l ls  o n ly ,"  the Committee fu r th er  considered u sin g  a
54The f i r s t  mention o f  fr e e  re ser v e s  which t h i s  author n o ticed  in  
th e  m inutes was on October 8 , 1952, a t  th e  E xecutive Committee m eeting  
o f  th a t date. Rouse, Account Manager, mentioned fr e e  reserv es  in  one 
o f  h is  statem en ts. Brunner and M eltzer , The Federal R eserve' s Attach­
ment to  the Free Reserve Concept. p . 1 0 , mention th a t Irv in g  Auerbach o f  
th e New York Federal Reserve Bank i s  o fte n  c r e d ite d  w ith th e  development 
o f  th e  fr e e  reserv e  concept.
55
For exam ple, see M inutes. R o ll 6 , f f .  419-420.
56...................................... .......................................................................................
W oodlief Thomas, Guides for  Open Market O perations. September- 
Dee ember 1952. Memorandum Submitted t o  th e  E xecutive Committee o f  the  
F ederal Open Market Committee, August 28 , 1952 (Washingtons Board o f  
Governors o f  th e  Federal R eserve System, 1952), pp. 1 -2 .
^Minutes. Roll 6, f. 505.
eg
"member bank borrowing” ta r g e t. However, ear ly  disenchantment w ith
t h is  ta rg et lim ited  i t s  usage. Some o f  th e  Committee members appeared
t o  be a t a lo s s  as to  how to  in s tr u c t  the Account Manager w ithout some
q u a n tita tiv e  measure. N everth eless, Rouse, the Account Manager, f e l t
th a t  he could understand the Committee’ s in te n t w ithout sp e c if ic  f ig u res
59being mentioned in  th e consensus statem ent. The concept o f fr e e
reserv es  seemed to  creep in to  the m eetings a b it  more beginning w ith  the
60
September 24, 1953, m eeting. A temporary regression  was made to
in te r e s t  r a te s  on November 6 , 1953, and then a t the November 23 , 1953,
m eeting, open market purchases, excess re ser v e s , and member bank borrow- 
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in g  were re la te d . The December 15 , 1953, meeting seemed to  c e r t i fy  
th e  acceptance o f  the fr e e  reserve  concept as  being a u se fu l one. In  
th a t FQMC meeting Thomas mentioned free  reserve  l e v e l s .  In th e Executive  
Committee meeting which fo llow ed , Rouse mentioned th a t  the Committee had 
not given  him a free  reserve ta rg e t  but th a t  he f e l t  he had been adher­
in g  to  the essence o f  the Committee's in s tr u c t io n s . Rouse seemed to  
in d ic a te  th a t he had been operating  around th e  free  reserve l e v e l  which
Thomas mentioned a t th e  November 23 m eeting, but th a t he had not been
62ab le  to  be p rec ise  in  stick in g  to  i t .  Henceforth, the m inutes reveal
58Ib id . .  R o ll 7 , f f .  134-140.
59
Ib id . . f .  177.
60For example, see the fo llow in g  statem ent: " It was Mr. R ie f le r 's
thought th a t i t  might be d es ira b le  to  have excess reserves above 
borrowings. . . ib id . ,  f .  351. A lso , see ib id . ,  f .  380.
6 lSee ib id . . f f .  400, 403-409.
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Ib id . . f f .  441, 451.
in crea sin g  usage o f  the concept o f  fr e e  re ser v e s , w ith  d iscu ssio n s  o f
6*3an appropriate fr e e  reserve le v e l  or range becoming commonplace. The 
m inutes revea l th a t  the fr e e  reserve goal was not ju s t  an arithm etic  
f ig u r e , but an in d ic a tio n  o f  the f e e l in g s  o f  th e  Committee as to  what
64the economic p o lic y  should be.
The Committee's honeymoon w ith  fr e e  reserv es  was sh o r t- liv e d  as the  
im perfections o f  such a ta r g e t  become apparent. Malcolm Bryan, P resi­
dent o f  the Federal Reserve Bank o f  A tlan ta , questioned whether free
reserv es  was a b e tte r  "guide" ( ta r g e t)  than t o t a l  r e se rv es . An immedi-
65ate  answer was not forthcom ing. A. L. M ills ,  J r . ,  Member o f  the Board
o f Governors, emphasized th a t in  judging the e f fe c t iv e n e s s  o f  a le v e l
o f  fr e e  reserves th e ir  d is tr ib u tio n  between c i t y  and country banks must 
66be considered. Chairman Martin noted th a t when the Account Manager 
operated according to  the f e e l  o f  th e  market rather than some s e t
63For example, see i b i d . ,  R o ll 8 , f .  133.
64
The fo llo w in g  statem ent by Sproul i l lu s t r a t e s  t h i s  point:
" . . .  He would assume th a t the committee would agree 
that w h ile  i t  would se t  up a goal o f  around $600 
m illio n  i t  was seeking an o b jec tiv e  rather than an 
arith m etica l f ig u r e , and th a t i f  in  the opinion o f  
the Manager o f  th e  Account the s itu a t io n  in  the money 
market was such th a t an attempt to  m aintain a $600 
m illio n  le v e l  o f  fr e e  re serv es  would be undesirable  
in  te r n s  o f  general p o lic y  he would be free  to  act  
a ccord in g ly ." I b id . , f f • 256.
A lso, th e  Account Manager must look to  the "tone" o f  the market 
in  applying Committee p o lic y .  I b id . ,  f .  321.
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67p rojection  he often  achieved b e tter  r e s u lt s .  At the June 22, 1955,
meeting o f the Committee, several members s ta ted  th a t they f e l t  that
68
free  reserves should not be used as the so le  "guide” ( ta r g e t ) .  At the
July 12, 1955, m eeting, i t  was noted th a t the s ig n ifica n ce  o f a le v e l  o f
69free  reserves changed as borrowings changed. This accumulation o f
evidence and growth o f  sentiment aga in st using  free  reserves a s the so le
ta rg et le d  to  a gradual de-emphasis o f i t s  u se . At the August 2 , 1955,
m eeting, several Committee members ca lled  for  using in te r e s t  ra te s  and
member bank borrowing as the major "guides" (ta r g e ts )  as  to whether to
70
supply ad d ition a l reserves to  the market or n ot. On June 26, 1956,
Chairman Martin stated  th a t he too would l ik e  to  get away from using net
borrowed reserv es, but he went on to  g ive an estim ate o f  what le v e l
71would be d esira b le . However, in  the fo llow in g  m eetings in  1956, the 
Committee members u su a lly  managed to  reach a consensus without much use 
o f  free  reserves.
In early  1957 there was a movement back toward th e use o f  free
67I b id . , f .  321.
6SI b id . . R oll 9 , f f .  365-369.
69I b id . . f .  406.
70
f I b id . ,  f f .  434, 444-445. A lso, see ib id . . f f .  512, 518. The 
de-emphasis o f  free  reserves continued, as may be seen from the fo llow ­
ing m inutes: ib id . , f f .  551-552, 590-594; ib id . . R o ll 10, f .  69.
71Ib id . , f . 345. Again on August 21, 1956, Chairman Martin stated  
th a t he was happy th at the Committee members were moving away from using  
net borrowed reserves as a ta r g e t . (Martin a c tu a lly  used the word 
"guide” in stead  o f  " target,"  but from the context o f the statem ent, i t  
i s  obvious he was speaking o f  a ta r g e t .)  I b id . ,  f f .  471-472.
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r e se r v e s . At th e  A pril 1 6 , 1957, m eeting o f  th e  Committee, two
members r a l l i e d  to  the d efen se o f  fr e e  r e se r v e s . A lfred  Hayes,
P resid en t o f  the Federal Reserve Bank o f  New York, s ta te d  th a t he f e l t
th a t  ". , . net borrowed (o r  fr e e )  re serv es  c o n s titu te  th e  b e s t  s in g le
73s t a t i s t i c a l  measure o f  c r e d it  r e s tr a in t .  , . Hugh Leach, P resident
o f  the Richmond Federal Reserve Bank and not a Committee member a t th a t
tim e , made a statem ent which the m inutes record as fo llow s*
I t  was Mr. L each's b e l i e f  th a t i f  th e  Committee were 
to  fo cu s on any s in g le  in d ic a to r  a s  a bench mark o f  
Committee th in k in g , net borrowed reserv es  was p refer­
able to  the b i l l  r a te  or the Federal funds r a te . The 
reasons had been s e t  fo r th  c le a r ly  in  Governor 
B ald erston 's  memorandum o f  A pril 3 , 1957* Mr. Leach 
sa id  th a t  he recogn ized  f u l ly  the l im ita t io n s  o f  any 
s in g le  in d ic a to r , but he was in c lin e d  to  th in k  th a t  
i t  might be u se fu l fo r  th e  Committee a t  each m eeting  
to  agree upon a f ig u r e  o f  net borrowed reserv es  as an 
in d ica to r  o f  Committee th in k in g . . . . Such a f ig u r e  
o f  net borrowed r e se rv es  would serve as a bench mark, 
but Mr. Leach emphasized th a t  he did  not have in  mind 
th a t i t  should be a f ix e d  g o a l.
Thus, fr e e  reserv es  became a symbol ra th er than a ta r g e t ,  though
ob servers, in c lu d in g  t h i s  one, may have d i f f i c u l t y  in  d iscern in g  th e  
75
d iffe r e n c e . With the in creased  use o f  a fr e e  reserve ta r g e t , the  
Account Manager was not expected  to  use the " feel"  o f  th e  market q u ite
72For example, see ib id . . R o ll 1 1 , f f .  98-125, 215-217.
73Ib id . . f .  235.
74Ib id . . f .  246.
75Apparently the Committee members to o  had d i f f i c u l t y  grasping t h is  
su b tle  d is t in c t io n . For example, see the fo llo w in g  d ia logue which took  
p la ce  in  August, 1957*
"Mr. M ills  asked . . . what was th e  present goa l fo r  
n et borrowed r e se r v e s . Mr. Rouse r e p lie d  th at in  h is  
view n et borrowed reserv es  were a symbol, not a
59
76so much in  carry in g  out Committee p o lic y .
A renewed a tta c k  began on free  re ser v e s  as a ta r g e t  in  e a r ly  195®.
Malcolm Bryan, P resid en t o f th e  Federal Reserve Bank o f  A tlan ta ,
expressed  great concern th a t l i t t l e  a t te n t io n  was being paid to  t o ta l
bank reserves and th a t the t o t a l  reserve le v e l  was not above what i t  had
been a year ago. In  a d d itio n , he sa id ,
I f  allow ance be made, as I  b e lie v e  i t  must be made, 
for a growth fa c to r  in  the economy, then th e reserve  
s itu a t io n  i s  in  my judgment q u ite  u n sa tis fa c to r y .
A ccordingly, i t  would seem to  me to  be w ise p o lic y  
not to  attem pt an e n t ir e  o f f s e t  o f  seasonal fa c to r s  
tending t o  ease bank reserve p o s it io n s .  On th e  con­
trary , I  would l ik e  to  see the Open Market instrument 
operated in  such a fa sh ion  as would g ive  us p o s it iv e  
to ta l  reserv e  comparisons when measured ag a in st year  
ago d a te s . Such a p o lic y  would mean th at We would 
not be p rim arily  concerned w ith se cu r ity  market 
y ie ld s — c e r ta in ly  not be fr ig h ten ed  by "sloppy money"
—and pay l i t t l e  or no a tte n tio n  to  free  reserv es .
I  would l i k e  to  see th e  s itu a t io n  allow ed n a tu ra lly  
to  ease i t s e l f ,  even i f ,  ju s t  fo r  a f ig u r e , the b i l l  
rate d r if t e d  to 2 .5 0  or below. At such a f ig u r e , I  
would be in c lin e d  to  make s a le s  and to  review , in  
another few weeks, what our t o t a l  reserve p o s it io n  
on the y ea r -to -y e a r  f ig u r e s  may prove to  be in  the  
l ig h t  o f  our a c t io n s .77
Thus, President Bryan wished to  move away from u sin g  fr e e  re serv es  as a
ta r g e t .  His approach im plied  th a t more a tte n tio n  should be paid to
target; i t  seemed to  him th at th e  view o f  th e  Committee 
at the l a s t  m eeting had envisaged  net borrowed reserv es  
o f $600-*700 m illio n ."  Ib id . . f .  496.
R ea lly , t h i s  concept o f  fr e e  r e se rv es  i s  not to o  d iffe r e n t  from the  
one o r ig in a lly  s ta te d . See n . 64, supra.
76Ib id . . f f .  635-65®.
77Ibid., Roll 12, ff. 29-30.
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long-run  fa c to r s  and short-run f lu c tu a t io n s  should not cause so much 
alarm. Bryan went on to  o u t lin e  the s p e c if ic  dangers which h is  approach 
would avo id ,
(a ) I t  b rin gs us back to  a b a s is  o f  a c tio n  com patible 
w ith  our continu ing Statem ents o f  Operating P o lic y ,  
which must sh o r tly  be reviewed again;
(b) I t  avo id s what I  consider th e grave danger th a t  
an in crease  in  fr e e  reserv es  may occur, not because 
th e c r ed it  s itu a t io n  has b ettered  but because the  
economic s itu a t io n  has worsened;
(c )  I t  avo id s the hazard o f  s a le s  based on estim ated  
magnitudes a t  a tim e when, a s id e  from our usual 
d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f  estim a tio n , the measuring and ex ten t  
o f  market fa c to r s  sea so n a lly  a f fe c t in g  bank reserv es  
are both e s p e c ia l ly  e lu s iv e ;
(d) I t  w i l l  avoid what I  regard as the g re a te s t  o f  
a l l  dangers, namely, th a t we w i l l  underestim ate the  
e f f e c t s  o f  th e present i l l i q u i d  p o s it io n  o f  the  
American banking system and thus cause us o u rse lv es  
to  be s a t i s f ie d  w ith a p o lic y  inadequate to  the task  
o f  making th e  banking system a dynamic fa c to r  in  
economic r e c o v e r y .'
Bryan's attack  e v id e n tly  im pressed some o f th e  Committee members.
At the next m eeting P resid en t Hayes, in  supporting Bryan's suggestion
th a t a new type o f  "guide” ( ta r g e t)  be found, s ta ted  th a t th e  use o f  a
fr e e  reserve  ta rg e t may in v o lv e  a kind o f  c ir c u la r  reasoning. That i s ,
a  p a r tic u la r  free  reserv e  l e v e l  may be su c c e ss fu lly  m aintained but t o t a l
79reserv es  and the money supply may be shrinking.
A lso , th e  Committee was not ce r ta in  th a t i t  could m aintain  a 
c e r ta in  l e v e l  o f  fr e e  r e ser v e s . I t  was recognized  th a t bankers might 
len d  out any ex cess  re serv es  which accumulated, thus d riv in g  down the
7(W
79I b i d . . f .  63.
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fr e e  reserve  f ig u r e  w hile c r e d it  expansion was occu rrin g . Chairman
M artin commented th a t t h i s  was one o f  th e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f u sin g  a fr e e  
80reserv e  ta r g e t . These comments seem to  a n t ic ip a te  some o f  th e  o u tsid e
81
c r it ic is m s  o f  fr e e  reserv es  as a ta r g e t .  With th e  movement away from
fr e e  reserv es  came an in crea s in g  emphasis upon th e  " fe e l” o f  the  
82
market. With the c o lla p se  o f  the government bond market, in  the  
summer o f  1958, a b r ie f  re tu rn  to in t e r e s t  r a te s  a s  a ta rg et was 
n ecessary . The System, however, continued to u se  fr e e  r e se r v e s , in  con­
ju n ctio n  w ith  f e e l ,  through the end o f  1958.
In  1959, Committee members continued to  d is c u s s  the va lu e o f  fr e e
re ser v e s  a s a ta rg et w h ile  using i t  in  conjunction w ith o th er ta r g e ts .
Some members were c le a r ly  unhappy w ith  the r e s u lt s  o f  m aintain ing a
p a r t ic u la r  fr e e  reserve l e v e l  for a lo n g  period o f  tim e. The fo llow in g
comments made by Governor M ills  underscore th is  concern:
In s e t t in g  o b je c t iv e s  and app raisin g  th e  e f f e c t s  o f  
monetary and c r e d it  p o lic y , th e  time h as come to  g iv e  
prime con sid era tion  to  the r e s u lt s  o f  s ig h t in g  p o l ic y  
a c tio n s  a t  su sta in in g  some predetermined l e v e l  o f  
n egative  free  reserv es  over a lengthy p er io d  o f tim e.
The unhappy experience o f  l a s t  year, when $500 m il l io n  
o f  p o s it iv e  fr e e  reserves were se t as a continu ing  
goal o f  p o lic y  a c t io n s , was r e f le c te d  in  a supercharged 
growth in  the money supply. S im ilar r e s u l t s  may occur  
in  rev erse  i f  some le v e l  o f  negative f r e e  reserves i s  
con sciou sly  m aintained by p o l ic y  a c tio n s  fo r  a con­
tin u ou s period o f  tim e, in  th a t  the u ltim a te  e f f e c t  on
8° I b i d . . f f .  374-375.
*^For example, see A. J . Meigs, Free R eserves and the Money Supply 
(Chicago: U n iv ersity  o f  Chicago P r e s s , 19^2). A lso , see W illiam  G. 
Dewald, "Free R eserves, T o ta l R eserves, and Monetary C ontrol,"  Journal 
o f  P o l i t i c a l  Economy. LXXI (A p ril, 1 9 6 3 ), 141-153.
gn  i y
For example, see M inutes. R o ll 12 , f f .  4 1 8 , 466, and 520.
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th e money supply o f  m ain ta in in g  any f ix e d  l e v e l  o f  
r e se r v e s  seems to  be comparable to  the r e s u l t s  
obtained  from compounding in t e r e s t .  ^
P resid en t Bryan continued to  be concerned about th e  growth o f  bank
8 4r e se r v e s .
In  e a r ly  I960 , Bryan fu rth er  urged exam ination o f  t o t a l  r e se r v e s  as
85a ta r g e t .  C. Canby B ald erston , member o f  th e  Board o f  Governors, 
in troduced  a money supply ta r g e t  to  rep la ce  fr e e  r e s e r v e s . B alderston  
s ta te d ,
. . .  He would recommend th a t p o l ic y  be implemented 
by adding about $20 m il l io n  a week to  the reserv e  
b a se , a f te r  allow ance fo r  sea so n a l and o th er  tr a n s i­
to r y  fa c to r s ,  which would perm it a ra te  o f  growth 
in  th e  money supply o f  about 2 p er cent a y ea r . °
However, the Committee seemed re lu c ta n t  to  endorse a m ech an istic
approach. On March 1 ,  I9 6 0 , P resid en t Hayes came to  th e  d efen se  o f  fr e e
r e se r v e s:
I  th in k  we would be g iv in g  up a h ig h ly  advantageous 
tech n iq u e, developed over many y e a r s , i f  we were to  
attem pt to  couch the in s tr u c t io n s  in  some very  exact  
m athem atical term s. Of a l l  the t e s t e d  s t a t i s t i c a l  
gu id es we have a v a ila b le ,  n e t borrowed r e se r v e s  are 
s t i l l  probably th e b e s t ,  but t h i s  guide i s  c e r ta in ly  
a lo n g  way from being s u f f ic ie n t  by i t s e l f . 8 '
^ Ib ld . , R o ll 1 4 , f . 169.
84I b ld . . f f .  877-878.
85Bryan’ s p ro p o sa ls  w i l l  b e  d iscu ssed  in  some d e t a i l  la t e r  in  t h i s  
ch ap ter. For examples o f  h is  e f f o r t s ,  see ib id . , R o ll 15 , f f .  100, 129 , 
158- 161.
8^I b id . ,  f f .  137-169 . M il ls  had been encouraging co n sid era tio n  o f  
an in crea se  in  th e money supply fo r  some tim e .
87I b id . . f f .  214-215. A lso  a t t h i s  tim e s tu d ie s  were in  p rogress  
t o  t e s t  other p o s s ib le  ta r g e t s .  See i b i d . ,  f .  428 , and ib id . . R o ll 16 ,
In ad d ition , th e  Board's s t a f f  stud ied  the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  using t o t a l  
reserves and/or the money supply a s  short-run ta r g e ts . At the conclu­
sion  o f  t h i s  study both were found to  be unsu itab le fo r  short-run  
83
purposes. Free reserv es  was v in d ica ted  as being a u se fu l and h e lp fu l
ta rg et in  ach ieving Committee o b je c tiv e s  i f  i t  were used in  conjunction
89w ith other f in a n c ia l measures.
The conclusion  reached by the FCMC in  I960 was th a t free  reserves
was a u se fu l ta rg et but th a t i t  had many lim ita t io n s .  The Committee
was aware th a t the le v e l  o f  f r e e  reserves could not be taken per se as
the in d ica to r  o f  f in a n c ia l co n d itio n s nor should i t  be used aB th e  so le
ta rg et fo r  System op eration s. Brunner and M eltzer have ca lle d  t h is  free
reserve doctrine which recogn izes some o f the lim ita tio n s  o f the concept
90the "modified free  reserve d o c tr in e ." 7 A l i s t  o f  th ese  q u a lif ic a t io n s  
i s  found in  the System 's response to  the Commission on Money and Credit
f .  113.
From previous quotations o f  statem ents by Hayes, i t  may appear th a t  
Hayes i s  cap ric iou s f i r s t  f o r ,  then a g a in st , and now again for  fr e e  
reserv es. (See nn. 73 , 79, supra. )  This apparent cap ric iou sn ess i s  
explained when one r e a l iz e s  th a t Hayes i s  c o n s is te n tly  fo r  fr e e  reserves  
only i f  i t  i s  used in  conjunction w ith  other measures. HiB above s ta te ­
ment, which i s  taken out o f  co n tex t, i s  both a defense o f  free  reserves  
and th e use o f  " feel"  a s  ta r g e ts  fo r  System p o lic y , and a reaction  
aga in st the ad op tion .o f a m echanical r u le .
88See the statem ents o f  Guy Noyes, s t a f f  econom ist, ib id . ,  f f .  
150-152.
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Ib id . , f .  211.
^Stfhile Brunner and M eltzer f e e l  th a t the m odified  free  reserve  
approach i s  more r e a l i s t i c  than the "naive" v ers io n , th e ir  major c r i t i ­
cism o f  the System, th a t i t  has fa i le d  to  develop a system atic under­
standing o f  the monetary p ro cess, s t i l l  stands. Brunner and M eltzer,
64
q u estion n a ire . System o f f i c i a l s  sta ted ,
The s ig n if ica n c e  a t any given time o f  net borrowed 
reserv es  (o r  free  reserv es) as a fa c to r  tending to  
r e s tr a in  (or  encourage) bank cred it expansion depends 
on a t le a s t  f iv e  th in g s: ( l )  the magnitude o f  the
free  reserves (or net borrowed r e se r v e s); (2 ) the  
l e v e l  o f  short-term  money r a te s  r e la t iv e  to  Federal 
Reserve d iscount ra te s;  (3 ) th e  v ig o r  o f  actu a l 
current demands for  bank cred it; (4 ) the e x is t in g  
l e v e l  o f  t o t a l  bank l iq u id ity ;  and (5 ) the v a r ia ­
t io n s  among d iffe r e n t  c la s s e s  and groups o f  banks 
w ith  resp ect to  the con d ition s ju s t  named.'*1
As most o f  the above q u a lif ic a t io n s  have been d iscu ssed  in  PCMC 
m eetings, i t  i s  obvious that the passage was not w r itten  as a hollow  
r a t io n a liz a t io n  o f  th e  use o f  free  reserv es . The passage stems from the  
lon g  stru g g le  w ith in  th e POMC over the meaning and use o f  free  reserv es. 
At the same tim e, Brunner and M eltzer, as w e ll a s  o th e rs , appear j u s t i ­
f ie d  in  concluding th a t fr e e  reserv es  was the major ta rg e t used by the  
FOMC. Of course, i t  was not the on ly  ta rg et used, and th e Committee 
members c e r ta in ly  seemed aware o f  the lim ita t io n s  o f  i t s  usage.
Thus, to  summarize t h is  sec tio n , th e FCMC and Executive Committee 
began u sin g  the concept o f  fr e e  reserv es  ea rn estly  in  la t e  1953. C r it i­
cism o f  fr e e  reserves le d  to  gradual de-emphasis o f  i t s  use in  1954,
The Federal Reserve*s Attachment to  the Free Reserve Concept, pp. 28-30. 
Brunner and Meltzer* s  c r it ic ism  seems d estin ed  soon to  be outdated. 
P resen tly , the Federal Reserve i s  undertaking "linkage” stu d ies  in  order 
to  obtain  a b e tter  understanding o f  th e  monetary p ro cesses . George W. 
M itc h e ll, "Some Current Problems o f  Monetary P o lic y ;” Remarks o f  George 
W. M itc h e ll, Member, Board o f  Governors o f  th e  Federal Reserve System at  
th e  J o in t Luncheon Meeting o f  the Southern Economic A ssocia tion  and 
Southern Finance A sso c ia tio n , A tlan ta , G eorgia, November 11, 1966 
(Washington* Board o f  Governors, 1966), pp. 4 -9 . A lso , see "Where the  
Fed Grets I t s  Bold New Ideas,"  B u sin ess.Week (December 10 , 1966), p . 104*
91Commission on Money and C red it, The Federal Reserve and the  
Treasury, p . 9 . Reprinted by perm ission o f the p u b lish er.
•v
1955, and 1956. In  1957 the FOMC returned to  the use o f fr e e  reserv es  
but w ith  the understanding th a t the e a r l ie r  c r it ic ism s  o f the ta rg e t  
were v a lid  q u a lif ic a t io n s  which must be kept in  mind. While the fr e e  
reserv es  target was in  use in  195& and 1959, an a tta ck  was launched to  
abandon i t  for  a t o t a l  reserve or money supply ta r g e t . In I960 the  
Committee concluded th a t fr e e  reserves was a u se fu l ta rg et and in d ica to r  
but th a t i t  must be used in  conjunction w ith other f in a n c ia l measures.
I I I .  THE TOTAL RESERVE TARGET
As mentioned in  the previous s e c tio n s  o f t h i s  chapter, the Federal
Open Market Committee considered in crea sin g  to ta l  bank reserves by some
increment per week as a short-run ta r g e t:  Most o f  the suggestions for
the use o f  a to ta l  reserve "guide" ( ta r g e t)  came from Malcolm Bryan,
P resid en t o f the Federal Reserve Bank o f  A tlanta. As ea r ly  as June 3 ,
1954, he questioned whether free  reserv es  was a b e tte r  ta r g e t  than t o t a l  
92
re ser v e s . A ctu a lly , the Committee q u ite  frequently  considered t o t a l  
bank reserv es  as a f in a n c ia l market in d ic a to r . However, the Committee 
was n ot using a short-run t o t a l  bank reserv e  le v e l  ta rg e t.
Guy Noyes, in  exp la in in g  some o f  the System 's responses to  the CMC 
q u estion n aire , s ta te d  that th e  volume o f  bank reserv es  was one o f  the  
short-run p o lic y  o b je c tiv e s . However, th e  b ig  problem w ith bank 
reserv es  had been to  p lace i t  tinder e f fe c t iv e  s t a t i s t i c a l  co n tro l. 
Short-run recurrent and random v a r ia t io n s  in  reserves com plicated i t s
^Minutes, R o ll 8 , f .  192. Committee members gen era lly  f a i le d  to  
d is t in g u ish  between "guides" and " ta rg ets ."  Bryan was advocating th e  
use o f  a to ta l  reserve ta r g e t , though he o ften  used the term "guide."
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use a s  a ta r g e t . I t  was p r a c t ic a l ly  im p ossib le  to  d is t in g u ish  funda­
m ental changes in  bank r e ser v e s  from random or season al ones i n  th e  very  
short-ru n . Refinem ents in  reserve d ata , in  an attem pt to  d ea l w ith  
th e se  v a r ia t io n s , le d  to  th e usage o f  th e  concepts " ava ilab le  reserves"
and "nonborrowed reserv es ."  Noyes in d ic a ted  th a t th e  FOMC was using
93" a v a ila b le  reserves"  a s  one o f  i t s  short-run ta r g e ts  in  1961. Though
th e  term " ava ilab le  reserves"  appears in  the m inutes o f the FOMC i t
apparently had not developed, in  la t e  I9 6 0 , to  th e p o in t where i t
rep laced  or r iv a le d  fr e e  re serv es  in  importance a s  a ta rg e t. A glance
at recen t is s u e s  o f  the Federal Reserve B u lle t in  seems to in d ic a te  th a t
94th e  concept o f  "nonborrowed reserves"  has grown in  importance.
The use o f  free  r e se r v es  and in te r e s t  r a te s  a s  ta r g e ts  im p lie s  a
short-run  approach to  monetary p o lic y , i . e . ,  i t  v iew s almost d a i ly  and
h ou rly  changes. Because o f  t h i s  short-run approach and em phasis on
"defensive" o p era tio n s, the Federal Reserve has come under con sid erab le  
95a tta c k . P resid en t Bryan’ s approach, even though i t  c a lle d  f o r  a 
w eekly in crea se  in  t o t a l  r e se r v e s , would have en vision ed  a lo n g e r  time
93Guy B . Noyes, "Short-Run O b jec tiv es  o f  Monetary P o lic y ,"  Review 
o f  Economics and S t a t i s t i c s . XLV (February, 19 6 3 ), Supplement, 147-149* 
"A vailab le reserves"  i s  derived  by a d ju stin g  t o t a l  reserv es  f o r  seasonal 
fa c to r s  as  w e ll  as changes in  Treasury ta x  and lo a n  account balances a t  
member banks. "A vailable reserves"  minus member bank borrowing y ie ld s  
"nonborrowed reserv es ."  Nonborrowed r e se r v e s , minus required reserves  
fo r  p r iv a te  d ep o sits  sea so n a lly  a d ju sted , y ie ld s  fr e e  r e se r v e s .
9^For example, see  Board o f  Governors, "Recent Bank C red it and 
Monetary Developments," Federal Reserve B u lle t in . L III (February, 1967), 
189-190.
9 '’For example, see Karl Brunner and A llan  H. M eltzer, Some General 
F eatures o f  th e  Federal R eserv e 's  Approach to  P o lic y . Subcommittee on 
Domestic F inance, House Committee on Banking and Currency, 88th  
C ongress, 2nd S essio n , February 1 0 , 1964, pp. 9 -1 6 .
span. In  e a r ly  I9 6 0 , Bryan s ta ted  h i s  reason s fo r  in trod u cin g  a t o t a l
reserve  ta r g e ts  He wanted t o  experim ent
. . .  to  detenaine whether th e  t o t a l  re serv e  concept 
r ep resen ts  a  p r a c tic a b le  foundation  on which th e  
Committee would b ase in s tr u c t io n s  (a ) in  q u a n tita tiv e  
and th u s , i n  m easurable term s; (b ) in  term s o f  a 
phenomenon, namely t o t a l  r e s e r v e s , th a t  are determin­
a b le  by th e  System; (c )  avoid  q u a lita t iv e  term inology  
a s  rep resen ted  by such in d e fin a b le  term s a s  to n e , 
f e e l ,  e a s e , t ig h tn e s s ,  and so on; and, a t  th e  same 
tim e, (d ) to  le a v e  th e  Desk w ith  s u f f ic ie n t  la t i tu d e  
t o  accommodate i t s e l f  to  the p r a c t ic a l  ad m in istra tio n  
o f  th e  Account and t o  co n d itio n s  as th ey  unfold  from 
m eeting to  m e e t in g .^
Concern about th e  la ck  o f  growth in  both th e  reserv e  base and the
money supply e v id e n tly  encouraged co n sid era tio n  o f  a t o t a l  reserv e  
98ta r g e t . The re lu c ta n c e  o f  Committee members to  accept a m ech an istic
approach t o  monetary p o lic y  and an unfavorable s t a f f  rep ort on t o t a l
r e s e r v e s , which i s  d iscu ssed  in  the fo llo w in g  s e c t io n , condemned i t s  u se
99a s  a short-run  ta r g e t .
IV. THE MONEY SUPPLY TARGET
There are se v e r a l a rea s  o f  con troversy  surrounding the money supply  
and i t s  u se  as a ta r g e t .  W hile econom ists o u ts id e  o f  the FOMC have been  
concerned w ith  s e le c t in g  th e  most v ia b le  d e f in i t io n  o f  the money a ip p ly , 
th e FOMC seems to  have la r g e ly  ignored  th e  d isp u te . At l e a s t  the
^ M in u te s . R o ll 15 , f f .  123-129. Bryan, in  t h i s  r e fe r e n c e , wa*s 
seek ing a  2 per cen t annual in crea se  in  t o t a l  r e se r v e s .
97I b id . .  f .  100 .
9®por exam ple, see i b i d . ,  f f .  243-253.
" ibid.. ff. 168-169, and Roll 16, ff. 150-152.
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m inutes do n ot revea l undue concern by th e  committee members a s  to  the
proper d e f in it io n . The Committee ev id e n tly  used th e same d e f in it io n  o f
the money supply which appears in  the Federal Reserve B u lle t in —demand
d ep o sits  p lu s  currency, w ith  th e appropriate adjustm ents.
Econom ists both w ith in  and w ithout the Federal Open Market
Committee have been concerned w ith  growth in  the money supply. M ilton
Friedman has been p e r s is te n t  in  proposing a 4 per cen t in crea se  in  the
100
money supply per year. A lso , Committee members have been concerned
w ith  the seasonal needs fo r  monetary expansion as w e ll  as a monetary
101
base fo r  long-run economic growth. At the March 5 , 1957, m eeting o f  
th e Committee, Governor M ills  expressed concern w ith  the seem ingly  
incom patible goa ls  o f  m eeting th e  monetary growth needs o f  an expanding 
economy and y e t  retard in g  in f la t io n .  He wondered whether d ep o sit turn­
over cou ld , w ith in  l im i t s ,  prevent economic stagn ation  w ith a r e la t iv e ly  
s t a t ic  money supply. W oodlief Thomas s ta ted  th a t System experience had 
shown th at th e money supply did not have to  in crea se  a t a constant ra te  
in  order fo r  the economy to  grow a t  a constant r a te . He noted th a t  
c e r ta in  measures could in crea se  money flow s w ithout in crea s in g  the stock
^ ^ M ilton  Friedman, A Program fo r  Monetary S t a b i l i t y  (New Yorks 
Fordham U n iv ers ity  P r e ss , 1959?, Chapter 4 .
■ ^ A t th e  August 24, 1954, m eeting o f  the E xecutive Committee, 
Sproul made the fo llo w in g  comment regarding seasonal needs:
’•An in crease  in  the money supply o f  about the usual 
seasonal proportions during the remainder o f  the year  
w i l l  be needed to  meet p r iv a te  and Treasury needs, 
and w i l l  req u ire an expansion o f  Federal Reserve 
c r e d it  to  o f f s e t  th e  re su lta n t in crease  in  required  
reserv es  and currency c ir c u la t io n ."  M inutes. R o ll 
8 , f .  248.
o f  money; b u t, he a lso  n o ted , th ese  measures may l im it  th e  e f f e c t iv e n e s s
o f  monetary p o l ic y .  The Committee members ended the d isc u ss io n  by
say in g  th a t i t  a l l  seemed to  be a m atter o f judgnent and th a t  fu rth er
102
study was needed.
As p re v io u sly  noted , th e  Committee members became concerned about
the slip p age between f r e e  reserv es  and changes in  the money supp ly . The
exp erien ce o f  1958 proved th a t the money supply could in crea se  q u ite
103
r a p id ly  w hile th e  free  reserv e  l e v e l  was held  co n sta n t. Then, un
1959 , th e  Committee became concerned th a t a con stan t n e t  borrowed
r e se r v e  l e v e l  would p r e c ip ita te  a to o  rapid co n tra c tio n  o f  the money 
104
sup p ly .
By I960 money was f e l t  to  be to o  t ig h t .  Governor M ills  became
q u ite  concerned as the Committee recogn ized  th e  need fo r  an in crea se  in
105the money supply, but d id  nothing about i t .  A lso , in  e a r ly  I9 60 ,
Governor B alderston  p resen ted  a p rop osa l to  in c r ea se  th e  money supply a t
a con stan t r a te  each y e a r . Balder ston* s proposal was s im ila r  to  A tlan ta
Bank P resid en t Bryan's, b u t B alderston  wanted to  in crea se  reserv es  by
tw en ty  m il l io n  d o lla rs  a  week in  ord er to  in c re a se  the money supply each 
106
y ea r .
New York Bank P resid en t Hayes s ta te d  th a t  he would l i k e  to  see  the  
Ib id . .  R o ll 11 , f f .  143-146.
103
See n . 83 , supra.
^ ^ M in u tes, R oll 1 4 , f* 100. For fu rth er  d isc u ss io n  on th e  money 
supply  during 1959, see ib id . , f f .  324-325 , 882 .
105I b id . ,  R o ll 15 , f f .  86-87.
106Ib id . . f f .  138-150 .
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money supply expand, but th a t a s  a short term ta r g e t  such an in crea se  in
th e  money supply would be m eaningless. Hayes continued:
The Desk could hardly see $20 m il l io n  a week in  
r e la t io n  t o  the kind o f  fa c to r s  th a t i t  was o f f ­
s e t t in g  a l l  the tim e and would s c a r c e ly  be ab le to  
t e l l  whether such an o b je c tiv e  was being accom­
p lish ed  or n o t. Of course, the Account Manager 
could look  a f te r  and see whether, in  a gen era l way, 
he had g o tten  toward th a t g o a l, but in  day-to-day  
op eration s the Desk could not be guided by such an 
in s tr u c t io n .l^ 7
Hayes went on to  s ta te  th a t such an in crea se  could be b u i lt  in to  the  
p r o je c tio n s  and used th a t way. But, i t  would be im possib le fo r  th e Desk
to  t e l l  whether i t  had accomplished any growth over a very short
’r u l  
109
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p eriod . The Committee members were re lu c ta n t to  adopt a " r le11 type
approach, but decided they would study B ald erston 1 s  proposal.
The Committee members, in  I960 , continued to  be concerned w ith the  
lack  o f  growth in  th e  money supply, but th e y  eschewed i t  as th e  primary 
t a r g e t . F i n a l l y ,  a t the August 16, I9 6 0 , m eeting o f the Committee, 
Guy Noyes d e liv ered  th e coup de grace to  the proposal th a t t o t a l  
reserv es  be in creased  a t a c e r ta in  ra te  so as to  in crea se  th e  money 
supply. Noyes d id  not f e e l  th a t  i t  was p o ss ib le  to  a n tic ip a te  the  
s p e c if ic  amount by which t o t a l  reserv es  should be changed in  order to  
m aintain the e x is t in g  le v e l  o f  the money supply or to  in crease  or 
decrease i t  by a c e r ta in  amount. Yet, th e  idea o f  u sin g  the money
107I b id . . f f .  155-156.
108I b id ,
109I b id . . f f .  161-169. 
110I b id . . f f .  233-253, 361.
71
111supply as some sort o f  long-range ta rg et-g u id e  was reta in ed .
Thus, a s  pointed out above, the Committee, w hile u sin g  free  
reserv es  as a ta r g e t, became concerned on sev era l occasions when the  
money supply began to  grow e ith e r  too  rap id ly  or too sLowly. Subsequent 
d iscu ssio n  pointed out th e  importance o f  v e lo c i t y  as w e ll a s  other  
fa c to r s  in  determining whether the money supply i s  growing a t the proper 
pace. Proposals for a constant in crease in  the money supply ta rg e t were
111
Noyes stated:
". . . I t  i s  l i t e r a l l y  im possib le to  quantify  in  
advance e ith e r  th e change in  t o t a l  reserv es  or the  
volume o f  System operations which would be necessary  
to  m aintain th e e x is t in g  le v e l  o f  the season a lly  
adjusted  money supply or to  in crease  or decrease i t  
by a sp e c if ie d  amount.
M0n the other hand, i t  does appear p o ss ib le , in  
r e tro sp e c t , to  determine w ith reasonable accuracy 
whether the net e f f e c t  o f  a l l  fa c to r s  a f fe c t in g  
member bank r e se r v e s , in clu d ing  System op erations, 
was such as to  provide more or l e s s  reserv es  than 
were needed to  support the le v e l  o f  the sea so n a lly  
adjusted money supply which p reva iled  a t the  
beginning o f th e  period. However, whether such an 
a n a ly s is  adds su b sta n tia lly  to  the in s ig h t  which can 
be gained from observation  o f  the movements o f  the  
money supply i t s e l f  on a semimonthly b a s is  i s  a t  
l e a s t  open to  q u estion . A fter  spending considerable  
tim e working over the data , my own judgment i s  that 
an appraisa l o f  the impact on the money supply o f  
l e v e l s  o f reserve  a v a i la b i l i t y  th at have p revailed  
in  the recent past can be made b est in  terms o f  the  
behavior o f the money supply i t s e l f ,  rather than 
th e  reserve base a v a ila b le  to  support i t .  I f  the  
l e v e l  o f  free  or n et borrowed reserv es  which has 
p reva iled  has produced changes in  the money supply 
other than th ose  intended by the Committee, then i t  
should be adjusted  in  th e d irec tio n  in d ica ted .
While the le v e l  o f  t o t a l  reserv es  i s  a lo g ic a l  lin k  
between the tw o, i t  does not seegi p r a c t ic a l to  use 
i t  d ir e c t ly  a s  a guide £"target_7 fo r  current 
operationsj on th e  other hand, nor does i t  seem to
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defeated  owing to th e ir  short-run inadequacies. However, the Committee
did  seem to  decide th a t allowance for  an annual in crease  in  the money
supply can be b u ilt  in to  free  reserve p ro jectio n s. This conclusion  i s
contained in  the fo llow in g  statement by System o f f i c ia l s :
Broader guides to  p o lic y  operations are provided by the  
consequences o f  changes in  reserve a v a i la b i l i t y  on the  
amount of t o ta l  loan s and investm ents o f  banks and on 
the money supply. Assumptions or estim ates as to  these  
elem ents underlie the current and projected  fig u re s  for  
to ta l  reserves and free  reserv es. The Open Market 
Committee in  i t s  d e lib era tio n s has in  mind what condi­
t io n s  with resp ect to  the a v a i la b i l ity  o f  bank cred it  
and growth in  the money supply would be an appropriate 
end o f  p o lic y  a t the tim e.
V. FEEL AS A TARGET
An understanding o f  the "feel"  o f  the market and i t s  p o s it io n  in  
the Committee-Account Manager re la tio n sh ip  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  d iscern and 
compose. "Feel" seems to  bridge the gap between the free  reserve ta rg et  
and the degree o f  ease or t ig h tn ess  in d icated  by the Committee during 
i t s  d iscu ssio n . That i s ,  though the Committee s e t s  a l e v e l  o f  free  
reserves in  i t s  d iscu ssio n , and often tim es in  i t s  consensus statem ent, 
i t  i s  r e a lly  in d ica tin g  a f e e l in g  which i t  has. Since market conditions  
may change, the numerical ta rg et which the Committee has se t may be 
in v a lid a ted . The Account Manager, however, w i l l  attempt to adhere to
shed l ig h t  on the impact o f past p o lic y  a ctio n s which 
i s  not revealed  by an examination o f  the course o f  the 
money supply i t s e l f . ” ib id . . R o ll 16, f f .  150-152.
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Commission on Money and C redit, The Federal Reserve and the  
Treasury, p. 20. Reprinted by perm ission o f the publisher.
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the 11 s p ir i t ” o f  the fr e e  reserve ta rg e t w h ile  not fo llo w in g  the ta rg et
to  th e  " letter.** In p r a c t ic e , th e  Committee may s e t  a range o f  fr e e
r eserv es  as a ta r g e t . The Account Manager then  w i l l  vary th e free
reserve  l e v e l  w ith in  th a t  range according t o  h is  f e e l  o f  the market in
113adhering to  th e  s p ir i t  o f  the Committee’ s  w ish es.
Evidence o f  the Account Manager's i n i t i a t i v e  in  t h is  resp ect i s
found in  the m inutes o f  August 24 , 1954. The Account Manager allow ed
some b i l l s  to  be "run o ff"  to  avoid  having a "sloppy" m a r k e t . E v e n
before the gen era l use o f  free  reserv es  a s  a ta r g e t , th e  Account Manager
f e l t  th a t he could  carry out th e Committee’ s in te n t  w ithout th e use o f  a
115s p e c if ic  numerical ta r g e t .  Even Chairman Martin in d ica ted  th a t on 
occasion  th e Account Manager's use o f " feel"  o f  th e  market as a ta rg e t  
was superior to  a f ix e d  fr e e  reserve  l e v e l , D u r i n g  much o f  the  
decade o f  Committee a c tio n  under study, the Committee, w hile u sin g  a 
fr e e  reserv e  ta r g e t ,  commented th a t  i t  w ished to  m aintain about th e same 
degree o f  "ease,"  " r estra in t,"  e t c .  That i s ,  the fr e e  reserve l e v e l ,  
w h ile  a c tin g  as a symbolic ta r g e t , was a ls o  accompanied by a verb al 
exp ression  o f  the same th in g .
Not a l l  o f  the Committee members put f a it h  in  th e  "feel"  o f  the 
market. Governor R obertson, a lready noted fo r  h is  c r it ic ism  o f  Desk 
a c t io n , made the fo llo w in g  statem ent:
113M inutes, R o ll 14 , f .  306.
114 Ib id . . R o ll 8 , f f .  249-252.
115 See n. 59, supra.
116
See n . 67 , supra.
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. . . He a lso  b e lie v e d  th a t  too much r e lia n c e  on 11 f e e l  
o f  th e  market” a s  seen in  New York could  be d isa stro u s  
in  th e  conduct o f  op era tion s t o  carry  out Committee 
p o lic y . He f e l t  th a t p ressu res in  New York were much 
g rea ter  and much more d i f f i c u l t  to  w ithstand  than they  
were ou tsid e New York. F e e l o f  the market cou ld  not 
be disregarded b u t i t  should not be g iven  f u l l  sway
L ikew ise, the System has been c r i t ic iz e d  from ou tsid e  fo r  p la c in g  such
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d e c is io n  making power in  th e  hands o f  the Desk.
A new f la r e  was added to  the in s tr u c t io n s  to  the Account Manager
when Martin s ta te d  th at he would l i k e  to  see th e  same " fe e l ,  to n e , and
119c o lo r ” o f the market continued. The r e lia n c e  o f  the Committee on the 
d isc r e t io n  o f  th e  Account Manager i s  c le a r ly  seen during the government 
s e c u r it ie s  market c r i s i s  o f  1958. The Manager was c a lle d  upon to  in d i­
ca te  when the market became d iso rd er ly  as w e ll  a s  how to  smooth i t  out 
and sca le  i t  down."^
In  g en era l, i t  seems that when the Committee became disenchanted  
w ith  fr e e  reserv es  i t  in crea sed  i t s  use o f  " f e e l” as a ta r g e t . In  I960  
P resid en t Hayes made a statem ent concerning how to  g iv e  in s tr u c t io n s  to  
th e  Account Mianager. T h is  statement seems t o  summarize the procedure 
used by the Committee during much o f  the p eriod  o f  t h is  study and up 
u n t i l  operation  tw ist:
117M inutes. R oll 1 1 , f .  635.
118For example, see  H astings and R obertson, ”The.M ysterious World 
o f  th e  Fed,” pp. 100-102; Brunner and M eltzer, Some General F eatures o f  
th e  F ederal.Re serve1 s Approach to  P o lic y . Subcommittee Report, pp. 
13- 18 .
119
M inutes. R oll 1 2 , f .  466.
120Ibid., Roll 13, ff. 12-60.
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. . .  I  b e liev e  th at our usual in s tr u c t io n s  couched in  
term s o f "the same degree o f r e s tr a in t11 or "more" or 
"less"  are s u f f ic ie n t ly  p rec ise  to  make i t  p o ss ib le  
fo r  the Manager to  rea ct to  changing developments f le x ­
ib ly  and in  such a way a s  to  carry  out f u l ly  the s p ir i t  
o f  the Committee's in s tr u c t io n s . As we have o ften  
noted , our system o f reports in c lu d in g  th e  d a ily  con­
feren ce c a l l ,  i s  so ex ten sive  th a t  each member has 
ample opportunity to  inform the Manager i f  he sees  any 
d ev ia tio n  from the Committee's in s tr u c t io n s . I  think  
we would be g iv in g  up a h igh ly  advantageous technique, 
developed over many y ea rs , i f  we were to  attempt to  
couch the in str u c tio n s  in  some very  exact mathematical 
term s. Of a l l  the te s te d  s t a t i s t i c a l  guides we have
a v a ila b le , net borrowed reserves are s t i l l  probably the
b e s t ,  but t h i s  guide i s  c e r ta in ly  a long way from being
s u f f ic ie n t  by i t s e l f . - ^ l
Thus the Manager o f  the Open Market Account " feels"  not only  the in ten t
o f  the Committee by i t s  verbal and q u a n tita tiv e  in s tr u c t io n s , but a lso
the market in  attem pting to  apply them.
7 1 . SUMMARY
As th e previous d iscu ssio n  has pointed  out, the Federal Open Market 
Committee has used and considered using a host o f  economic ta r g e ts .  
Beginning w ith  the Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord in  March, 1951* the  
System moved away from using in te r e s t  r a te s  as a ta r g e t. During t h i s  
tim e, the Account Manager operated la r g e ly  according to  the f e e l  o f  the  
market, th e  Committee g iv in g  him lim ited  q u a n tita tiv e  in stru c tio n s  
through d iscu ssio n  and the consensus statem ent. The adoption o f  " b i l l s  
only" was follow ed q u ite  soon by the adoption o f  fr e e  reserves as a 
ta r g e t . The Committee qu ick ly  discovered th at fr e e  reserves was not a 
panacea fo r  i t s  d ir e c t io n a l i l l s .  During v a c i l la t io n s  in  the p opu larity
121Ibid.. Roll 15, ff. 214-215.
o f  fr e e  r e se r v e s , " fee l"  o f  th e  market was o fte n  r e l ie d  upon. Concern 
w ith  th e behavior o f  th e  money supply and t o t a l  bank r e se r v e s  le d  to  
t h e ir  co n sid era tio n  a s  ta r g e ts  and a dim inution in  the use o f fr e e  
r e se r v e s . In  I960 fr e e  r e s e r v e s , m odified  by many q u a lif ic a t io n s  and 
a s s is t e d  by f e e l ,  returned as th e  s in g le  most workable ta r g e t ,  w ith  
money supply and t o t a l  reserv e  in c r e a se s  tucked in to  i t s  p r o je c t io n s .  
Concern over the in te r n a t io n a l balance o f  payments problem le d  to  th e  
return  o f  in te r e s t  r a te s  a s  an important t a r g e t .  With the i n i t i a t i o n  
o f  op eration  t w is t ,  th e  b i l l  r a te  was not to  f a l l  below two per c e n t .  
T his chapter, by examining th e  v a r io u s  ta r g e ts  which have been  
used by th e  Committee, le a d s  th e  way to  a co n sid era tio n  o f  t h e ir  use  
during s p e c if ic  b u sin ess  c y c le s .  Chapter IV examines the economic 
in d ic a to r s  which th e Committee reacted  t o ,  th e  len g th  o f  tim e i t  took  
th e Committee to  r e a c t ,  and th e  ta r g e t  in s tr u c t io n s  which th e  Committee
CHAPTER IV
MONETARY LAGS
T his chapter b eg in s w ith  an exam ination o f  some o f  th e  problems 
in vo lved  in  la g  determ in ation , i . e . , the d i f f i c u l t i e s  in vo lved  i n  p in ­
p o in tin g  la g s .  N ext, ev idence o f  th e  in s id e  la g  during upturns and 
downturns in  th e  p eriod  1951-1958 i s  con sid ered . F in a l ly ,  the ev idence  
o f  la g s  found in  t h i s  stu d y  i s  summarized and compared w ith  th e  len g th  
o f  la g s  reported  in  o th er s tu d ie s .
I .  PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN LAG DETERMINATION
The i n i t i a l  problem in  la g  determ ination  i s  to  d e fin e  th e  la g s  
which are to  be s tu d ied . Economic l i t e r a t u r e ,  w h ile  abounding w ith  la g  
d e f in i t io n s ,  la c k s  th e  u n iform ity  n ecessa ry  to  avo id  sem antical d i f f i ­
c u l t ie s .^  To avoid  t h i s  p i t f a l l ,  t h i s  chapter w i l l  presen t below in  
ta b u la r  form th e  la g  d e f in i t io n s  which were in troduced  in  th e  f i r s t  
chapter o f  t h i s  study:
For example, see M ilton  Friedman, ,fA Monetary and F is c a l  
Framework fo r  Economic S t a b i l i t y ,” The American Economic Review, 
XXXVIII (June, 1 9 4 $ ) , . p , .255; Harry G. Johnson and John W. L. Winder, 
Lags in  th e E f f e c t s  o f  Monetary P o lic y  in  Canada. Working Paper 
Prepared fo r  th e  Royal Commission on Banking and Finance (Ottawa: 
Q ueen's P r in te r , 1 9 6 2 ), p . 6; and A lb ert Ando, e t  a l . , "Lags in  
F is c a l  and Monetary P o l ic y .11 S ta b i l iz a t io n  P o l i c i e s : A .S e r ie s  o f
R esearch S tu d ies  Prepared fo r  th e Commission on Money and C redit 
(Englewood C l i f f s :  P r e n tic e -H a ll, I n c . ,"195377 P* 3*
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TABLE I I  
MONETARY LAGS
Lag D escrip tion  o f the Dating Point Lag T it le
An Economic Change Occurs
The R ecognition  Lag
R ecognition  o f  the Need fo r  a 
Change in  P o lic y  -----------------
The A dm inistrative or  
D ecision  Lag
  A P o lic y  D ecision  I s  Made ------------------------------------------------------------------
3 The Action Lag
  The A u th o r itie s  Commence A ction --------------------------------------------------------
4  Part I  o f  the O utside Lag
  The Banking System I s  A ffected  ---------------------------------------------------------
5 Part I I  o f  the O utside Lag
 The Economy Begins to  R espond----------------------------------------------------------
At f i r s t  g la n ce , i t  would appear th at th e  above d e f in it io n s  so lve  
the problem o f  sem antics. This appearance, however, i s  m islead ing  
because the p r e c ise  meaning o f  th e  dating p o in ts  i s  su b ject to  q u estion . 
Each o f  the above d escr ip tio n s  o f  dating  p o in ts , th er e fo r e , w i l l  be 
examined in  turn  to  expose th e ir  weaknesses and to  c la r i f y  th e ir  meaning 
fo r  use in  t h is  study.
The f i r s t  problem i s  to  determine when an economic change occurred. 
Several in d ic e s  may be used to  make t h is  determ ination ex  p o s t . The
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most popular appear to  be th e  N ation al Bureau o f  Economic Research 
(NBER) tu rn in g  p o in ts ,  the Federal Reserve Index o f  In d u s tr ia l Produc- 
t io n ,  and unemployment s t a t i s t i c s .  Kareken and Solow 's stu d y , w h ile  
u sin g  a l l  th r e e , does not seem to  in d ic a te  a s ig n if ic a n t  d iffe r e n c e  in  
r e s u it s  between u sin g  the NBER turn ing p o in ts  and those in d ic a te d  by th e  
F ederal Reserve Index o f  In d u s tr ia l Production . The use o f  unemployment 
s t a t i s t i c s  y ie ld e d  lon ger la g s  a f te r  peaks and sh orter  la g s  a f te r
3
troughs. The use o f  a consumer p r ic e  in d ex  provided mixed r e s u lt s .
Even though th ese  in d ic e s  have been used by econom ists o u ts id e  the  
System , i t  would seem to  be more re lev a n t to  date the need fo r  a change 
from v a r ia t io n s  in  economic in d ic a to r s  used by th e  FOMC. T his approach, 
however, would s u f fe r  the weakness o f  judging th e  System by u sin g  th e  
System 's own c r i t e r ia .
What i s  needed i s  to  judge th e System a g a in st independent m easures 
o f  when a c t io n  should have been taken . Even t h i s  p o in t may be ques­
t io n e d . For example, when does the need for a change in  System p o lic y
o
Perhaps the most popular in d ic a to r  i s  th e  N ational Bureau's judg­
ment o f  th e  turn ing p o in t. Friedman, Schwartz, Lerner, Brunner and 
M eltzer , and Kareken and Solow have used i t  in  la g  s tu d ie s . See M ilton  
Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz, A Monetary H istory  o f  th e  U nited  
S t a te s . 1867-1960 (P rin ceton  U n iv ers ity  P r ess , 1 9 S 3 J 7 p .~ £>14} Eugene M. 
Lerner, "A C r itic ism  o f  Free R eserves,"  Review o f  Economics and S t a t i s ­
t i c s .  XLIV (May, 19 6 2 ), 225} Karl Brunner and A llan  H. M eltzer , The 
Federal R eserve*s Attachment to  the Free Reserve Concept. Subcommittee 
on Domestic F inance, House Committee on Banking and Currency, 88th  
Congress, 2nd S e ss io n , May, 1964, p . 42} and John Kareken and Robert M. 
Solow, "Lags in  F is c a l  and Monetary P o lic y ,"  S ta b il iz a t io n  P o l i c i e s ; A 
S e r ie s  o f  Research S tu d ies  Prepared fo r  the Commission on Money and 
C redit ^Englewood C l i f f s :  P r e n tic e -H a ll, I n c . ,  1963) ,  p . ? 8 l ( H e r e ­
a f te r  c i t e d  as Kareken and Solow w ith  th e  page or page numbers fo llo w ­
in g .)  Kareken and Solow a ls o  used th e  Federal Reserve Index o f  Indus­
t r i a l  Production and unemployment s t a t i s t i c s  as d ating  p o in ts  in  th e ir  
study.
^Kareken and Solow, pp. 68-71.
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occur? I s  i t  p r e c is e ly  a t the moment some economic v a r ia b le , such as an 
in d ex  o f in d u s tr ia l  production , changes; o r , granted th a t monetary 
p o lic y  takes some tim e to  work, i s  i t  b efore  economic a c t iv i t y  turns up 
or down? The turm oil over measuring the o u tsid e  la g  o f  monetary p o lic y  
o n ly  adds to  the con fu sion . The answers to  th ese  q u estion s appear, 
owing to th e im perfect s ta te  o f  our knowledge, to  be a m atter o f judg­
m ent.^ While recogn izin g  the shortcom ings o f  the measure, t h i s  study 
u se s  the NBER turning p o in ts  in  dating the time when an economic change 
occurred.
The next q u estion  i s  t h is :  Who must recogn ize the need fo r  a
change? Does the reco g n itio n  la g  end when a s t a f f  member or Committee 
member recogn izes the need fo r  a change? Since d e ta ile d  records are not 
a v a ila b le  to  show when in d iv id u a l Committee members or s t a f f  members 
f i r s t  recognized  the need fo r  a change, some other dating p o in t must be 
found. Because t h i s  study i s  attem pting to  d iscover the response o f the  
FCMC or E xecutive Committee to  economic changes, i t  w i l l  use as that  
d atin g  p oin t th e  tim e when the Committee as a whole reached a new
^While many econom ists have been attem pting to  purge economics o f  
valu e judgments, o th ers seem anxious to  prove th a t we cannot escape 
them. Hence, th ey  should be made e x p l i c i t .  By s e le c t in g  th e  NBER 
turn ing p o in ts  as in d ic a t iv e  o f  an economic change and the need fo r  some 
response to  i t ,  t h i s  author i s  a ssuming th a t  h is  ch oice i s  the most 
appropriate one, whether value judgments are in vo lved  or n o t. For a 
b r ie f  survey o f  th e  l i t e r a tu r e  on va lu e judgments in  econom ics, see  
George J . S t ig le r ,  The Theory o f  P r ice  (New Yorks The MacMillan 
Company, 19 4 6 ), pp. £>-9; M ilton Friedman, Essays in  P o s it iv e  Economics 
(Chicago: The U n iv ersity  o f  Chicago P r e ss , 1953), pp. 9-10; F r itz
Machlup, “The Problem o f  V e r if ic a tio n  in  Economics," Southern Economic 
Jou rn al. XXII (J u ly , 1955), 1 -21; Gunnar Myrdal, The P o l i t i c a l  Element 
in  the Development o f  Economic Theory (London: Routledge & Paul, 1953), 
p . 20; and Royaill Brandis, "lvalue Judgments and Economic S c ie n c e ,1* 
Q uarterly Review o f  Economics and B u sin ess , I I I  (Summer, 1 9 6 3 ), 41-45»
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consensus as the r e s u lt  o f changed economic co n d itio n s . This approach 
has two disadvantages. F ir s t ,  i t  may oversta te  the len gth  o f  the recog­
n it io n  la g . Second, i t  assumes th a t the ad m in istrative la g  i s  zero.
The adm in istrative la g  i s  t r a d it io n a lly  measured from the time when
th e need fo r  p o lic y  change i s  recognized to  the tim e when a p o lic y
d ec is io n  i s  made. The reaching o f  a consensus i s  c e r ta in ly  a p o licy
d ec is io n . I f  the recogn ition  o f  the need fo r  a change i s  acknowledged
by using the consensus as a dating p o in t, then the ad m in istrative la g  i s
assumed to  be zero, thus perhaps o v ersta tin g  the reco g n itio n  la g  by the
len g th  o f th e  time adm in istrative la g . There are sev era l reasons which
j u s t i f y  t h is  approach, however. F ir s t ,  as seen above, i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t
i f  not im p ossib le , owing to  the lack  o f  data, to  date the end o f the
recogn ition  la g  when an in d iv id u a l s t a f f  or Committee member p erceives
the need fo r  a change in  p o lic y . A lso, some s e le c t io n  must be made as
to  who must p erceive the need fo r  a change. Second, a s  a m atter o f
p r a c tice , th e  adm in istrative la g  must be q u ite  short for monetary p o lic y
s in ce  the FOMC meets every three weeks and can meet more freq u en tly  i f
n ecessary . The Committee can a lso  assemble on short n o tic e  or even make
5
p o lic y  d ec is io n s  using a telephone hookup. Third, other s tu d ies  which 
have encountered t h is  d i f f i c u l t y  have taken an approach sim ilar  to  the  
one which t h is  author i s  fo llo w in g .
For example, in  the Kareken and Solow study, the adm in istrative la g  
i s  considered to  be o f  zero len gth .^  Kareken and Solow, however, date
M̂ inutes. R o ll 13 , f f .  12-30.
6Kareken and Solow, p . 65.
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the end o f  the combined recogn ition -ad m in istra tive  la g  by the change in
the d ir e c t iv e  issu ed  by the FOMC and in  th e earning a s s e t s  which may be
held  by commercial banks. This p ra ctice  i s  q u estion ab le . As mentioned
in  Chapter I I  o f t h is  study, there i s  no reason to  b e lie v e  th a t
consensus changes and p o lic y  d ir e c t iv e  changes must always occur a t the
same tim e. In f a c t ,  severa l cases examined in  t h i s  study show that
consensus changes o ften  precede d ir e c t iv e  changes. For t h is  reason i t
would seem more appropriate to date the end o f  the reco g n itio n -
ad m in istrative la g  w ith  consensus changes, not w ith d ir e c t iv e  changes.
Kareken and Solow a lso  claim  th at the d ir e c t iv e  i s  changed almost
sim ultaneously with a change in  the volume o f maximum earning a s se ts
7(MaxE) which may be held by commercial banks. Owing to  th is  f a c t ,  they  
date the end o f  th e ir  recogn ition -ad m in istrative  la g  as the tim e when 
MaxE changes. Their approach seems to  be dating a combination o f la g s  
1 -4  as defined  in  Table I I  above. This technique has the shortcoming 
o f  o v ersta tin g  the len gth  o f  the in s id e  la g  by the len gth  o f  the f i r s t  
part o f  the ou tsid e la g . This p a r t ia l ly  accounts fo r  the d iffe r en c e  in  
the fin d in g s  o f t h is  study and th ose  by Kareken and Solow.
Kareken and Solow in  th e ir  search for  an adequate numerical 
d escr ip tio n  o f  Federal Reserve p o lic y  adopted and developed the v ariab le  
••maximum earning a s se ts  which the commercial banking system may h o ld ,” 
or sim ply MaxE, The f in a l  product o f  th e ir  work was the development o f  




Max^ = x * R -  V + B + N
j o t  1  _  \c&  1
MaxEl  “  k»  R + £ * V * - V  + B + N
Marist » , 1 -  k* (R + V) + B + N
A k*
k* = the weighted average o f  le g a l  reserve r a t io s  
R *= the t o ta l  d ep o sits  o f member banks with th e System 
B = t o t a l  member bank borrowings 
V -  t o t a l  v a u lt cash 
N = t o ta l  net worth
V* *= th a t portion  o f  to ta l  v a u lt  cash allowed as le g a l  reserves
-JBfr -ft
MaxEjL d if f e r s  from MaxEj_ in  th a t th e fo m er  con sid ers and a llow s
fo r  the 1959 le g a l  change which perm its commercial banks to  count v a u lt
*  ##
cash as le g a l  reserves whereas the la t t e r  does n o t. MaxE  ̂ and MaxÊ
both assume th at a l l  v a u lt  cash i s  n ecessary, in  some way, fo r  conduct-
*
in g  b u sin ess whereas MaxE2 assumes th at v a u lt cash i s  unnecessary, i . e . ,  
8
excess re serv es . The concept o f  MaxE i s  important in  th a t Kareken and 
Solow date the response o f  the Federal Reserve to  economic changes from 
the tim e when s ig n if ic a n t  changes in  MaxE occur. A lso , t h is  study 
examines the same MaxE data for  peaks and troughs a s  w e ll as upturns and 
downturns in  MaxE.
Another la g  which may be assumed to  be aero fo r  monetary p o licy  i s  
the a c tio n  la g . The Open Market Account Manager in  p ra ctice  immediately 
e ffe c tu a te s  p o lic y  d ec is io n s  made by the Committee. In the case  o f
For a complete d escr ip tio n  o f  MaxE see ib id . . pp. 76-87.
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f i s c a l  p o lic y , the a c t io n  la g  may take some tim e, e s p e c ia l ly  i f  new
o rg a n iza tio n s must be formed or p lan s drawn up. In  the case o f  monetary
p o lic y , however, the Account Manager has but to  buy or s e l l  government
s e c u r it ie s .  This i s  p r a c t ic a l ly  an instantaneous p rocess.
Thus, fo r  the purposes o f  t h i s  study, the in s id e  la g , composed o f
the r eco g n itio n , a d m in istra tive , and a c tio n  la g s ,  i s  sa id  to  be the tim e
between th e occurrence o f  an economic change, a s  measured by the NBER
tu rn in g  p o in ts , and th e  Com mittee^ reaching a new consensus in  response
to  th e economic change.
C onsideration o f  th e  o u tsid e  la g ,  w h ile  im portant, i s  la r g e ly
beyond the scope o f t h i s  study. The f i r s t  part o f  the o u tsid e  la g  ends
when th e banking system i s  a f fe c te d  by monetary p o lic y  a c tio n . But how
can one determine whether the banking system has been a ffec ted ?  Several
measures have been used. Brunner and M eltzer seemed to  watch fo r  v a r ia -
9
t io n s  in  a moving average o f  fr e e  re se rv es . Kareken and Solow dated
10
th e la g  from changes in  MaxE. Eugene Lerner watched fo r  a lte r a t io n s
11in  the r a te  o f  change in  loan s and investm ents. Perhaps other in d ica ­
t io n s  would be a lte r a t io n s  in  th e  money stock or v a r ia t io n s  in  i t s  ra te  
o f  growth.
The second part o f  th e  o u tsid e  la g , when the economy b eg in s to
respond, a lso  su ffe r s  dating  problems. M ilton  Friedman m aintains th a t
t h i s  la g  i s  lon g  and v a r ia b le ; hence, d iscre tio n a ry  monetary p o lic y  i s
g . . .  ........................
Brunner and M eltzer, The Federal R eserve1 s Attachment to  the Free
Reserve Concept. pp. 42-43*
"^Kareken and Solow, pp. 64-67*
^^Lerner, "A C ritic ism  o f  Free R eserv es,” p . 227*
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d e s ta b i l iz in g .  Other econom ists take is s u e  w ith  t h is  p o in t.
Kareken and Solow recogn ize  a  cum ulative impact sh o r tly  fo llo w in g
monetary a c t io n . Other in v e s t ig a t io n s  r e v e a l th e  Impact which monetary
p o l ic y  has on s e le c te d  i n d u s t r i e s .^  A d e ta ile d  in v e s t ig a t io n  o f  t h is
la g  i s  beyond th e scope o f  t h i s  study.
I I .  EVIDENCE OF THE INSIDE LAG DURING DOWNTURNS
Two downturns, which took p la ce  during th e  period  under stu d y , are
examined in  t h i s  s e c t io n . The NBER d a tes  th e re lev a n t c y c l ic a l  peaks a s
occu rrin g  in  J u ly , 1953, and J u ly , 1957*
In the economic l i t e r a t u r e ,  con sid erab le  d iv e r s i ty  o f  op in ion
e x i s t s  as  to  when th e FOMC responded to  the economic downturn o f  1953*
Using MaxE a s  a gu id e, Kareken and Solow say th at th e  System did not
respond u n t i l  May, 1954, te n  months a f t e r  the c y c l ic a l  peak o f  J u ly ,
151953. Friedman and Schwartz s ta te  th a t the FOMC reversed  i t s  p o lic y
in  th e  week ending May 13 , 1953, when th e account began purchasing  
16
Treasury b i l l s .  T his was two months p r io r  to  the tu rn in g  p o in t.
^^M ilton Friedman, “The Lag in  E f fe c t  o f  Monetary P o lic y ,"  Journal 
o f  P o l i t i c a l  Economy. LXIX (O ctober, 1 9 6 1 ), 447-466. A lso , see M ilton  
Friedman and Anna J . Schwartz, "Money and B u sin ess C ycles,"  Review o f  
Economics and S t a t i s t i c s . XLV (February, 1 9 6 3 ), Supplement, 32-64 .
■^John C ulbertson , "Friedman on th e Lag in  E ffe c t  o f  Monetary 
P o lic y ,"  Journal o f  P o l i t i c a l  Economy, LKVIII (December, I 9 6 0 ) , 617-621. 
A lso , see Abba P. Lerner, "A Program fo r  Monetary S t a b i l i t y ,  Part I I ,"  
Proceed ings o f  th e  1962 Conference on Savings and R e s id e n tia l F in an cin g .
1962, pp. 34-47.
■^Warren.L. Sm ith, "On th e E f fe c t iv e n e s s  o f  Monetary P o lic y ,"  
American Economic Review, XLVI (Septem ber, 1 9 5 6 ), 588-606.
^■%areken and Solow, p. 69.
*1 A
Friedman and Schwartz, A Monetary H isto ry , pp. 613-614.
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Brunner and M eltzer n o t ic e  th a t th e  Record o f  P o lic y  A ction showed a
change on June 1 1 , 1953, one month p r io r  to  the peak, but th a t fr e e
r e se r v e s  began in cr ea s in g  on May 27, 1953, about a month and a  h a lf
17
p r io r  to  th e  peak. Thus, econom ists date the System 's response from
two months p r io r  to  th e c y c l ic a l  tu rn in g  p o in t to  ten  months a f te r  the
tu rn in g  p o in t occurred.
An exam ination o f  th e  m inutes o f  th e  FOMC, a source not a v a ila b le
to  th e  above au thors, sheds some l i g h t  upon th e m atter. The m inutes
r e v e a l th a t in  e a r ly  1953 the s t a f f  and Committee members f e l t  th a t th e
economy was ch a ra cter ized  by a h igh  l e v e l  o f  production , optim ism , and
18
t ig h tn e s s  in  th e money m arket. At th e March 4 , 1953, FOMC m eeting,
Chairman Martin sa id , ". . . I t  appeared to  be th e  consensus th a t th ere
was more reason to  f e e l  concern about th e p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  in f la t io n a r y
19developm ents than o f  a d e f la t io n a r y  movement." At th e March 24
E xecutive Committee m eetin g , however, some o f  the members expressed
concern about th e  fu tu re  path o f  economic a c t iv it y :
The Chairman exp ressed  concern th a t th ere  might be a 
b u l l is h  movement during th e spring months o f  th is  
year fo llo w ed  by a sharp drop. . . .  He f e l t  th a t  
th e problem should be considered  in  terms o f whether 
th e System by a c t in g  now could  minimize a d d itio n a l 
boom during th e next th ree months.^®
P resid en t Sproul in d ica te d  th a t he would l i k e  to  s e e  the same p o lic y
17
Brunner and M eltzer , The Federal R eserve*s Attachment to  th e Free  
R eserve Concept, p . 42 .
l 8M inutes. R o ll 7 , f .  27.
19 I b id . . f .  55.
20Ibid., f. 99.
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m aintained, but th a t he would be a le r t  to  s ig n s  o f  a slowdown in  
economic a c t i v i t y .2"*"
A d d ition al warning s ig n s  o f  an imminent economic downturn were
mentioned a t the A pril 24 , 1953, m eeting o f  the E xecutive Committee.
Young's economic rep o rt, w hile m entioning th at income, production , and
employment were h igh , included  the fo llo w in g  statem ents
. . . There i s  grea ter  caution  about lon ger  range 
p rosp ects  than a t the beginning o f  t h is  year. Much 
o f  the concern about economic p rosp ects r e la t e s  to  
p o ss ib le  developments la t e r  t h i s  year or next year, 
th e main q u estion  appearing to  be whether e x is t in g  
l e v e l s  o f  economic a c t iv i t y  w i l l  be susta in ed  in  
the l a t t e r  part o f  1953 and ea r ly  1954.
P resid en t Sproul f e l t  th a t u n le ss  some new stim ulant appeared to  rep lace
r is in g  government spending and expansion in  consumer and mortgage cr e d it
or to  o f f s e t  d e c lin in g  farm income, a p eriod  o f  readjustm ent would
appear. But, to  avoid a period  o f  r is in g  cr e d it  expansion which o fte n
occurs a t  th e  end o f a boom, Sproul recommended con tin u ation  o f  the same
p o lic y . I t  was during t h is  p eriod , im m ediately a f te r  the adoption o f
" b i l l s  only" and p r io r  to  the adoption o f  fr e e  reserv es  as a ta r g e t ,
th a t th e  FCMC was experim enting w ith  member bank borrowing as a ta rg e ts
Chairman Martin s ta ted  th a t he f e l t  th a t a f a ir  
in te r p r e ta t io n  o f  the understanding a t  the A pril 
& m eeting o f  th e  execu tive  committee was th a t , i f  
member bank borrowings rose  above $ 1 -1 /2  b i l l i o n ,  
th e presumption would be th a t the System account 
would have a tendency to  acquire some s e c u r it ie s ;  
i f  member bank borrowings were below $ l - l / 2  b i l l i o n ,  
the presumption would be ag a in st such o u tr igh t purchases.
21I b id . . f .  102.
22
Ib id . . f .  129.
23Ibid.. ff. 134-135.
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Thus, as o f  A pril 24, th e  E xecutive Committee was m aintain ing about th e  
same degree o f  r e s tr a in t  as  i t  had been fo r  some months, but was a le r t  
fo r  sign s o f  economic change.
The May 6 , 1953 > E xecutive Committee m eeting proved to  be a s ig n i f ­
ica n t one. Concern th a t the money market was becoming to o  t ig h t  and 
awareness th a t an economic downturn might be in  the making le d  t o  a 
m itig a tio n  o f  monetary pressu res by supplying re ser v es . The comments o f  
Committee members during th e  m eeting bear out th ese  concerns. Governor 
M ills  f e l t  th a t some funds were needed in  th e  short-term  market to  tone
pi
i t  up and to  prevent a t t r i t io n  in  the coming Treasury fin a n cin g . 
President Sproul made a rath er len gth y  statem ent in  which he g en era lly  
agreed w ith M ills ' co n clu sio n s. The p o in ts  which Sproul made are men­
tion ed  below:
1 . While p ro d u ctiv ity  has been a t ca p a city  fo r  some 
tim e, c o s t s  are r i s in g ,  p r ic e s  are s ta b le , and 
fu tu re p r o f i t s  u n certa in . A lso , investm ent funds 
seem to  be la ck in g , even w ith h igher in te r e s t  
r a te s .
2 . In sta llm en t buying i s  up.
3 . Banks have been f e e l in g  monetary pressure fo r  some 
tim e,
4 . I t  i s  in c r e a s in g ly  f e l t  th a t economic change i s  
coming. The stock market r e f l e c t s  t h i s  f e e l in g .
5 . Treasury r e c e ip ts  are below and w i l l  remain below  
what i s  needed.
6 . Banks w i l l  be put under a d d itio n a l s tr a in  to  meet 
the coming Treasury o ffe r in g .
7 . I f  banks are forced  in to  liq u id a t in g  lo a n s , a 
chain rea c tio n  may r e s u lt .
24Ibid.. ff. 145-157.
Sproul concluded:
1 . Our p o lic y  o f  n e u tr a lity  has gradually sh ifte d  to  
one o f  t ig h tn ess; even w ith ra te s  which appear 
low, money can be t ig h t .
2 . As monetary p o lic y  tak es time to  be e f f e c t iv e ,  
t h is  i s  not the time to  increase pressure in  the  
money market.
3 . Treasury borrowing w i l l  press reserves; buying 
s e c u r it ie s  w i l l  h elp .
4 . The r isk  o f  easing market t ig h tn e ss  i s  th at i t  
may give a f in a l boost to  unwholesome cred it  and 
b u sin ess developments. This would increase our 
la te r  d i f f i c u l t i e s .  I f  we do not act an economic. 
downturn may occur and the Treasury w i l l  have 
financing d i f f i c u l t i e s .  P resen tly , th e  la t t e r  
r isk s  are the g rea ter .
5 . Buy s e c u r it ie s  now to  put reserves in to  the  
market. *
Chairman Martin a lso  expressed in te r e s t  in  th e s itu a tio n . He sa id
th a t the q uestion  was not whether the Treasury should be helped, but
th at i t  was a matter o f  whether " . . .  the rubber band was at the break-
26
in g  poin t in  the m atter o f  t ig h tn e ss ."  The s t a f f  in d icated  th a t addi­
t io n a l  reserves o f  about $100 m illio n  per week would have to  be supplied
27to  keep the market from becoming t ig h te r .  The fo llow in g  statement by
Sproul a p tly  summarizes the consensus reached in  the meeting:
Mr. Sproul sta ted  th at h is  understanding was th at our 
p o licy  i s  not fo r  the purpose o f  help ing the Treasury 
to  f lo a t  any issu e  or to  f i x  any r a te s . Treasury 
financing w i l l  have an impact on the reserve p o s it io n  
o f  banks, however, and the q uestion  the committee had
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been d isc u ss in g , Mr. Sproul sa id , r e la te s  to  
whether there should be fu rth er t ig h ten in g  in  
the money market because o f  th is ;  i t  was on the  
b a s is  o f  avoiding a fu rth er t ig h ten in g  th a t he 
understood reserves would be placed  in  the  
m a rk et.^
Thus, on May 6 , the Committee decided to  keep p ressures on the money
market from in crea sin g  by supplying reserv es .
This a n a ly s is  corresponds c lo s e ly  w ith  the reco g n itio n  la g  c ite d  by
Friedman. A fter review ing the u n certa in ty  which ch aracterized  the bond
market in  t h i s  p eriod , Friedman and Schwartz say,
There was a quick change in  monetary p o lic y , when 
the System was confronted w ith  more t ig h tn e s s  than  
i t  had intended. The rev ersa l in  monetary p o lic y  
began in  the week ending May.1 3 , when th e System  
began buying Treasury b i l l s .  ^
Friedman and Schwartz, however, seem to  view the bond market c r i s i s  a s
th e  only  reason fo r  th e s h i f t  in  System p o licy :
The bond market c r i s i s  was in  one resp ect a b le ss in g  
in  d isg u ise . For th e  f i r s t  tim e in  i t s  h is to r y , the  
Reserve System was le d  to  undertake easin g  a c tio n  
b efore or c o in c id e n ta lly  w ith  a peak in  general 
b u sin ess ,™
As has been shown, th e  Committee, w h ile p rim arily  concerned w ith  
market t ig h tn e s s ,  was not attem pting to  support bond p r ic e s  and was 
aware o f  the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  a downturn in  economic a c t iv i t y .  A lso , the  
Committee acted  to  stop fu rth er  tig h ten in g  in  the money market, not to  
ea se  co n d itio n s.
For a s h i f t  to  ea se , one must w ait u n t i l  th e meeting o f  June 11.
28Ib id . . f f .  160-161.
29Friedman and Schwartz, A Monetary H istory , pp. 613-614.
3°Ibid.. p. 614.
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In  th e May 13 , 1953, m eeting o f  th e  E xecutive Committee, Ralph Young, in
h is  economic rep o rt, mentioned th a t th e  economy continued strong but
w ith  f a in t  w eaknesses. He a lso  s ta te d  th a t a number o f  o u ts id e
ob servers were p r e d ic tin g  a downturn but th a t  he d id  not f e e l  one would
31occur in  th e  immediate fu tu re . The E xecutive Committee members agreed
to  continue th e same p o lic y . A lso , a t  the May 26 , 1953, m eeting o f  th e
32E xecutive Committee, th e  same p o lic y  was renewed. But, th e  June 1 1 ,
1953, m eeting o f  th e  FCMC produced a  major change. The continu ing
t ig h tn e s s  in  the money market had r e su lte d  in  near d isord er in  th e
government s e c u r it ie s  market. The economic report showed th a t p r ic e s
were s ta b le  and th a t  economic a c t iv i t y  was h igh , but th a t worry about a
downturn in  the economy continued to  be p resen t. Concern about th e
money market le d  t o  the su ggestion  by Sproul th a t  th e  FGMC u n tie  i t s e l f
from th e r e s tr a in t s  o f  " b i l l s  only" so th a t a more f le x ib le  p o l ic y  could
be pursued i f  i t  were needed. Sproul1s lo g ic  ca rr ied  the day and the
" b i l l s  only" p o l ic y  was rescin ded —but on ly  fo r  a short tim e. W hile th e
FCMC members were sharply d iv id ed  on th e  " b i l l s  only" p o l ic y , they  were
uniform in  th e ir  agreement th a t more re ser v e s  needed to  be supp lied  to  
33th e  market. The consensus statem ent was as fo llo w s:
Follow ing fu rth er  d isc u ss io n , Chairman M artin s ta ted  
th a t  i t  appeared to  be the consensus o f  the Federal 
Open Market Committee th a t th ere  should be an 
aggr e s s iv e  supplying o f  r e ser v e s  to  th e market 
during th e near fu tu r e , on a sharply r i s in g  b a s is .
31M inutes. R o ll  7 , f f .  164-165.
3 2I b id . . f f .  177-178.
33I b id . . f f .  195-248.
34Ibid.. f. 243.
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35A lso , a change in  th e  wording o f  th e  d ir e c t iv e  was approved."^ Thus, a s
t h i s  author in te r p r e ts  th e Committee1s  a c t io n , the ea sin g  was in
response to  an unduly t ig h te n in g  money m arket, a t ig h te n in g  which th e
Committee f e l t  was th e  r e s u lt  o f  heavy c r e d it  demands, Treasury and
p r iv a te , a t  th e  end o f  a boom p eriod .
S tu d ies  which date th e end o f  th e  re co g n itio n  la g  as occurring udien
th e  Committee's d ir e c t iv e  changed or when th e  Record o f  P o lic y  A ction  in
th e  Annual Report in d ic a te d  a s h i f t  in  p o lic y  thus show June 11 as th e
36d a tin g  p o in t. Brunner and M eltzer1s  study i s  such a c a se . The d isad ­
van tages o f  such an approach, however, le a v e  i t  open to  c r it ic is m .  
Brunner and M eltzer, by showing th a t  th e  fr e e  reserv e  l e v e l  changed 
p r io r  to  the d ir e c t iv e  change, conclude th a t th e Account Manager was
a c t in g  independently  and o u ts id e  o f  th e  d ir e c t iv e  is su e d  by th e  
37Committee. T his i s  c le a r ly  an erroneous con clu sion  r e s u lt in g  from 
in te r p r e t in g  FCMC changes a s  bein g  co in c id en t w ith  E xecutive Committee 
consensus. The Annual R eports d id  not con ta in  summaries o f  the  
E xecu tive  Committee m eetin gs. The consensus change o f  May 6 in  the
E xecu tive  Committee le d  to  th e  fr e e  reserv e  change which Brunner and
3SM eltzer noted on May 27 . Thus, th e Account Manager was a c t in g  w ith in  
th e  w ish es o f  th e  Committee. Brunner and M eltzer , however, d id  recog­
n iz e  th a t  consensus changes may occur w ithout corresponding d ir e c t iv e
35I b id . . f .  246.
3 ^Brunner and M eltzer , The Federal R eserve1s Attachment to  th e Free 
Reserve Concept, pp. 37 -4 2 .
37Ib id . . pp. 47 -4 9 .
3%bid.. p. 42.
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changes. T his fa c t  i s  i l lu s t r a t e d  in  th e  fo llo w in g  statem ent found in
t h e ir  study:
. . .  I t  was p o s s ib le  /" fo r  th e  Com m ittee^  
change . . . / ”* i t s _J  p o l ic y  w ithout changing the  
d ir e c t iv e .  The converse was a ls o  tr u e . At tim es, 
th e  d ir e c t iv e  would be changed, but i t  would be 
noted in  th e  Record o f  P o lic y  A ctions th a t  there  
was no change in  p o l i c y . 39
The Kareken and Solow study seems t o  have m issed  the proper d atin g  
p o in t com pletely . By rev iew ing  th e  s t a t i s t i c s  used by Kareken and 
Solow, t h i s  author concludes th a t  th e  use o f  MaxE does indeed  show th e  
s h i f t  in  System p o lic y  but th a t  the s h i f t  occurred much sooner than th e  
date in d ic a te d  by Kareken and Solow. Indeed, the s h i f t  appears to  have 
occurred during May, 1953, th e same period  in  which Friedman noted a 
s h i f t  in  System p o lic y  and in  which Brunner and M eltzer noted an 
in c re a se  in  fr e e  reserv es .^ 1® Whereas Kareken and Solow date the s h i f t  
to  ea sy  money a s  b ein g  in  May, 1954, Table I I I  c le a r ly  shows th a t MaxE 
began to  in crea se  lo n g  b efore t h i s .  T his d ivergence o f  op in ion  as to  
when MaxE changed can be exp la in ed . Kareken and Solow dated changes in  
MaxE from th e tim e when i t  showed a "sharp change in  tren d ."  This 
author dated changes in  MaxE from the tim e when i t  f i r s t  began to  s h if t
39I b id . ,  p . 33 .
^ B runner and M eltzer a t tr ib u te  th e  d iffe r e n c e  in  th e reco g n itio n  
la g  between th e ir  study and th a t o f  Kareken and Solow to  be th e  r e s u lt  
o f  th e  System 's m isunderstanding o f  th e  monetary p ro cess . Brunner and 
M eltzer f e e l  th a t th e  System se e s  th e upsurge in  f r e e  r e se rv e s  p rior  to  
r e c e s s io n  a s  the r e s u lt  o f  System a c t io n , not o u ts id e  fo r c e s . Then the  
System 's fa i lu r e  to  in crea se  t o t a l  r e se r v e s  u n t i l  some months la te r  
r e s u lt s  in  a d elay . Thus,MaxE w i l l  not change u n t i l  s ig n if ic a n t ly  la t e r  
than th e  date o f  FOMC re c o g n it io n . Brunner and M eltzer , The Federal 
R eserv e 's  Attachment to  th e  Free R eserve Concept. pp. 45-46 .
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a f te r  a peak or trough.
TABLE I H
SEASONALLY ADJUSTED MONTHLY VALUES 
OF MaxE*, MaxE  ̂ , AND MaxE*, JANUARY. 1953-JUNE, 1954& 




Jan. 1953 121,208 134,101
Feb. 1953 121,618 134,679
Mar. 1953 121,351 134,188
Apr. 1953 120 ,147 T 132,912
 ̂May 1953 120,217 I  133,299
June 1953 120,531 133,456
J u ly  1953 - .1 2 3 ,1 3 3 136,803
Aug. 1953 123,969 137,966
S ep t. 1953 123,984 137,761
O ct. 1953 123,752 137,748
Nov. 1953 124,706 138,680
Dec. 1953 124,535 138,766
Jan. 1954 126,250 140,807
Feb. 1954 125,739 140,245
Mar. 1954 126,373 140,466
Apr. 1954 126,287 140,287
May 1954 127,540 141,754
June 1954 128,584 142,682
3»Sources John Kareken and Robert M. Solow, "Lags in  F is c a l  and 
Monetary P o lic y ,"  S ta b il iz a t io n  P o l i c i e s ; A S e r ie s  o f  Research S tu d ies  
Prepared- fo r  th e  Commission on Money and C redit (Englewood C l i f f s ;  
P r e n tic e -H a ll, I n c . ,  1 9 6 3 ), pp. 89 -90 . R eprinted by perm ission  o f  the  
p u b lish er .
b
The fo llo w in g  symbols are u t i l i z e d  in  Table I I I  to  in d ic a te  t h i s  
a u th o r 's  d a tin g  o f  MaxE and consensus changes:
A *  a change in  th e  consensus
T = a trough in  MaxE
I  = th e  f i r s t  month in  which MaxE in creased  fo llo w in g  a trough
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Thus, fo r  the downturn o f  1953, t h i s  author concludes that the
p o lic y  d ec isio n  made on May 6 , 1953, le d  to  the easin g  o f  reserv es  which
was continued and confirmed by the June 11 m eeting. The in s id e  la g ,
th ere fo re , was negative s in ce  i t  preceded the NHER turning poin t by two
months. Friedman and Schwartz*s examination o f  open market operations
confiim s t h is  f in d in g . A lso , Brunner and M eltzer*s examination o f free
reserve le v e l  changes confirms i t .  Kareken and Solow*s study confiim s
i t , - t o o ,  when MaxE changes are examined fo r  th e ir  f i r s t  date o f  change.
Economists seem to  be in  c lo se r  agreement as to  when the System
responded to  the economic downturn which began in  Ju ly , 1957. Friedman
and Schwartz, by basing th e ir  reasoning on d ir e c t iv e  and discount ra te
changes, s ta te  th a t **in November 1957, four months a fte r  the c y c l ic a l
peak, the Federal Reserve System reversed  i t s  p o l ic y ." ^  Brunner and
M eltzer g ive  August 20, 1957, as the f i r s t  date o f  a minor p o lic y
change. They base th is  dating upon the Record o f  P o lic y  A ctions and
f e e l  th a t a major change occurred October 22, whereas fr e e  reserves
42
changed October 23. Kareken and Solow f e e l  th a t MaxE changed in
A3February, 1958, in d ica tin g  a change in  PGMG p o lic y . Thus, econom ists 
f e e l  th a t the System responded to  the economic change from one to  seven 
months a f te r  the turning p o in t.
An examination o f  the s t a t i s t i c s  o f  in d u s tr ia l production preceding
^Friedm an and Schwartz, A Monetary H istory , p . 6 l6 .
^Brunner and M eltzer, The Federal Reserve* s Attachment to  the Free 
Reserve Concept. p . 42.
^K areken and Solow, p. 69.
th e  1957 downturn in d ic a te s  th at the economy was characterized  by what 
had been termed a "sidew ise movement" for  almost e igh teen  months. ̂  The 
m inutes rev ea l th at the Committee members were aware o f  t h is  movement.
In add ition  to  output co n sid era tio n s, th ey  were concerned w ith  cost-push  
in f la t io n  a s  w e ll as Treasury fin a n cin g s .
An examination o f the FOMG meeting o f  A pril 16 , 1957, f in d s  the
Committee members m ild ly  d ivided  as to  what economic p o lic y  should be
fo llow ed . President Hayes questioned whether the FOMG was keeping 
th in g s  too "tight" in  terms o f present economic con d ition s. The 
economic in d ica to rs  which he was watching suggested a sideways movement 
in  the economy a t b e s t . A h ealth y  concern about in f la t io n  was a lso  
expressed:
I  am in  f u l l  agreement w ith  the t h e s is  put forward 
by Mr. Young a t  the l a s t  m eeting, th a t we would do 
w e ll to  continue a general p o lic y  o f  r e s tr a in t  u n t i l  
i t  i s  qu ite c lea r  that a r e a l downward turn has come, 
i . e . ,  to  encourage com petitive fa c to r s  to  bring some 
o f f s e t  to  the in fla t io n a r y  p r ice  trend o f  th e  past 
eigh teen  months. But I  th ink  we would be asking too  
much o f monetary p o licy  i f  we should expect i t  to
bring about, by i t s e l f ,  a complete reversa l o f  p rice
in crea ses a lready in  e f f e c t  and r e f le c t in g  past wage 
r i s e s  w e ll in  ex cess  o f p ro d u ctiv ity  ga in s.
He a lso  suggested th a t some reserves be supplied to  the market for  the
coming Treasury fin an cin g , not to  support the fin a n cin g , but to  keep i t
from making cred it con d ition s t ig h te r  than they  p resen tly  were:
Perhaps the System 's minimum r e s p o n s ib il ity  to  the  
Treasury i s  to  apply the same standards in  deter­
mining System response to  Treasury financing needs
^■Board o f  Governors o f the Federal Reserve System, H isto r ica l  
Chart Book, 1966 (Washington, D. C.: Board o f  Governors, 1966), p . 87.
^̂ Minutes. Roll 11, ff. 232-233.
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th a t are ap p lied  to  other borrowers. Seasonal 
needs are g en era lly  not viewed as in fla t io n a r y  and 
the System does, in  f a c t ,  supply reserv es  through 
open market purchases to  prevent th ese  needs from 
generating  a d d itio n a l c r e d it  p ressu res. For the  
System to  f a i l  to  provide r e ser v es  in  support o f  a 
temporary Treasury need, in  th e  absence o f  a budget 
d e f ic i t ,  means th a t th e System has allow ed the  
Treasury’ s f in a n c ia l needs to  impose a d d itio n a l 
r e s tr a in t  on the cr e d it  markets a t a tim e when i t  
would be d i f f i c u l t  to  j u s t i f y  such a course on the  
b a s is  o f  economic and cr e d it  developm ents.^6
The o th er  members seemed to  agree th a t the same amount o f r e s tr a in t  was
c a lle d  f o r ,4^
On A p ril 24 , 1957, a telephone m eeting was h e ld  to  d isc u ss  the poor
recep tio n  the T reasury's o ffe r in g  was having. The FOMG members agreed
th at c r e d it  p o lic y  was more important than the Treasury's fin an cin g . An
unexpected r is e  in  th e f lo a t ,  which th e  Committee decided not to  o f f s e t ,
48
eased th e  s itu a t io n .
The s t a f f ' s  economic report on May 7 , 1957, in d ica ted  th a t  the
economy had stren gth  but was undergoing a r o l l in g  adjustment. T reiber,
o f  th e  New York Bank, noted th a t the co in cid en t in d ica to rs  remained
strong but th a t th ose  which a n t ic ip a te  future tren d s were e x h ib itin g  
49w eakness. At l e a s t  one member showed concern about a downturn. 
Vardaman, a member o f  the Board o f Governors, sa id  th a t in  s p ite  o f  what 
current s t a t i s t i c s  show, in d iv id u a ls  f e e l  that th e  "bloom was o f f  th e
46I b id . ,  f .  235.
47
Ib id . .  f f .  246-258.
48Ib id . . f f .  261-274.
49Ibid.. f. 286.
rose ."  He f e l t  th a t t h is  was a very  touchy period and th a t th e  boom was
50not l i k e l y  to  continue* N everth eless, the consensus o f  th is  meeting 
was to  continue the same p o lic y .
At the June 18, 1957* m eeting, President Hayes, continuing to  show 
concern about the course o f  economic ev en ts, made the fo llow in g  
statem ent:
The b u sin ess s itu a tio n  has changed very l i t t l e  since  
our l a s t  m eeting. While i t  continues b a s ic a lly  
strong, e s p e c ia lly  in  the area o f  demand fo r  f in a l  
products, most measures o f p h ysica l a c t iv it y  suggest 
e ith e r  a sideways or a s l ig h t  downward movement. I  
have in  mind such item s a s  th e Federal Reserve index  
o f in d u str ia l production, t o t a l  manufacturing employ­
ment, and average hours worked per week. There has 
been no s ig n if ic a n t  progress in  the country's r e a l
output now fo r  more than s ix  months; and most s t a t i s ­
t i c a l  data foreshadowing future l e v e l s  o f  b u sin ess  
a c t iv i t y  are l e s s  favorable than those r e f le c t in g  
current a c t iv it y .  Hence th e trend o f  p h ysica l 
a c t iv i t y  seems more l ik e ly  to  be downward than upward 
fo r  a t le a s t  the next two or three months.**
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Hayes was a lso  concerned th a t th e investm ent boom was crestin g  out.
Not a l l  o f  the members were so g r e a t ly  concerned. Malcolm Bryan,
President o f  the Federal Reserve Bank o f  A tlan ta , wanted to  r e ly  on fa c t
rather than exp ecta tion , and Governor M ills  wanted to  in crease  the
53discount r a te . The consensus was to  continue the same p o lic y .
The f i r s t  FCMC meeting in  J u ly , the month o f the downturn, was 
about th e same. The s ta f f  recognized th a t downward adjustments were
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continu ing in  sev era l l i n e s  but th a t upward adjustm ents were occurring  
5 L
in  o th ers . W oodlief Thomas, s t a f f  econom ist, making a f in a n c ia l
rep ort, was concerned w ith  in f la t io n a r y  developments:
N otw ithstanding adjustm ents in  variou s a rea s , view s  
a s  to  th e  fu tu re  gen era lly  continue more confident  
than ca u tio u s . In f la t io n a r y  p ressu res are bein g  
f e l t .  The c o s t-p r ic e  push, which i s  a m a n ifesta tio n  
o f  in f la t io n  a s  w e ll as a con tribu tor to  th e  s p ir a l ,  
i s  s t i l l  in  ev id en ce . At th e  same tim e th e  c o s t -  
p r ic e -p r o f it  squeeze, which might be r e l ie d  upon to  
check the in f la t io n a r y  s p ir a l ,  does not appear to  be 
d e v e lo p in g ,^
D iscu ssion  by th e  Committee members in d ic a te s  th a t  th ey  to o  were s e r i ­
o u sly  concerned about in f la t io n .  They agreed th a t  th e  in f la t io n a r y
56s itu a t io n  c le a r ly  c a lle d  fo r  a con tin u ation  o f  r e s tr a in t .  This would 
seem to  in d ic a te  th a t the Committee was responding more to  changes in  
the p r ic e  l e v e l  than to  changes in ,  or  rath er to  the lack  o f  a change 
in ,  th e  index o f  in d u s tr ia l  production. I f  p r ic e s  as w e ll  a s  th e  index  
o f  in d u s tr ia l production had been co n sta n t, perhaps the System would 
have reacted  d if f e r e n t ly .
The Ju ly  3 0 , 1957 t m eeting was s im ila r  to  th a t o f  Ju ly  9. The 
production in d ic a to r s  were mixed, but p r ic e s  were s t i l l  r is in g .  I t  was 
in form ally  decided th at the d iscount r a te  could  be in creased , an a c tio n  
which would help  to  b rin g  i t  in to  l i n e ,  w ithout r isk in g  any more
57c r it ic is m  than would occur in  the event o f  an economic downturn.
54 Ib ld . . f f .  416-417.
55Ib id . . f .  421.
56I b id . . f f .  422-447.
57Ibid.. ff. 455-485.
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At th e  August 20 , 1957, FOMC m eeting, one month a f te r  the downturn,
th e  economic report s t i l l  did not con ta in  h in ts  o f  the presence o f  the
downturn. Some o f  the statem ents in  the report are found below;
In  t h is  country, o v e r a ll economic a c t iv i t y  remains 
a t high l e v e l s ,  w ith  GNP in  constant d o lla r s  s t i l l  
showing a modest upward t i l t .
The important economic news d o m estica lly  r e la t e s  to  
a strengthening o f  consumer m arkets. Improvement in
consumer demand sin ce  A p ril and some liq u id a t io n  o f
d is tr ib u to r  stock s has been r e f le c te d  in  s ig n if ic a n t  
improvement o f  th e  output o f  consumer goods, e s p e c ia lly  
durables. This has la r g e ly  o f f s e t  th e  in flu en ce  o f  
decreases in  output in  b u sin ess  equipment, ordnance, 
and crude petroleum , and s ta b i l iz e d  th e index o f  
in d u s tr ia l  production fo r  June and July  a t 144, compared 
w ith  143 fo r  A pril and May-*®
Rouse, th e  Account Manager, in d ica ted  th a t a lower le v e l  o f  net borrowed 
reserv es  would a llow  the same degree o f  r e s tr a in t  to  be continued. The
Committee members seemed to  go along w ith  low ering i t  some. A consider­
ab le  amount o f d iscu ss io n  concerning th e  August d iscount ra te  in crease  
took p la c e . I t  was ev id en t th a t  some o f  th e  Federal Reserve Bank 
D irecto rs  were re lu c ta n t to  v o te  in  the d iscount ra te  in crea se , but did  
so even though th ey  did not f e e l  th a t i t  was j u s t i f i e d .  The Committee 
members were d iv ided  on the is s u e .  Governor Vardaman f e l t  th a t th e  
t ig h te n in g  was u n ca lled  fo r ,  whereas Governor Robertson and o th ers  
thought th a t i t  was n ecessary . The consensus reached in  the m eeting was
to  continue the same p o lic y , recogn iz in g  th a t t h i s  a c tio n  might require
59a low er le v e l  o f  n e t borrowed r e se r v e s . Brunner and M eltzer took t h is  
58
I b id . ,  f .  497.
59Ibid., ff. 496-530.
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d e c is io n  as in d ic a tin g  a minor change in  System p o lic y .
The s t a f f ' s  economic report o f  September 10 was g en era lly  o p t i­
m is t ic ,  darkened only by acknowledgment th a t some cutbacks in  defense  
spending had been announced and th a t more s iz a b le  ones were a n tic ip a ted . 
The report was q u a lif ie d  by the fo llo w in g  statement*
There are competent b u sin ess  ob servers, e s p e c ia lly  
in  the f in a n c ia l community, who are in c lin e d  to  the  
b e l i e f  that major economic fo rces  are shaping toward 
a downward d r i f t  ahead o f  general a c t iv i t y .  These 
observers emphasize* ( l )  the cumulative in h ib it in g  
e f f e c t s  o f  monetary r e s tr a in ts  on cred it-f in a n ced  
investm ent; (2 ) a high and in f le x ib le  in d u s tr ia l  
c o s t  stru ctu re; (3 ) a cumulating pressure o f  ex cess  
ca p a city  on markets fo r  in d u s tr ia l  m a ter ia ls  and 
fa b r ica ted  commodities r e su lt in g  from the sw ollen  
volume o f  b u sin ess  investm ent of recent years; (4 )  
the prospect o f  a s ig n if ic a n t  reduction  in  n a tio n a l  
defense expenditures during the current f i s c a l  year; 
and (5 ) a developing psychology o f  gloom in  high  
b u sin ess  p la c e s .
But, Young added:
T his p rogn osis , which u n d er lies  some current pessimism  
in  "informed f in a n c ia l c ir c le s ,"  seems fa r  o u t ,o f  focus  
in  terms o f  th e  r ec en tly  developing s itu a t io n . 2
Governor Vardaman showed concern about the defense cutbacks. Hayes 
a lso  urged cau tion . D elos C. Johns, P resident o f  the Federal Reserve 
Bank o f  S t. L ou is, f e l t  th at r e s tr a in t  would perhaps have to  be eased  
soon. A lfred  H. W illiam s, P resid en t o f  th e  Federal Reserve Bank o f  
P h ila d e lp h ia , and Wilbur D. F u lton , P resident o f the Federal Reserve 
Bank o f  C leveland, were fo r  continu ing the same p o lic y . Governor
^^Brunner and M eltzer , The Federal R eserve's Attachment to  the Free 
Reserve Concept. p . 42.
6lMinutes. Roll 11, f. 550.
62Ibid.
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R obertson f e l t  th a t  th e  FOMG had allow ed  too  much e a se . Governor M il ls ,
ta k in g  a d if fe r e n t  approach, f e l t  th a t  Labor Day had s ig n a led  n ot on ly  a
change o f  seasons but a lso  an economic downturn. His in tu it io n  was h is
63gu ide. The other members seemed to  want to  continue th e  same p o lic y .
T h is f e e l in g  i s  r e f le c te d  in  th e  fo llo w in g  comments by Chairman Martin:
Chairman M artin s ta te d  th a t i t  seemed c le a r  th a t  
th e  consensus a t today* s  m eeting was th a t  th ere  
should be no change in  th e  Committee's p o l ic y  and 
no change in  th e  wording o f  th e  d ir e c t iv e  a t  t h i s  
. t im e .64
In concluding h is  remarks, th e  Chairman sa id  th a t  
he b e lie v e d  the f i s h  was hooked and th a t  i t  would 
be a m istake to  p u ll  the l in e  ,so ta u t th a t  i t  might 
break. He would c a s t  h is  l o t  on th e s id e  o f  n et  
borrowed r e ser v e s  o f  around $400 m il l io n ,  u sin g  
th a t  as a rough ta r g e t ,  ra th er  than th e $500-$600  
m illio n  range, u n t i l  a f te r  th e  current Treasury  
fin a n cin g  was out o f  th e  way. He d id  n ot th in k  
such a procedure would cause .any comment about a 
change in  the System p o lic y .  *
Again, Brunner and M eltzer took t h is  a s  in d ic a t in g  a minor change toward
66e a se .
At th e  October 1 , 1957» m eeting o f  the FCMC, the s t a f f  s t i l l  d id  
not reco g n ize  th a t a downturn was underway. The economic rep ort s ta te d ,  
"While i t  i s  p o ss ib le  th a t  p r ic e s  and a c t iv i t y  g e n e r a lly  are a t  a c r e s t  
and th a t  th e  next broad movement o f  p r ic e s  and a c t iv i t y  w i l l  be down­
ward, th e  recent f ig u r e s  are fa r  from c le a r  th a t  such a development i s
63I b id . . f f .  550-574.
64 I b id . . f .  575.
65I b id . ,  f .  578.
^^Brunner and M eltzer , The Federal R eserve1 s  Attachment to  the Free  
R eserve Concept, p . 39 .
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becoming an a c tu a lity ."  Each o f  the Committee members in d ica ted  th a t
th e same p o lic y  should be follow ed; none seemed to  express concern th a t
a recess io n  was occurring. Governor Var daman, however, d id  say, " . . .
th a t  even i f  he had contrary id eas he would h e s ita te  to  exp ress them in
th e face o f  the view s expressed by M essrs. Young and Thomas and the
68e ig h t P resid en ts  o f the Reserve Banks who had reported th us far ."
M artin in d ica ted  th a t the consensus was to  continue the same p o lic y .
Chairman Martin was q u ite  c le a r ly  concerned w ith in f la t io n a r y  p ressu res,
n a t io n a lly  and in te r n a tio n a lly :
He observed th a t he had v i s i t e d  w ith  seven M in isters  
o f Finance and s ix  Governors o f  cen tra l banks a t  th e  
annual m eeting o f  the Boards o f  Governors o f  the  
In tern ation a l Monetary Fund and the In tern a tio n a l 
Bank fo r  R econstruction  and Development during th e  
p ast week. He was impressed w ith  the unanimity o f  
th e ir  v iew s th a t in f la t io n  in  each in sta n ce  had 
gotten  ahead o f  them, th a t i t  was the primary 
problem in  th e ir  co u n tr ie s , and th a t th ere would be 
no way o f coping w ith  the in f la t io n  other than a
l i t t l e  d ec lin e  in  b u s i n e s s . °9
M artin f e l t  th a t pressure would be p laced  on th e System to  reverse i t s
p o l ic ie s  in  order to  avoid  adjustm ents in  th e economy. Martin a lso  f e l t
70th a t the System did not have the means t o  avoid the adjustm ents.
Thus, as o f  October 1 , th e  FOMC f e l t  th a t a downturn might occur in  the  
fu tu re but th a t fo r  the p resen t th e  b est  course was to  continue  
r e s tr a in t  in  order to  avoid  in crea sin g  in f la t io n a r y  d i f f i c u l t i e s .
67M inutes. R oll 11 , f .  591.
6aib id . . f .  604.
6?Ib id . . f .  611.
70Ibid.. ff. 611-612.
The minutes o f  the October 22 , 1957* m eeting r e v e a l a marked
change in  the a tt itu d e  o f  s t a f f  and Committee members. The economic
review  sta ted  th a t
. . . Recent developments at home and abroad c a lle d  
fo r  searching re-exam ination o f  th e  economic s itu a ­
t io n .  In t h is  country the la t e s t  d ec lin es  in  market 
va lu es o f  common stock s and s e n s it iv e  in d u str ia l  
commodities had been o f  s u f f ic ie n t  magnitude t o  bring 
in to  qu estion  continued dominance o f  in fla t io n a r y  
f o r c e s . '
W ithin the United S ta te s ,  the l a t e s t  q u arterly  and 
monthly f ig u r e s  showed continuation  through th e  th ird  
quarter o f  1957 o f  many featu res p rev a ilin g  e a r lie r  
in  the year, with production steady at a h igh  le v e l ,  
p rice  movements in  w holesale markets mixed but the  
average up, and consumer p rices gen era lly  continuing  
upward. September in d u str ia l production was a t  144, 
down a p o in t from August but w ith in  the narrow 143-146 
range p rev a ilin g  so fa r  th is  y ea r . . . . /"*The_7
short-run abatement in  in fla t io n a r y  pressures . . * 
ra ised  questions about p o ten tia l d ec lin es in  important 
sec to rs  o f  a c t iv it y .7 2
Hayes c ite d  severa l in d ica to rs  which added to  the doubts o f business  
outlook . Even r e t a i l  s a le s  had fa lle n . Other Committee members such a s  
Governors Shepardson and Robertson f e l t  th a t pessimism was being over­
done. A fter a len gth y  d iscu ss io n , Hayes, acting  chairman in  th e  absence 
o f  Martin, i s  reported to  have made the fo llo w in g  summary statem ent:
With resp ect to  c r e d it  p o licy  . . .  i t  seemed to  him 
the Committee had an e a s ie r  tim e find ing a consensus 
on th e p o lic y  to be follow ed in  the next few  weeks 
than i t  would have on an ap p ra isa l o f the economic 
outlook . There was a  fa ir ly  even d iv is io n  between 
those who appraised th e  outlook w ith  the v iew  that 
s t a t i s t i c s  and developments th a t  had been observed  
h eld  a considerable th reat o f  recessio n  and those
71Ib id . . f f .  621-622. 
72Ib id . , f f .  622-623.
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who f e l t  th a t b a s ic a lly  such a p o s s ib i l i t y  was 
s t i l l  to  be demonstrated and th a t recent develop­
ments were la r g e ly  p sych o log ica l w ith  the b asic  
fa c to r s  remaining s tro n g .73
Hayes went on to  say th at the Committee, a t t h i s  tim e, d id  not want to
make any overt moves or to  g ive a s ig n a l th at i t  was changing p o lic y ,
but th at i t  wished to  supply seasonal needs f r e e ly  and did not w ish to
in crease  r e s tr a in t . While the average net borrowed reserves ta rg et
mentioned a t the previous meeting was $500 m ill io n , t h is  time i t  was 
74about $350. Thus, even though the Committee was d iv id ed , the uncer­
ta in ty  o f the s itu a t io n  le d  to  a reduction in  the net borrowed reserves  
ta r g e t . This author th inks th a t t h is  point i s  s ig n if ic a n t  and th a t t h is  
i s  the date o f  the change in  FCMC p o lic y , i . e . ,  th at t h i s  i s  th e  end o f
th e in s id e  la g .  Brunner and M eltzer a lso  c i t e  t h i s  date as the time
75when a major p o lic y  s h if t  took p la ce .
The p o lic y  s h if t  was d e f in it e ly  confirmed on November 12, 1957- A 
s t a f f  memorandum sent to  Committee members on November 8 sta ted  th a t the 
economic clim ate had changed considerably and that contradictory forces  
had become more prominent. The economic report given in  the FGMC meet­
in g  by Ralph Young confirmed that a d ec lin e  had se t in .  The in d ica to rs  
c it e d  in  th a t report have been examined in  Chapter I I  o f  th is  study. 
Chairman Martin sta ted  th a t the Board o f  Governors, on the preceding  
Friday, had recognized th a t a downturn was occurring. The Committee
73Ib id . . f f .  656-657.
74
Ib id . . f f .  657-660.
75
Brunner and M eltzer, The Federal R eserve1 s Attachment to  th e  Free 
Reserve Concept, p . 39.
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members agreed th at th e  net borrowed reserve le v e l  should be lowered
fu rth er  and th a t the discount ra te  should be lowered. In ad d ition , the
d ir e c t iv e  was a ltered  to  show th e change in  Committee p o lic y . Robertson
was the only member d issen tin g ; he f e l t  th a t in f la t io n  was a ser iou s
76th re a t and th a t continued r e s tr a in t  was necessary . As mentioned above,
t h is  date, when the d ir e c t iv e  was changed, i s  the one which Friedman
s e le c te d  to  mark the end o f the recogn ition  la g .
While both Brunner and M eltzer and Friedman and Schwartz date t h is
change in  System p o lic y  (using  Brunner and M eltzer 's  dating o f  the major
p o lic y  change) w ith in  a month o f  each o th er, the Kareken and Solow study
77does not in d ic a te  a p o lic y  change u n t i l  th ree  months la t e r .  Once 
aga in , t h i s  author f e e l s  th at the la t e  dating o f the turning p o in t by 
Kareken and Solow was due not to  the use o f  MaxE, but to  a d ifferen ce  o f  
in te r p r e ta tio n . The data found in  Table IV in d ica te s  th a t fo llow in g  the  
economic peak which occurred in  Ju ly , 1957, MaxE began clim bing in  
December, 1957• On the other hand, Kareken and Solow f e e l  th at MaxE 
began to  in crease at a " su b sta n tia lly  rapid rate" in  February, 1958.
The data reproduced in  Table IV c le a r ly  in d ic a te s  th a t MaxE reached a 
trough in  November, 1957, and then began to  r i s e  in  th e fo llow in g  month, 
th u s  supporting t h is  author1 s conclusion th a t MaxE changed d irec tio n  in  
December, 1957, f iv e  months a fte r  the c y c l ic a l  peak in  economic 
a c t iv i t y .
76
M inutes. R o ll 11 , f f .  665-714.
7 7
See Brunner and M eltzer, The Federal Reserve* s Attachment to  the  
Free Reserve Concept. p . 39; Friedman and Schwartz, .A Monetary H istory , 




MONTHLY VALUES OF MaadsJ, MaxÊ  
AND MaxE2 > JULY, 1957-JUNE, 1958a 




July 1957 142,912 160,317
Aug. 1957 141,855 159,602
Sept. 1957 142,319 160,204
a  Oct. 1957 142,348 160,296
Nov. 1957 141,992 T 159,834
Dec. 1957 142,981 I  160,745
Jan, 1958 143,160 161,291
Feb. 1958 144,921 163,091
Mar. 1958 148,377 166,717
Apr. 1958 151,180 169,591
May 1958 153,678 172,916
June 1958 154,527 174,089
Source: John Kareken and Robert M. Solow, "Lags in  F isca l and
Monetary P o licy ,"  S ta b iliz a t io n  P o l ic ie s : A S e r ie s  o f  Research S tu d ies
Prepared for the Commission on Money and Credit (Englewood C li f f s :  
P ren tice-H a ll, I n c .,  1963), pp. 90-91. Reprinted by perm ission o f  the  
p u b lish er.
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The fo llow in g  symbols are u t i l iz e d  in  Table IV to  in d ica te  t h is  
a u th o r s  dating o f Maks and consensus changes:
A ■ a change in  the consensus
T = a trough in  MaxE
I  = the f i r s t  month in  which MaxE increased  fo llow in g  a trough  
The December date fo r  the MaxE change i s  one month a fte r  the turn­
ing  poin t date se le c te d  by Friedman and Schwartz and two months a f te r  
the date se le c te d  by Brunner and M eltzer. As in d ica ted  above, t h i s  
author agrees w ith the dating o f  the p o lic y  change as found by Brunner 
and M eltzer, i . e . ,  October 22, three months a f te r  the c y c l ic a l  turning  
p o in t. The e a r lie r  minor changes found by Brunner and M eltzer, August
ios
20 and September 10, w ere, in  fa c t ,  on ly  adjustm ents to  m aintain th e  
same degree o f  t ig h tn e s s , not a change in  p o l ic y .  Perhaps, as in  1953* 
th e  Committee would have responded more q u ick ly  had not in f la t io n a r y  
f e a r s  been o f  prime concern.
I I I .  EVIDENCE OF THE INSIDE LAG DURING UPTURNS
In t h is  se c tio n  two upturns in  economic a c t iv i t y  are  examined. The 
NBHl dates th e  c y c l ic a l  troughs as occurring August, 1954, and A p r il,  
1958.
Economists seem to  be f a ir ly  w e l l  agreed upon the date a t which the
System responded to  the economic upturn o f August, 1954. Brunner and
M eltzer, by s c r u tin iz in g  th e Record o f P o lic y  A ction in  the Annual
R eport. conclude that th e  FOMC changed i t s  p o l ic y  in  December, 1954,
78four months a f te r  the c y c l ic a l  tu rn in g  p o in t. Kareken and Solow, by
79w atching changes in  MaxE, reached th e  same co n clu sio n . Friedman and 
Schwartz, u n fortu n ately  fo r  the c o n t i n u i t y  o f  t h is  stu d y , do not g ive  a 
s p e c if ic  date fo r  the tim e when th e y  th ink  th e  System changed p o lic y .
The Committeers s t a f f  recogn ized  as e a r ly  as A pril 13 , 1954, th at
80
th e  r e c e s s io n , which had begun in  J u ly , 1953, showed s ig n s  o f slow ing. 
During t h is  period  the E xecutive Committee was pursuing a  p o lic y  o f  
a c t iv e  ease and s e tt in g  a s  a fr e e  reserve ta r g e t  a range o f  $400-4700
Brunner .and M eltzer , The Federal R eservef s Attachment to  the Free 
R eserve Concept, p. 38 .
79' 'Kareken and Solow, p. 66,
60Minutes, Roll 8, f. 126.
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m ill io n .  At the May 1 1 , 1954, m eeting o f  th e  E xecu tive  Committee,
Ralph Young, in  p resen tin g  th e  economic rep o rt, s ta te d  th a t  the economy
was s t i l l  d r i f t in g  downward but th a t  th e  n eg a tiv e  fa c to r s  appeared to
be lo s in g  t h e ir  stren g th . He f e l t  th a t  th e  economy was approaching a
82
balanced p o s it io n  but th a t th e  fo r c e s  fo r  r e v iv a l  were not y e t  c lea r .
Some o f th e  E xecutive Committee members added to  the rep ort encouraging
83
s ig n s  which th ey  saw.
For sev er a l months a heated d isc u ss io n  was ca rr ied  on a s  to  the  
ap p rop riaten ess o f  f r e e  r e se r v e s  a s  a ta r g e t  a s  w e ll  a s  to  what l e v e l  o f  
f r e e  r e se r v e s  should be m aintained. Some o f  th e  members were concerned 
over the p o s s ib i l i t y  th a t  th e e x i s t in g  fr e e  reserv e  l e v e l  was not h igh  
enough because country banks u su a lly  hold a su b sta n tia l amount o f ex ce ss  
r e s e r v e s . Other members were concerned over th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  th at  
supplying more r e ser v es  t o  th e market would m erely r e s u lt  in  a change in  
bond p r ic e s  w ithout having an in crea se  in  bank len d in g  or  c a p ita l  
investm ents
In  response t o  Chairman M artin 's q u estio n  as to  how 
he arrived  a t th e  co n c lu sio n  th a t th e  recen t l e v e l  
o f  fr e e  r e se r v e s  was about r ig h t ,  Mr. Sproul s ta te d  
th a t  in  h is  op in ion  th e  performance o f  the money 
market and o f  the economy g en era lly  seemed to  in d i­
c a te  th a t monetary p o l ic y  was doing a l l  th a t i t  could  
do to  f o s t e r  whatever ten d en c ie s  th ere  were toward 
recovery and to  combat whatever downward ten d en c ie s  
e x is te d  in  th e  economy, w ithout a t  th e  same tim e p i l in g  
r e se rv es  on r e se r v e s  and thus m erely b rin g  down th e  
l e v e l  o f  r a te s  on short-term  c r e d it  in stru m en ts. 4
8l I b id . . f f .  133 , 139 , 146 , and 153-154.
82I b id . . f f .  149-150.
83I b id . . f .  151.
84 l b i d . ,  f .  214. A lso , see  i b i d . ,  f f .  163-171 .
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At the June 8 , 1954, m eeting o f  the E xecutive Committee, Young 
rep orted  an improved economic s itu a t io n . The B oard's in d ex  o f  indus­
t r i a l  production  had remained constant fo r  March and A p r il. Young sa id  
th a t  i t  might have in crea sed  in  May. However, "Mr. Young f e l t  th a t i t  
was not c le a r  a t  t h i s  tim e whether th e economy had reached a turning
p o in t or whether th e d e c lin e  rep resen ted  a le v e l in g  o f f ,  to  be fo llow ed
85by fu rth er  d e c lin e  la t e r  on." Beginning w ith  t h i s  m eeting and con­
t in u in g  through la t e r  on es, Chairman Martin urged a reco n sid e ra tio n  o f  
the a c t iv e  ease  p o lic y . N ev e r th e le ss , th e  Committee members w ished to  
con tin u e the same p o lic y  and exp ressed  concern about the coming Treasury
fin a n c in g . Some o f  the members exp ressed  the d e s ir e  to  see  reserv e
86
requirem ents low ered so a s  to  provide some funds to  the market.
There were two E xecutive Committee m eetings during August, the  
month o f  th e  upturn. The economic rep o rts  p resen ted  in  th o se  m eetings  
were s im ila r . They recogn ized  th a t c y c l ic a l  adjustm ents had taken  
p la c e , but th ey  d id  not y e t  recogn ize  th e  b u sin ess  fo r c e s  which would 
promote a cum ulative r e v iv a l .  Such favorab le  fe a tu r e s  a s  h igher r e t a i l  
s a le s ,  stren gth  in  the auto m arket, co n stru c tio n , and th e s t a b i l i t y  o f  
in d u s tr ia l  output were m entioned. But unfavorable fa c to r s  such a s  cu t­
backs in  defense spending, low  h ir in g  r a te s ,  and b u sin ess fa i lu r e s  were
87
m entioned. The Committee members decided  to  continue the same p o lic y .
At th e September 22, 1954, m eeting o f  th e  FOMC, P resid en t Sproul
85
I b i d . . f .  175.
86
I b id . .  f f .  177-182.
87Ibid.. ff. 233-257.
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made a statement which seemed to  summarize the a c tio n s  and outlook o f
th e  Committee.
A ll  during 1954, in  th e  face o f  a d ec lin in g  or s id e -  
w ise movement o f the general economy, we have 
fo llow ed  a c re d it  p o lic y  o f " active  ease ."  I t  has 
involved  the use o f  a l l  o f  the th ree  main instrum ents 
o f  c r e d it  management— open market op era tion s, d is ­
count r a te s , and reserve requirements. I t s  o b jective  
has been to  encourage the free  use o f  c r ed it  and an 
a c tiv e  c a p ita l and mortgage market. I t s  main tech­
n ic a l  guide has been th e  maintenance o f a su b stan tia l 
volume o f " free  reserves"  in  the banking system.
While the use o f such a guide has ra ised  problems o f  
cen tra l banking technique, which have been d iscussed  
h ere, the general p o lic y  has served the economy w e ll .
The ready a v a i la b i l i t y  and low co st o f  bank cred it  
and o f  c a p ita l funds have maintained a monetary clim ate  
favorable to  b u sin ess expansion and high employment, 
recogn izing  th a t c r ed it  p o lic y  i s  only one part o f th e  
whole complex. The present economic outlook suggests  
to  me a continuance o f  e x is t in g  cred it  p o lic y , re ly in g  
on open market operations to  make i t  e f f e c t iv e .
Even a s  la te  as October 20 , 1954, th e  economic report did not h int
o f  the upturn which had been running for two months. Young sta ted  that
". . . the general economic s itu a t io n  continued to  be one o f o f f s e t t in g
changes w ith the broad aggregates s t i l l  showing few sign s o f  moving
89
upward or downward by s ig n if ic a n t  amounts." He did say th a t some
b u sin ess econom ists who were recen tly  in  Washington f e l t  th at ". . .
th ere  was a d isp o s it io n  to  p ro jec t a c t iv i t y  for the near-term fu ture on 
90
th e  up sid e ."  The Committee members again decided to  continue the 
same p o lic y  o f  a c t iv e  ease.
88
Ib id . . f f .  281-282.
89
Ib id . . f .  314.
90Ibid.
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F in a lly , a t the November 9,  19 % ,  Executive Committee m eeting, a
d is t in c t  change in  opinion occurred. While the s t a f f ’ s economic report
remained conservative in  op in ion , Young d id  s ta te  th a t 11. . . the
current strengthening in  a c t iv i t y  and f in a n c ia l  markets was being w idely
in terp reted  as foreshadowing su sta in ed , though p o ss ib ly  moderate,
91c y c l ic a l  expansion." Chairman Martin c a lle d  for a f u l l  d iscu ssion  o f
economic p o lic y . He suggested th a t perhaps the d ir e c t iv e  issu ed  by the
FCMC was out o f date and th at th e  f u l l  Committee should be c a lle d  in to  
92se ss io n . Chairman Martin then made the fo llow in g  statem ent:
. . . The committee would always be confronted with  
th e problem o f  lea d s and la g s  between c r e d it  p o licy  
and economic a c t iv it y  but th at a t  the present time 
he f e l t  th a t , in stead  o f  there being a "bubble on 
top  o f  a boom," as the s itu a t io n  had been described  
a t  previous tim es, th ere  was now a "bubble on top  o f  
the foundation" which had been la id  for  a s o lid  
b u sin ess recovery. Chairman Martin f e l t  i t  ju s t  as  
important t o  keep such a bubble from forming on the 
f lo o r  o f  recovery as i t  had been to  keep such a 
bubble from forming on a boom. For the f i r s t  tim e, 
he sa id , he had begun to  f e e l  th a t the easy  money 
p o lic y  o f th e  Committee was fu rth erin g  a sp ecu la tive  
psychology in  a great many d ir e c tio n s  in  a way that 
could lea d  to  undesirable developments at a c r i t i c a l  
p o in t. He thought th e committee should consider t h is  
p sych o log ica l fa c to r  which had been h igh ligh ted  
r ecen tly  in  a statement to  th e e f f e c t  th a t those who 
were w a itin g  fo r  evidence th at recovery i s  here should 
cease looking; they cou ld  expect to  see the evidence 
a f te r  i t  had gone p a st .
Martin suggested the problem was a d i f f i c u l t  one in  l ig h t  o f  th e  
coming Treasury fin an cin g . He suggested th a t the E xecutive Committee
91I b id . . f .  334.
9^Ibid . , f . 335. The d ir e c t iv e  a t th a t time c a lle d  fo r  " a c tiv e ly  
m aintaining a cond ition  of ease ."
93Ibid.. f. 336.
d iscu ss  whether i t  should d irec t fr e e  reserv es  toward the lower end o f  
th e  $400-$700 m illio n  range or n o t, Sproul did not f e e l  th a t an immedi­
a te  change in  p o lic y  was needed, but he did f e e l  th a t i f  recovery were 
to  develop more f u l ly ,  then i t  should be considered. He did not object 
t o  low ering fr e e  reserves somewhat. Sproul did not f e e l  th at in f la ­
tion ary  psychology was firm ly  e s ta b lish e d . Martin d iffered :
. . .  He f e l t  the committee may already have lo s t  
con tro l; there were in d ic a tio n s  o f  an exuberance 
o f  s p ir i t  among in t e l l ig e n t  businessmen w ith respect  
to  1955 b u sin ess p rospects th at seemed to  him to  be 
dangerous. He d is lik e d  having the System 's easy  
money p o licy  a sso c ia ted  w ith  t h is  s itu a tio n ; i f  
perm itted to  develop, i t  might bring a demand for  
a c tio n  on th e part of the Federal Reserve to  do 
something a t a time when th e a c tio n s  th e Systenui 
might take would have l o s t  th e ir  e f fe c t iv e n e s s .
Chairman Martin went on to  say th a t f le x ib le  monetary p o lic y  could not
always w ait u n t i l  a l l  o f  the evidence was in .  He c ite d  the May, 1953,
rev ersa l in  monetary p o lic y  as an example, Sproul agreed th a t the
Executive Committee could not always wait and th a t i t  should be a le r t .
Governors Robertson and Balderston seemed to  go along w ith  Martin that
fr e e  reserv es  should be lowered. Governor Szymczak was more in c lin e d  to
w a it . Governor M ills  was concerned that the Committee, in  attem pting to
d estroy  sp ecu la tion , might destroy recovery. The general consensus
reached was that the Account Manager should gradually move fr e e  reserves
* 95toward th e  lower le v e l  o f  the $400-$700 m ill io n  free  reserve range.
T his d ate, November 9 , i s  indeed th e  turning point in  System p o lic y .
^ I b i d . , f f .  339-340. Governors Balderston and M ills  were v i s i t o r s  
a t  th is  m eeting.
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I t  marks the end o f th e in s id e  la g — three months a f te r  the c y c l ic a l  
turn ing p o in ts .
At the November 23, 1954, m eeting o f  th e  E xecutive Committee, the  
members confirmed th e ir  p rev iou s d e s ir e  to  low er the fr e e  reserve l e v e l .  
Q uestions were ra ised  as to  how fa r  the E xecutive Committee could go and 
s t i l l  remain w ith in  the l im i t s  o f  th e  FOMC d ir e c t iv e .  The members 
seemed to  in d ic a te  th a t th ey  w ished to  remain w ith in  the l im it s  o f  the 
d ir e c t iv e  but th a t the d ir e c t iv e  should be recon sidered  a t  the next FCMC 
m eetin g .9^
The FOMC met on December 7 , 1954* The m inutes show th a t w hile most 
o f  th e  Committee members were not concerned th a t  the economy would 
recover too  rap id ly  and promote in f la t io n ,  th e y  did f e e l  th a t the 
changes in  economic co n d itio n s  should be recogn ized  a t  l e a s t  by a change 
in  the d ir e c t iv e .  Chairman M artin continued h i s  strong stand a g a in st
th e  e v i l s  o f  in f la t io n :
The System had an o b lig a t io n  not to  perpetuate w aste and 
in e f f ic ie n c y  in  the economy, Chairman Martin sa id , and he 
did  not b e lie v e  th a t in f la t io n  provided jobs fo r  people  
on a sustained b a s is  although i t  m ight tem porarily  promote 
jo b s. He f e l t  th e  Committee should be very ca re fu l about 
lea n in g  too fa r  on th e  s id e  o f ea sy  money, and he expressed  
the view that on th e b a s is  o f  comments made a t t h i s  meet­
in g , i t  appeared to  be th e  m ajority view  th at some change 
in  th e d ir e c t iv e  to  the ex ecu tiv e  committee would be 
d esira b le  a t t h i s  t im e .97
The Committee a lso  understood th a t by changing the d ir e c t iv e  i t  was
98endorsing a gradual red u ction  in  the amount o f  market ea se .
96I b id . . f f .  352-362.
97I b id . . f .  367.
98Ibid.. f. 369.
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Brunner and M eltzer e v id e n tly  date th e ir  change in  System p o lic y  
from t h is  p o in t . S ince the Annual Report d id  not carry the e a r lie r  
a c t io n s  o f th e  E xecutive Committee, Brunner and M eltzer1 s dating o f th e  
l a g  was one month in  e r r o r .99 A fter examining the data for  MaxE pre­
sen ted  by Kareken and Solow, t h i s  author agrees w ith  th e ir  dating o f the  
change in  MaxE as being in  December. Table V reproduces the relevan t  
d a ta .
TABLE V
SEASONALLY ADJUSTED MONTHLY VALUES OF MaxE*, 
MaxE  ̂ AND MaxEg, JULY, 1954-JUNE, 1955a 
( in  m ill io n s  o f  d o lla r s )
Date13 MaxE^, MaxE^ MaxEg
J u ly  1954 129,330 144,210
Aug. 1954 131,714 147,539
Sept. 1954 131,166 147,115
Oct. 1954 133,116 149,460
A  Nov. 1954 135,074 P 151,182
Dec. 1954 134,102 D 150,357
Jan. 1955 134,022 150,445
Feb. 1955 135,054 151,218
Mar. 1955 134,454 150,720
Apr. 1955 135,601 151,769
May 1955 136,001 152,111
June 1955 134,837 150,956
Source: John Kareken and Robert M. Solow, "Lags in  F is c a l  and
Monetary P o lic y ,"  S ta b il iz a t io n  P o l ic ie s : A S e r ie s  o f  Research S tu d ies
fo r  the Commission on Money and Credit (Englewood C li f f s :  P r en tice -
H a ll, Inc . , 19^3), p . 90 . R eprinted by perm ission o f  the p u b lish er.
The fo llo w in g  symbols are u t i l i z e d  in  Table V to  in d ic a te  t h is  
author’ s d a tin g  o f Maks and consensus changes:
A  a change in  the consensus
P = a peak in  MaxE
D ** the f i r s t  month in  which MaxE decreased fo llow in g  a peak
99Board o f  Governors o f th e  Federal Reserve System, Annual Report 
1954 (Washington, D. C .: Board o f  Governors, 19 5 5 ), PP* 60 , 92-98.
A lso , see Brunner and M eltzer, The Federal R eserve*s Attachment to  the  
Free Reserve Concept. p. 38.
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Thus, t h i s  stu d y  f in d s  th a t th e  Committee a lte r e d  i t s  p o lic y
in  response to  changed economic c o n d itio n s  and the fe a r  o f in f la t io n
on November 9 , 1954, th ree  months a f t e r  the c y c l ic a l  upturn. Other
s tu d ie s ,  based on changes in  MaxE and the F0M3 d ir e c t iv e ,  date t h is
change one month l a t e r .
Econom ists d isa g ree  a s  to  the date when th e  economic upturn, ,
which began in  A p ril o f  1958, was recogn ized  by th e  FOMC. Brunner and
M eltzer , b asin g  t h e ir  op in ion  on th e  Record o f  P o lic y  A ction , f e e l
th a t  the F0M3 recogn ized  th e  economic change on August 1 9 , by making
a major p o lic y  change. They f e e l ,  however, th a t minor changes in
100p o lic y  took  p lace  p r io r  to  th a t date on May 27 and J u ly  29.
Kareken and Solow, by watching MaxE, determ ined th a t th e  System
responded in  June, 1958"*’̂ "*’ Friedman and Schwartz do not seem to
g iv e  a d e f in i t e  tim e fo r  the s h i f t  in  System p o l ic y ,  but say on ly
102
th a t i t  occurred months a f t e r  th e change in  economic a c t iv i t y .
Thus, th e  e s tim a te s  range from one month, u sin g  minor changes, to  
fo u r  months.
100Brunner and M eltzer , The Federal R e se r v e d  Attachment to  the  
Free Re serve Concept, pp. 39-40 .
1 0 1Kareken and Solow, p . 66.
102 ,
Friedman and Schwartz, A Monetary H isto ry , p . 617.
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Two months p r io r  to  the trough, s t a f f  econom ists d id  not see  s ig n s  
o f  a slow ing in  th e  r e c e ss io n . Young, in  making th e s t a f f  r e p o r t, 
s ta ted :
. . .  We can say th a t r e c e ss io n  i s  con tin u in g . Down­
ward adjustment has gained in  momentum and s ig n s  o f  
l e v e l in g  o u t, or saucering  o u t, are not y e t  a t hand.
That p o in t may not be fa r  o f f  . . . .
A fter  f iv e  months o f  rapid  d e c l in e ,  th e  economy should  
be nearing th e phase o f  g r a d u a l n e s s . -^3
The March 25 , 195&> economic report in d ica te d  th a t the d e c lin e  in  
b u sin ess  a c t iv i t y  and employment was con tin u in g . I t  was rep orted  th a t  
because t h i s  r e c e ss io n  had extended as fa r  a s  th e previous two post-war 
r e c e s s io n s , some in d iv id u a ls  were concerned th a t i t  might become cumula­
t i v e .  A lso , " r e a lis t ic "  adjustm ents in  p r ic e s  and c o s ts  had not y et  
occurred. One favorab le  s ig n , however, was th a t  in ven tory  accum ulation  
had about run i t s  c o u r s e . A t  l e a s t  two o f  the Committee members f e l t  
th a t a bottom might not be too  fa r  o f f .  During t h is  p er io d , a s  in
e a r l ie r  on es, th e  adequacy o f  fr e e  reserv es  as an in d ica to r  and ta rg e t  
105
was d isc u sse d . A lso , th e  appropriateness o f  " b i l l s  only" occasion ­
a l l y  came to  be d isc u s se d ,’'"^ The consensus reached in  t h i s  m eeting was 
to  continue e s s e n t ia l ly  the same p o licy :
Chairman M artin then  sa id  i t  seemed to  him th a t th ere  
was a f a i r l y  c le a r  m ajority  in  favor o f  m aintain ing  
th e presen t d ir e c t iv e ,  postponing any change in  the
1Q3M inutes. R o ll 12 , f .  109.
104 I b id . . f .  221.
105I b id . , f .  236.
1Q6I b id . , f f .  204-216, 262.
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discount ra te  fo r  th e tim e b e in g , and m aintain ing  
a degree o f  ease s ig n if ie d  by fr e e  reserv es  o f  $500 
m illio n  to  s l ig h t ly  more than t h a t . '
The economic report presented in  A pril showed concern w ith  the  
r is in g  p r ice  l e v e l .  I t  a lso  contained a h in t  th a t th e r e ce ss io n  might 
be slow ing.
The anomaly o f  r e ce ss io n  in  output, employment, and 
trade a t high and even s t i l l  advancing p r ic e  l e v e l s  
has continued to  be one o f  the s tr ik in g  fe a tu r e s  o f  
the economic panorama. Most recent data on recess io n  
are su ggestive  o f  some slow ing down in  the pace o f  
d ec lin e  fo r  t o t a l  output and employment, some l e v e l ­
ing  out in  tra d e , and some developments o f  an expan­
s iv e  character in  fin an ce . With con stru ction  a c t iv i t y  
being m aintained, th e  o v e r a ll p ic tu re  d o m estica lly  
appears as one o f  more d iv e r s ity  or crosscu rren t than  
e a r l ie r  in  the yea r . 8
In  summarizing the m eeting, Chairman Martin sa id  th a t no one wanted to  
see fr e e  reserv es  d r a s t ic a l ly  reduced and th a t low ering reserve req u ire­
ments was one p o ss ib le  way o f supplying reserv es  to  the market to  main­
ta in  th e p resen t fr e e  reserve l e v e l .  He a lso  s ta te d  th a t the members
109favored a reduction  in  the d iscount r a te .
A f o r e t e l l in g  o f th e  imminent bond market c r i s i s  i s  found in  the
m inutes o f  the FOMC m eeting held  May 27, 1958. Larkin, an a s s is ta n t
v ic e -p r e s id e n t  o f  the New York Bank, made the fo llo w in g  statem ents
. . . There has been a continuing wave o f  specula­
t io n  in  the Government s e c u r it ie s  market s in ce  the  
change in  cr ed it  p o lic y  l a s t  f a l l .  With th e approach 
o f  the forthcom ing Treasury refunding op eration , 
th ere had now been a w holesale sp ecu la tiv e  movement




in to  Treasury r ig h ts  maturing in  June. Some 
estim ates p laced the magnitude o f  th is  specu la­
t io n  in  th e v ic in i t y  o f  o n e-h a lf b i l l io n  d o lla r s ,  
but yesterday, Mr. Larkin sa id , he heard a 
f ig u re  mentioned in  th e  area o f  $1 b i l l io n .  I f  
th e  refunding went smoothly, t h i s  would not  
cause tro u b le . However, i f  the terms were not 
acceptab le to  the sp ecu la tors and i f  they  
unloaded a t one tim e when the su b scrip tion  books 
were opened, there could be tro u b le  in  the  
market p la ce .
Young, in  h is  economic rep ort, sa id  th at i t  seemed th a t a bottom to the
economic d ec lin e  was in  the making. Thomas said th e economic s itu a tio n
had been c a lle d  an " in fla tio n a ry  recess io n ."  Some o f  the Committee
members f e l t  th a t a bottom was approaching, but th e  consensus was to
111continue the same p o lic y . Brunner and M eltzer f e l t  that a minor
112
change in  p o lic y  took place a t t h i s  m eeting. As sta ted  above, the  
minutes in d ica te  th a t the consensus was to  continue the same p o licy .
The economic report presented  at th e  June 1 7 , 1958, m eeting con­
firmed th a t a bottom to  the r e c e ss io n  was occurring. Young said:
The stock market i s  s t i l l  saying, with even stronger 
emphasis, th at economic recovery, p o ss ib ly  in f la ­
tio n a ry  recovery, i s  e ith e r  under way or ju s t  around 
th e  corner. The fu rth er  economic inform ation a v a il­
ab le fo r  t h i s  m eeting i s  confirming our report at th e  
l a s t  m eeting th at bottoming out o f  recess io n  i s  in  
fa c t  occurring. W hile the inform ation i s  g en era lly  
on the encouraging s id e , some o f  i t  i s  b lack  and i s  
a counterweight to  th e  w hite. ^
110I b id . . f .  380.
m i b i d . ,  f f .  383-410.
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Brunner and M eltzer, The Federal R eserv ed  Attachment to  the 
Free Reserve Concept, p . 39*
113Minutes. Roll 12, f. 433.
The encouraging parts included a r is e  in  in d u str ia l production in  May
and p o ss ib ly  for  June, a r is e  in  e le c tr ic  power output, fre ig h t car
lo a d in g s , housing con stru ction  and personal income, fu rth er liq u id a tio n
o f  in v e n to r ie s , a reduced f a l l  in  manufacturers * s a le s ,  strengthening in
th e labor market, stren gth  in  r e t a i l  s a le s ,  e tc . The black s id e
included reductions in  new p lan t and equipment spending, specu lation  in
s t e e l ,  a slow auto market, a f a l l  in  consumer in sta llm en t c r e d it , and 
114some p r ic e s  up. Hayes did not fe e l  th a t  i t  was c le a r  that a low
p o in t had been reached. The Federal Reserve Bank P resid en ts, in  th e ir
reg io n a l rep o rts , ranged from o p tim istic  to  p e s s im is t ic . Chairman
Martin concluded the d iscu ssio n  by sta tin g
. . . th at i t  was h is  own view, and he b e lie v e d , the  
m ajority  view —with some v a r ia tio n s  in  degree—that 
th ere should be no change at t h is  tim e in  th e  p o lic y  
d ir e c t iv e , the discount ra te , or reserve requirem ents.
A lso , the same tone, co lo r , and f e e l  o f th e  market should be m aintained.
The economic report presented July 8 , 1956, was more o p tim istic
than e a r l ie r  rep o rts. The r i s e  in  in d u str ia l production and numerous
sm all ga in s in  various segments o f  the economy h igh ligh ted  the 
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rep o rt. The f in a n c ia l report stressed  th e severe pressure on the
117Treasury bond market. The sp ecu la tive  asp ects  seemed to  be p laying a 
la r g e  ro le  in  the d i f f ic u l t y .  Thomas ended h is  report by sta tin g :
1 U I b i d . . f f .  434-435.
115I b id . . f .  466.
I l6 Ibid.. ff. 476-477.
The experience o f  June i s  an example o f  the p i t f a l l s  
th a t may be encountered in  fo llo w in g  a path o f  
fo rc in g  down in te r e s t  r a te s  and stim u la tin g  c re d it  
commitments reg a rd less  o f  current needs. R esu ltin g  
sp ecu la tiv e  e x cesse s  may le a d  to  c r is e s  th a t in  turn  
r a is e  demands fo r  r e l i e f  measures. I s  economic 
recovery aided by such f a ls e  and temporary movements?
F in a lly , i s n ’t  th e  l iq u id i t y  o f th e  economy already • 
more than adequate to  support recovery fo r  a lon g  
time ahead? ^
Other members showed concern over the dilemma o f  tr y in g  to  stim u late
recovery w ithout crea tin g  too  much l iq u id i t y .  From th e d isc u ss io n , i t
was ev id en t th a t view s were mixed: a t l e a s t  one person wanted to  lower
the d iscount ra te ; o th ers who were concerned with the l iq u id i t y  p o s it io n
wanted to  t r y  to  lower th e  free  reserve l e v e l  a b it ;  w h ile  o th ers  wanted
to  continue th e  same degree o f  ea se . No one seemed to  th in k  th a t  p o lic y
should be changed d r a s t ic a l ly .  Some recognized  a le v e l in g  in  th e
economy, but no one seemed to  in d ic a te  a f e e l in g  th a t a d e f in it e  upturn
had occurred. At le a s t  one member was w orried th a t t h i s  was a f a ls e
bottom. Concern was expressed by a few about the in c o m p a tib ility  o f
Treasury and System p o lic y . There was con sid erab le  d isc u ss io n  about
changing th e d ir e c t iv e , but such a su ggestion  was d efeated  by a show o f
hands. The d iscu ssio n  ended w ith  many in  attendance f e e l in g  th at a fr e e
reserv e  le v e l  o f  about $500 m ill io n  would be good, but recogn izin g  the
many d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f  u sin g  a fr e e  reserve ta r g e t  and adm itting th at
119ton e, f e e l ,  and co lor  o f  th e  market must be an elem ent.
E ight telephone conferences were held  b efore the next regu lar FOMC
122
m eeting in  J u ly , The c o lla p se  o f  th e  government bond m arket, a s  d is ­
cu ssed  in  Chapter I I I ,  r e su lte d  in  a rev ers io n  to  in te r e s t  r a te s  a s  a 
ta r g e t .
On J u ly  29, 195S, the economic rep ort was glow ing. Young s ta te d  
th a t  th e  economy had sprung back and th a t A p ril would probably mark the  
r e ce ss io n a r y  trough. The economy looked  stron ger than had been reported  
e a r l ie r .  Thomas recogn ized  th at the r e c e n t  a c t io n s  aimed a t  market 
m anipulation  had been made a t th e  s a c r i f ic e  o f  th e  System* s major ob jec­
t i v e s  and f e l t  th a t  th e  two fo r c e s  o f  economic recovery  and Treasury
needs would shape fu ture System a c t io n s . The p resen t ta sk  was to  adjust
120FGMC p o l i c i e s  to  d ea l w ith  th ese  fo r c e s .  As might be exp ected , the
Committee members d if fe r e d  in  th e ir  op in ion s a s  to  what th e  p o lic y
should b e . A fter  con sid erab le  d isc u s s io n , the consensus reached was to
reduce th e  l e v e l  o f  fr e e  re serv es  a s much a s  p o s s ib le  w ithout crea tin g
d isord er  in  the government s e c u r it ie s  market. W hile Brunner and M eltzer
121f e l t  t h i s  was a minor change in  System p o lic y , t h i s  author th in k s  i t  
was a major one. I t  i s  ev id en t th a t  th e  Committee was not ju s t  a c t in g  
to  mop up e x cess  r e se r v e s , but was tak in gs i t s  f i r s t  s te p s  toward l e s s  
ea se  now th a t th e  bottom o f  the r e c e s s io n  was c le a r ly  p ast and m ild  
recovery  was under way. Thus, the Committee a cted  in  J u ly , th ree  months 
a f t e r  th e  upturn.
Brunner and M eltzer date th e major p o lic y  change as having taken
122p la ce  a t  th e  August 19 , 1958, m eeting. T his author, however, f in d s
12QI b id . , f f .  69-72 .
1 21  ......................................Brunner and M eltzer , The F ederal R eserve1s Attachment to  th e
Free R eserve Concept, p . 4 0 .
122Ibid.
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th e  m eeting important on ly  in  th a t  i t  confirm s the e a r l ie r  consensus 
d e c is io n  reached by ordering a change in  the d ir e c t iv e .
Once aga in , a d iffe r e n c e  i s  found between the d atin g  p o in t s e le c te d  
by Kareken and Solow and th a t o f  t h i s  study. Kareken and Solow examined 
th e  MaxE data fo r  changes in  the month-to-month in c re a se  in  MaxE whereas 
t h i s  author examined th e  data fo r  peaks and downturns. Kareken and 
Solow found th a t a f t e r  June, 1958, month-to-month in c r e a se s  in  MaxE 
slowed con sid erab ly . T his author, by examining peaks and downturns, 
concluded th a t  MaxE changed in  September, f iv e  months a f t e r  the NBER 
tu rn in g  p o in t . The fo llo w in g  ta b le  confirm s t h i s .
TABLE VI
SEASONALLY ADJUSTED MONTHL£ VALUES 
OF MaxEj, MaxE£% AND MaxE2 , 1958a 
( in  m il l io n s  o f  d o lla r s )
Dateb
------- ¥ --------- -----------
MaxEj_, MaxE^ MaxE^
Jan. 1958 143,160 161,291
Feb. 1958 144,921 163,091
Mar. 1958 148,377 166,717
Apr. 1958 151,180 169,591
May 1958 153,678 172,916
June 1958 154,527 174,089
 ̂ J u ly  1958 155,152 174,908
Aug. 1958 155,434 P 175,500
S ep t. 1958 154,683 D 175,009
O ct. 1958 154,407 174,973
Nov. 1958 154,703 175,000
Dec. 1958 155,312 175,518
aSource: John Kareken and Robert M. Solow, "Lags in  F is c a l  and
Monetary P o l i c y ," S ta b il iz a t io n  P o l i c i e s : A S e r ie s  o f  Research S tu d ie s
f o r  th e  Commission on Money and C redit (Englewood C l i f f s :  P r e n tic e -
H a ll, I n c . ,  19 6 3 ), pp. 90-91 . R eprinted by perm ission  o f  th e  p u b lish er .
^The fo llo w in g  symbols are u t i l i z e d  in  Table VI to  in d ic a te  t h i s  
au thor’ s d atin g  o f  MaxE and consensus changes:
A  “  a change in  th e  consensus
P a peak in  MaxE
D =>- th e  f i r s t  month in  which MaxE decreased fo llo w in g  a peak
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IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS OF CHAPTER IV
Thus, i t  appears, in  t h is  author’ s op in ion , th at th e  FOMG has 
been f a ir ly  prompt in  recogn izin g  economic changes. The fo llo w in g  
ta b le ,  which summarizes the la g s  found in  t h i s  study, r e f l e c t s  t h i s  
points
TABLE VII
RESPONSE OF THE FOMC TO ECONOMIC CHANGES— THE INSIDE LAG
NBER Turning 
P oin ts
The Committee’ s Response 
As Noted in  the Minutes
Time Lag 
(months)
J u ly , 1953 (peak) May 6 , 1953 -2
August, 1954 (trough) November 9 , 1954 +3
J u ly , 1957 (peak) October 22, 1957 +3
A p r il, 1958 (trough) Ju ly  29, 1958 +3
Thus, i t  appears th a t  w ith  th e  excep tion  o f  the May, 1953, response  
(which occurred two months p r io r  to  the c y c l ic a l  peak), th e  Committee 
responded to  economic changes th ree months a f t e r  they occurred. A 
reexam ination o f t h is  1953 l ag r e v e a ls  th a t the Committee, at th a t tim e,
was responding m ainly to  a t ig h te n in g  money market and su sp ic ion  o f  a
123pending economic downturn. An exam ination o f  the minutes fo r  1953
r ev ea ls  th a t the Committee members did not recogn ize  th at the downturn
had a c tu a lly  occurred u n t i l  September, 1953, two months a f te r  the
c y c l ic a l  peak had passed . For example, a t  th e September 6 , 1953,
Executive Committee meeting R ie f le r ,  Committee secreta ry , s ta ted :
. . . Developments in  the l a s t  two weeks had reso lv ed  
any doubts he had had as to  whether the System should  
be s h if t in g  to  a p o lic y  o f  " active  ea se ."  He noted th a t  
the System had m aintained te ch n ic a l ease in  the money 
market from la t e  June or e a r ly  Ju ly , th a t th ere were no 
s ig n s  th a t banks had expanded c r e d it  unduly on the b a s is  
o f  reserv es  a v a ila b le . . . .
Mr. R ie f le r  thought th e  System should be try in g  to  b u ild  
fa c to r s  which would o f f s e t  any down-turn in  the economy 
or in  Federal Government expend itures. ^
The E xecutive Committee then adopted a p o lic y  o f  " active  ease" a t  t h i s  
125
m eeting.
The s t a f f  economic rep o rts  during t h is  period  were ra th er vague.
Clear m ention was not made u n t i l  the November 23, 1953, m eeting o f the
E xecutive Committee th a t an economic downturn had taken p la c e , though
Ralph Young mentioned the r i s e  in  b u sin ess fa ilu r e s  in  the November 6 ,
1261953, E xecutive Committee m eeting. Owing to  t h is  incom pleteness o f  
the m inutes and to  the fa c t  th a t the p o lic y  o f  " active  ease" was adopted
123  ..........
See nn. 1 6 -4 0 , supra.
12Z*M inutes. R o ll 7 , f f .  339-340.
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at th a t tim e, t h i s  study dates th e  Executive Committee's reco g n itio n  o f  
the economic downturn a s  being in  September. This "adjusted" estim ate  
o f  th e  in s id e  la g  o f two months fo r  1953 i s  c le a r ly  more in  l in e  w ith  
the other r e s u lt s .  The fo llo w in g  ta b le  summarizes the average in s id e  
la g  found in  t h i s  study:
TABLE V III 
AVERAGE INSIDE LAGS OF THE FOMC
Average In sid e  Lag—Peaks *5 mos. (ad ju sted  2 .5  m os.)
Average In sid e  Lag—Troughs 3*0 mos.
Average In sid e  Lag—Peaks &. Troughs 1 .7 5  mos. (adjusted  2 .7 5 )
Thus, i t  would appear th a t the FOMC responded as soon as s t a t i s t i ­
c a l data were a v a ila b le  which confirmed th a t e ith e r  a peak or a trough  
had been reached. Treasury fin a n c in g s , in f la t io n a r y  p ressu res, and 
other fa c to r s  were considered. These fa c to r s  seem to  have a ffe c te d  the 
FOMC a c tio n s  in  varying ways. For example, the 1953 s h i f t  occurred when 
money market pressu res became too  great and the Committee seemed to  
expect a c y c l ic a l  downturn. Thus, two fo r c e s  urged the Committee to  
ease  p ressu re. The 1954 trough was unencumbered. The 1957 peak had 
been preceded by a lo n g  period o f  sidew ise movement. Perhaps, owing to  
the in f la t io n a r y  p ressu res a t hand, the Committee did not take a c tio n  
b efore concrete evidence was presented . Thus, c o n f lic t in g  fo rc e s  were 
presen t preceding the Committee1s a ctio n  in  1957. The upturn o f  195^,
much to  th e  dismay o f  th e  FOMC, was preceded by s t ic k y  and r is in g  
p r ic e s . This fa c to r  was a lso  com plicated by the heavy Treasury
fin an cin g  o f th e  period  and the co lla p se  o f  the government bond market* 
With th e  in fla t io n a r y  th reat and Treasury needs being o f f s e t t in g  fo r c e s ,  
the Committee moved to  t ig h ten  cred it con d ition s a s soon a s  evidence was 
in  th at an upturn had sta rted . From th ese  a c tio n s  i t  i s  c lea r  th at a 
high and r is in g  le v e l  o f  in d u str ia l a c t iv i t y  was a prime o b jec tiv e  o f  
the Committee. I f  in fla t io n a r y  forces se t  in ,  however, the Committee 
sa c r if ic e d  some economic growth. A lso , Treasury needs were met i f  they  
coincided  w ith  other System o b je c t iv e s . When th ey  c o n flic te d , the  
System maintained an "even-keel" p o lic y  u n t i l  the fin an cin gs were over 
u n less  in fla t io n a r y  pressures were q u ite  strong. In th at ca se 'th e  
System allowed the government s e c u r it ie s  market to  approach disorder  
w hile i t  pursued a tight-m oney p o licy .
The fin d in g s o f  t h is  study a lso  a llow  the author to draw some 
con clu sion s about th e f i r s t  part o f  the outside la g . The fo llow in g  
ta b le  r e la te s  peaks, troughs, and changes in  MaxE to  the consensus 
changes found in  the minutes:
12S
TABLE IX
PART I  OF THE OUTSIDE LAG AS REVEALED BY PEAKS, 
TROUGHS, AND CHANGES IN MaxE*1
Date o f  th e  
Committee1s 
Response
MaxE Peaks Lag 






May, 1953 (T) A p ril, 1953 -1 May, 1953 0
November, 1954 (P) November, 1954 0 December, 1954 +1
October, 1957 (T) November, 1957 +1 December, 1957 +2
Ju ly , 195& (P) August, 195& +1 September,► 195S +2
Average .25 Average 1.25
aSource: Derived from Tables III-VT.
Thus, from changes in  MaxE, the f i r s t  part o f  the ou tsid e la g  appears to  
be an average of f iv e  weeks in  len gth .
The changes which Brunner and M eltzer noted in  th e ir  moving average 
o f  fr e e  reserves are summarized in  the fo llow in g  ta b le :
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TABLE X
PART I  OF THE OUTSIDE LAG AS 
REVEALED BY CHANGES IN FREE RESERVES3,







May 6 , 1953 May 27 21 days
November 9 , 1954 December 1 22 days
October 22, 1957 October 23 1 day
J u ly  29, 1958 August 13 15 days
Average 17 days
Source: The d ates o f  th e  Committee’ s response were d iscerned  from
an a n a ly s is  o f  the Minutes o f  th e  Federal Open Market Committee, 1936-60 
and o f  I t s  E xecutive Committee. 1936-55* R o lls  No. 6 -1 6 , Microcopy No. 
591, Record Group 82 (Washington, D. C,* The N ational A rchives, 1965). 
Free reserve  changes are from the fo llo w in g  a r t ic le :  Karl Brunner and
A llan  H. M eltzer, The Federal Reserve* s Attachment to  the Free Reserve 
Concept. Subcommittee on Domestic Finance, House Committee on Banking 
and Currency, 88th Congress, 2nd S ession , May, 1964, p. 42.
The above r e s u lt s  suggest th a t the f i r s t  part o f  the o u ts id e  la g  
averages two to  f iv e  weeks in  len g th . That i s ,  the banking system  
b eg in s to  respond to  System a c t io n s  a few weeks a f te r  the in i t ia t io n  o f  
new System p o lic y . Of course, one must be wary o f  th e  post hoc ergo 
propter hoc fa l la c y  in  in te r p r e tin g  such data .
This study a lso  su ggests th a t the con clu sion  reached by Brunner and 
M eltzer th a t the Open Market Account Manager a c ts  in  advance o f  p o lic y  
d e c is io n s , and th erefo re  autonomously, i s  erroneous. Brunner and 
M eltzer based th e ir  case on th e  q uestionab le fin d in g  th at fr e e  reserves  
changed p r io r  to  d ec is io n  changes:
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The tim ing o f responses o f  fr e e  reserv es  . . . and 
the d iscu ssio n  in  the t e x t  about the movement o f  
free  reserves a t or near c y c l ic a l  turning p o in ts ,  
suggested q u ite  stron gly  th a t the fr e e  reserv es  
l e v e l s  o ften  change in  advance o f  m eetings o f  th e  
FOMC.127
We have now found th a t there i s  a strong in d ica tio n  
th a t h is  /" th e  Account M anager's/7 a c tio n s  are more 
than a r e f le c t io n  o f  the p o lic y  view s o f  the  
Committee. Often the reserve i s  tru e; the Manager 
perm its or encourages changes in  th e  le v e l  o f  free  
reserv es , and the Committee o ften  r a t i f i e s  h is  prior  
d e c is io n .12®
This study shows, however, th a t fr e e  reserves changed a f t e r ,  not prior  
t o ,  consensus changes. Thus the Account Manager was a ctin g  w ith in  
Committee in str u c t io n s .
127Brunner and M eltzer, The Federal R eserve's Attachment to  th e  
Free Reserve Concept, p . 47.
128 . _Ibxd. « p. 49.
CHAPTER V
POTPOURRI AND CONCLUSIONS
While t h i s  study se t  out to  answer cer ta in  q u estio n s i t  has 
undoubtedly r a ise d  many o th er s . Chapter V i s  devoted to  examining some 
o f  th ese  q u estion s as w e ll  as to  r e la t in g  t h is  a u th o r 's  conception o f  
th e  FQMC's decision-m aking process to  th a t  o f  other w r ite r s  in  the  
f i e ld .
I .  TARGETS VS. INDICATORS
I t  i s  obvious from th e  m ateria l in  t h i s  study th a t th e  FOMC has 
f a i le d  to  d is t in g u ish  c le a r ly  between the ta r g e ts  and in d ica to r s  which 
i t  u se s . The FOMC seems to  r e ly  upon th e "catch a ll"  term "guides" to  
in d ic a te  both. For example, as s ta te d  in  i t s  response to  the CMC, th e  
System f e e l s  th a t the major v a r ia b le  which i t  can co n tro l i s  the t o t a l  
o f  member bank reserv es . However, th e  m inutes rev ea l th a t t o ta l  bank 
reserv es  was re jec ted  fo r  use as a short-run ta r g e t .  F ir s t ,  Committee 
members were not w il l in g  to  use a "rules" approach and adopt a s p e c if ic  
in crease  in  t o t a l  reserv es  per week. Second, th ey  did not th ink the  
Open Market Account Manager could e f f e c t iv e ly  in crea se  t o ta l  reserv es  by 
some m inute, increm ental amount per week due to  th e  t r a n s it iv e  fo r c e s  in  
th e  market. Third, even i f  a "discretionary" approach were fo llow ed , 
tr a n s it iv e  fo r c e s  would h id e s ig n if ic a n t  s h i f t s  in  the v a r ia b le  making 
i t  p r a c t ic a l ly  im possib le fo r  the Open Market Account Manager to  carry  
out th e appropriate a c tio n  on a d a ily  b a s is . The r e s u lt  seems to  be
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that the Committee r e l ie d  upon "guides" to  in d ica te  th e degree o f  
t ig h tn e ss  in  t o ta l  bank reserv es , i . e . ,  the Committee u t i l iz e d  such 
concepts as free  reserves and nonborrowed reserves to  in d ica te  the  
cond ition  o f t o ta l  bank re ser v es . In "Federalese," the Committee i s  
steer in g  the car by look ing at the rear-view  mirror s in ce  the w indshield  
i s  fogged up.
C learly  the Committee i s  not only using th ese  "guides" to  in d ica te  
the con d ition  o f  bank reserves but i s  a lso  using them as ta r g e ts . I f  
one o f th e  "guides," such a s  free  reserv es , v a r ie s  from the le v e l  which 
the Committee th inks i s  appropriate, open market a ctio n  w i l l  be taken to  
resto re  i t .  How sound i s  t h is  p ractice?  According to  Friedman the on ly  
relevant t e s t  o f  an economic hypothesis i s  how w e ll i t  works. The 
"guide" approach, no m atter how confusing to  the o u ts id er , seems to  be 
working.'*' The Committee appears to  have a n tic ip a ted  many o f  the  
c r i t ic i s n s  o f i t s  ta r g e ts  by academic econom ists and, in  some way, has 
compensated fo r  the ta r g e ts ' shortcomings.
I I .  THE FGMC'S DECISION MAKING PROCESS
In recent months a number o f  laudable attem pts have been made to  
d u p lica te , in  model form, the d ec is io n  making process o f  the FOMC. John
H. Wood, formerly o f  the s t a f f  o f  the Board o f  Governors, developed a 
q u a n tita tiv e  model which demonstrates
^"Franco M odigliani, "Some Em pirical T e s t s  o f Monetary Management 
and o f  R ules Versus D iscretio n ,"  Journal o f P o l i t i c a l  Economy, LXKII 
(June, 1964), 243-244.
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th a t the Federal R eserve, in  i t s  conduct o f  open 
market op eration s, responds in  a system atic fash ion  
to  recent movements in  such ta r g e t  v a r ia b le s  as  
GNP, the balance o f  payments, unemployment, and 
p r ic e s , and to  changes in  GNP and b a la n ce-o f-  
payments ta r g e ts .
Wood n o tes th a t most o f th e  System 's a ctio n s are ,ld e fe n s iv e ,,,
However, a small but s t a t i s t i c a l l y  s ig n if ic a n t  p o rtio n  o f i t s  a c tio n s
are in  d ir e c t  response to  the v a r ia b le s  mentioned in  the Employment Act
o f  1946. Wood reached h is  con clu sion s a f t e r  studying em pirical data and
3
then using reg ressio n  a n a ly s is .
A d is t in c t ly  d iffe r e n t  approach was taken by W illiam  P. Yohe. Yohe
was concerned with s p e c if ic  Committee d e c is io n s  and how th ey  were
reached rather than w ith th e  implem entation o f  the d e c is io n s  by the
Account Manager. Yohe su c c in c t ly  s ta te s  h is  conception o f Committee
behavior as fo llow s:
My b a sic  conception o f  a policy-m aking committee 
l ik e  th e  FOMC i s  th a t  o f  a h e u r is t ic  problem 
so lv er  whose c o a l i t io n s  sy stem a tica lly  s h i f t  in  
response to  changes in  inform ation and whose 
d e lib e ra te  a c tio n s  are both in frequ en t and 
increm ental.^-
This author, w h ile  d isagreein g  w ith certa in  " h e u r is t ic s” used in  
th e model, b e lie v e s  th at Yohe has captured the essen ce  o f  th e  FOMC 
d ec is io n  making p rocess. The Committee does respond to  in p u ts o f  data.
2   ...............
John H. Wood, A Model o f  Federal Reserve B ehavior, S ta f f  Economic
Study No. 17 (Washington, D. C .: Board o f  Governors, 1966), p . 37.
3 Ib id .
^William P. Yohe, "A Model o f  Federal Open Market Committee 
D ecis io n  P r o c e sse s ,” An-Unpublished Paper Presented At The Southern 
Economic A ssocia tion  Convention, A tla n ta , Georgia (November 11 , 1966), 
p . 1 .
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W hile some c o a l i t io n s  seem to  remain r e la t iv e ly  co n sta n t, fo r  example 
th e  "hard money men," new c o a l i t io n s  are formed as the economic 
s itu a t io n  changes. The Committee1 s  d e lib e r a te  a c t io n s , i . e . ,  "dynamic" 
resp o n ses, are  r e la t iv e ly  in freq u en t and are carried  out in  an 
increm ental manner. Yohe concludes h is  paper w ith  a computer flo w  chart 
and a l i s t  o f  h e u r is t ic s  which in corp orate h i s  in te r p r e ta t io n  o f  FOMC 
behavior.
While a complete a n a ly s is  o f  Yohe• s  p resen ta tio n  i s  beyond th e  
scope o f  t h i s  study, t h i s  author ta k es  is s u e  w ith two s p e c if ic  p a r ts  o f  
th e  model. F ir s t ,  as Yohe d escr ib es  i t ,  th e  i n i t i a l  d e c is io n  made by 
th e  FOMC i s  whether to  m aintain  an "even-keel"  p o lic y  because o f  a major 
Treasury f in a n c in g , d efin ed  as one b ein g  over $4 b i l l i o n ,  or to  proceed  
w ith  an a n a ly s is  o f  th e  gen era l economic s itu a t io n .^  I t  i s  obvious from 
th e  m inutes th a t even though th e Committee may decide to  m aintain an 
"even-keel" t h i s  d e c is io n  i s  made o n ly  a f t e r  the Committee rev iew s a 
con sid erab le  amount o f  economic d ata . The Committee does not ju s t  
a u to m a tica lly  proceed, a s  in d ica ted  in  the Yohe paper, to  renew the  
p reviou s d ir e c t iv e .
Second, Yohe seems to  m iss th e  importance o f  th e  consensus to  th e  
Committee members and th e fa c t  th a t  th e consensus may be changed in  
c a se s  where th e  p o lic y  d ir e c t iv e  i s  n o t. To be more accu rate in  h is  
m odel, Yohe should in corporate a llow ances fo r  t h i s .
This author has attem pted, in  Figure I ,  to  diagram h is  own in te r ­
p r e ta tio n  o f  the Committee * s d e c is io n  making p ro cess . The diagram
Îbid., Table I, Notes on Subroutines of FOMJ Model II.
in co rp o ra tes  t h i s  a u th o r 's  above c r it ic is m s  o f  th e  Yohe m odel. F ir s t ,  
d e c is io n s  to  m aintain  an "even k eel"  are not autom atic during refund ings  
but come on ly  a f te r  an a n a ly s is  o f  economic data . Second, consensus and 
d ir e c t iv e  changes may be made independently  o f  each o th er .
FIGURE I
A MODEL OF THE FOMC DECISION MAKING PROCESS
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I I I .  STRUCTURE VS. FUNCTION
Some econom ists have been concerned w ith  the stru ctu ra l and
fu n ctio n a l ev o lu tio n  o f  th e  Federal Reserve System. Some observers,
such as Michael D. Regan, f e e l  th a t th e  '’r e g io n a l” stru ctu re o f  the
*
6System i s  outmoded and should be abandoned. Other observers f e e l  th a t
the System has become too  c en tr a liz ed  and th a t a return to  "regionalism ” 
7
should be made. The m inutes shed some l ig h t  upon s p e c if ic  p a rts  o f  th e  
controversy—the in flu en ce  o f  th e  Federal A dvisory Council (FAC) on the  
FOMC and the "nodes o f  power” w ith in  th e  System.
F ir s t ,  a s id e  from th e  q u estion  o f  which groups should be repre­
sented on th e FAC, there i s  the m atter o f th e  ex ten t o f  th e FAC's 
in flu en ce . While the FAC i s  to  ad v ise  the Board o f Governors, much 
o f  th e "dynamic" d ec is io n  making performed in  the System i s  conducted 
in  th e  FOMC m eetings. Regan has sta ted  th a t i t  i s  presumptuous to  
assume that th e  FAC can provide inform ation which the Federal Reserve
Bank p resid en ts  or the System 's s t a f f  econom ists have not already  
dgleaned. H astings and Robertson p lace  the FAC l a s t  in  th e ir
□
hierarchy o f  th e  "nodes o f  power” in  the System. Confirming th e above 
statem ents, th e  m inutes o f  the FOMC rev ea l th at the Committee members
^Michael D. Regan, "The P o l i t i c a l  Structure o f  th e  Federal Reserve 
System," American P o l i t i c a l  Science Review, LV (March, 1961), 64-76.
"^Delbert C. H astings and Ross M. Robertson, "The M ysterious World 
o f  the Fed," B usiness Horizons (Spring, 1962), pp. 97-104.
Q ■
Regan, "The P o l i t i c a l  Structure o f  the Federal Reserve System," 
p. 72. • *
^Hastings and Robertson, "The M ysterious World o f  the Fed," pp. 
98-99 .
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r a r e ly  mention the FAC a t Committee meetings* The recommendations o f  
th e FAC are e ith e r  ignored or they are simply mentioned in  passing  
w ithout much a tten tio n  being paid to  them.
Second, observers r e a liz e  th at the power structure w ith in  the  
System i s  d iffe r e n t  from th at which was o r ig in a lly  created by the 
Federal Reserve Act. H astings and Robertson have form alized t h is  aware­
n ess by s e tt in g  forth  the "nodes o f  power" as they  see them in  the  
Federal Reserve System. The descending order o f  power i s  a s  fo l lo w s :^
1 . Chairman o f  the Board o f  Governors
2 . Other Governors
3 . The Board's s t a f f ,  e s p e c ia lly  sen ior advisors
4 . The FOMC
5. The trading desk a t  th e  New York Bank
6. The New York Federal Reserve Bank President
7 . Other Federal Reserve Bank P residents
8 . D irectors o f  the Federal Reserve Banks
9 . System-wide standing and ad hoc committees 
10. The FAC
While t h is  study i s  not concerned w ith the System as a whole i t  can shed 
some l ig h t  on the "nodes o f  power" w ith in  the FOMC. This author 
b e lie v e s  th at two "node" stru ctu res e x is t  w ith in  the FOMC, one fo r  
routine "defensive" op erations and another for  "dynamic" d e c is io n s .
These stru ctu res are l i s t e d  belows




1 . The trad ing desk a t the New York Bank
2. The FOMC1s s ta f f
3 . The Chairman o f  the FOMC
4 . The President o f  the New York Bank
5. Other FOMC members 
"Dynamic Nodes"
1 . The Chairman o f  the FOMC
2. The President o f  the New York Bank
3 . The FOMCts s t a f f
4* Other FOMC members
5. The trading desk a t the New York Bank
Of course the ordering o f  th ese  stru ctu res i s  a su b jective  ta sk . 
However, in  the case o f  "defensive" operations i t  i s  c lea r  th a t d a ily  
operations o f  the Open Market Account are handled by and subject to  the  
d iscre tio n  o f the Account Manager* Hence h is  primary importance. The 
FOMC s t a f f ,  a s  w e ll as the s t a f f  o f  the New York Bank, prepares reserv es  
p ro jectio n s in  an attempt to  a n tic ip a te  d isru p tive  fa c to r s . The m inutes 
in d ica te  th at th ese  p ro jection s are accepted by the Committee as v a lid  
and are incorporated in  "defensive" operations. The Chairman o f  the  
FOMC and the President o f  the Federal Reserve Bank o f  New York seem to  
have c lo se  to  equal in flu en ce in  "defensive" op eration s. The New York 
Bank president i s  "on the scene" but the Chairman o f  the FOMC seems to  
have more p o l i t i c a l  weight on the Committee. C lea r ly , the other FOMC 
members p a r tic ip a te  l e s s  in  "defensive" d ec is io n s .
The "dynamic" nodes are perhaps more c lea r  cu t. Unquestionably 
the Chairman w ie ld s the g rea test  power. The President o f the Federal 
Reserve Bank o f  New York u su a lly  "leads o ff"  th e "go-around." The 
m inutes revea l th a t the President i s  almost w ithout exception  f u l ly  
prepared fo r  d iscu ssio n  and in  fa c t  u su a lly  makes a lengthy economic 
statement which i s  o ften  quoted verbatim in  the m inutes. Both h is  
speaking p o s it io n  and h is  s ta tu s  w ith in  the System undoubtedly add 
weight to  h is  in flu en ce . At f i r s t  glance the FOMC's s t a f f  seems to  but 
ca u tio u sly  inform the Committee members o f recen t economic a c t iv it y .  
However, when view ing the Committee m eetings over a longer period o f  
time i t  becomes apparent th a t the s t a f f  p la y s an important ro le  in  not 
only s e le c t in g  appropriate ta r g e ts  but a lso  ta r g e t  l e v e l s .  The other  
FOMC members, w ith notable excep tion s, seem to  s id e  w ith the Chairman, 
s t a f f ,  and New York Bank President once a strong case for changing 
p o lic y  i s  made. Chairman M artin, though he u su a lly  i s  the l a s t  to  speak 
during the "go-around," w i l l  q u ite  o ften  in d ica te  h is  economic views 
before th e "go-around" by suggesting th at a change in  p o lic y  should be 
considered by th e members. Or, he may make some comment about "the 
th rea t o f  renewed in fla t io n a r y  pressures" or "we should avoid le t t in g  a 
bubble form on th e  top o f  th e  boom." Such comments cue the members in  
to  h is  view s. The Account Manager, w hile o f  extreme importance in  main­
ta in in g  and planning "defensive" op eration s, p lays a much le s s e r  r o le  in  
"dynamic" op erations. The Manager ca r r ie s  out the operations assigned  
by the Committee—he does not in i t i a t e  than.
An ad d ition a l measure o f  th e  in flu en c e , though adm ittedly a weak
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one, o f  the in d iv id u a l Committee members i s  the average number o f  tim es  
which th e member* s name i s  recorded in  the m inutes o f  the FQMC per 
m eeting. The m inutes record the members' names both when the members 
speak and when th ey  are mentioned by o th ers. Such an account fo r  the  
year 1956 i s  presented  in  Table XI.
TABLE XI
THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF TIMES PER MEETING WHICH 
THE VARIOUS PARTICIPANTS IN THE 1956 FOMC MEETINGS 
HAD THEIR NAME RECORDED IN THE MINUTES8,
Board o f  Governors Bank P resid en ts S ta f f
Martin 22.6 Sproul 16 .3 Rouse 9 .7
Robertson 8 .2 Hayes 11 .5 Thomas 5 .8
M ills 6 .6 Johns 5 .9 Young 3 .0
Vardaman 4*4 Mangels 5 .2
Balderston 4*3 Leach 4 .9
Shepardson 3*3 W illiam s 4 .9









Source; Compiled from th e Minute s o f  the Federal Open Market 
Committee, 1936-60 and o f  I t s  E xecutive Committee, 1936-1955* R o ll 10 , 
Microcopy No. 591, Record Group 82 (Washington, D. C.s The N ational 
A rch ives, 1965).
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The year 1956 was s e le c te d  s in ce  i t  record s th e presence o f two 
P resid en ts  o f  th e  Federal R eserve Bank o f  New York. T his author, o f  
cou rse , reco g n izes  th a t  frequency o f  speech, q u a lity ,  and in flu en c e  
are not always d ir e c t ly  r e la te d . This ta b le  o b v io u sly  r e l i e s  upon 
th e  c e t e r is  paribus assumption as w e ll a s  the assum ption th a t nega­
t iv e  m arginal u t i l i t y  from speaking to o  much does not occur* Hence, 
c e t e r i s  p arib u s, th e  more one speaks the more in flu e n c e  he has.
Granted th ese  assum ptions, Table XI seems to  confirm  th e  r e la t iv e
importance o f  th e  Chairman o f  th e  Committee, th e  P resid en t o f th e  New
11York Bank, and the Open Market Account Manager.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In  reading th e m inutes o f  th e  FQMC one d isco v er s  th a t th e  "Fed" 
i s  not so m ysterious a s  some sch o lars would have us b e l ie v e .  The 
System, a s  any other o rg a n iza tio n , i s  composed o f  p eo p le , people each 
w ith  h is  own p r iv a te  e c c e n t r ic i t i e s  a s  w e ll  a s  knowledge, s k i l l s ,  and 
b e l i e f s .  I f  the System pursues “t ig h t  money’1 to o  o f te n , one may 
q u estion  whether i t  i s  the Committee members who are to  blame or 
whether i t  1b th e  person who app oin ts or approves th e  s e lc t io n  o f  
th o se  who are to  serve on the Committee. Surely  in d iv id u a l propensi­
t i e s  are known p r io r  to  appointment.
"^During 1956 M artin was Chairman o f  th e  Committee, Sproul and 
Hayes served c o n sec u tiv e ly  a s  P resid en ts  o f  th e  New York Bank, and 
Rouse was th e Manager o f  the Open Market Account.
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As lon g  as th ere  are  advances in  economic th eory  th ere  most 
c e r ta in ly  w i l l  be a tta ck s  on the System fo r  n ot having thought o f  the  
advances f i r s t  or  fo r  not having incorporated  them sooner. The FOMC 
can o n ly  be a s  p ro g ressiv e  and as s k i l l f u l  as  th e  persons who compose 
i t .
I f  powerful dynamic in d iv id u a ls  are  p laced  in  the System, i t  i s  
reasonable to  exp ect th a t th e se  in d iv id u a ls  w i l l  become nodes o f  power 
and in f lu e n c e . S u rely  th e most knowledgable and s k i l l f u l  in d iv id u a ls  
w i l l  be s e le c te d  fo r  the most important p o s it io n s ,  thus adding to  th e ir  
in f lu e n c e .
Each d is c ip l in e  as w e l l  a s  s p e c if ic  f i e l d s  w ith in  d is c ip l in e s  
develop th e ir  own s p e c ia l  term inology. The Federal R eserve should not 
be expected  to  be any d if f e r e n t .  The e x is te n c e  o f  HF ed era lese” i s  to  
be expected . The capable sch o lar  o f  monetary p o lic y  should encounter 
no d i f f i c u l t y  in  m astering i t .
During th e  period  o f  t h i s  study th e  FCMC seemed to  respond to  
economic changes a s  promptly a s  th e in d ic a to r s  which i t  was using  
s ig n a led  a change. The Committee used th e  ta r g e ts  which i t  f e l t  were 
th e  b e s t  fo r  th e ta sk  a t  hand. Most im portant, the Committee showed 
w ill in g n e s s  to  change i t s  in d ic a to r s , ta r g e ts ,  and procedures when 
superior ones were developed. T his t r a i t  and h er ita g e  o f  f l e x i b i l i t y  
which th e  System, even tod ay , p o sse s se s  i s  undoubtedly i t s  g r ea te st  
a s s e t .
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Purchase and s a le  o f government 
s e c u r it ie s  by nonbank in v e s to r s  
Tone o f the market 
Money market p ressu res  
Market u n certa in ty  as to  whether the  
System was going to  supply r e se r v e s
Other:
Money supply  
L iq u id ity  (g en era l)
L iq u id ity  needs
V e lo c ity
C redit demands
R eserve bank c r e d it
Currency expansion
Seasonal currency drain
Currency in flo w
B u sin ess lo a n s
R eal e s ta t e  lo a n s  and c r e d it
C red it l iq u id a t io n
F lo a t
Corporate bonds 
M unicipal bonds 
Demands o f  corporate ta x  and 
dividend period  
Gold w ithdraw als 
Mortgages 
Federal funds
October 4 , 1951 
January 29, 1952 
October 4 ,  1951 
May 17 , 1951
A p ril 24 , 1953 
J u ly  1 8 , 1958 
June 1 9 , 1952
A pril 17 , 1951
A p ril 17 , 1951 
December 15 , 1953 
January 27 , 1953
August 25 , 1953
October 4 ,  1951 
January 6 , 1953 
January 8 , 1957 
May 17 , 1951 
May 17 , 1951 
May 17 , 1951 
November 6 , 1953 
May 1 7 , 1951 
January 19 , 1954 
February 10 , 1953 
February 10 , 1953 
May 27 , 1958 
January 19 , 1954 
March 24 , 1953 
March 24 , 1953
March 24 , 1959 
A pril 15 , 1958 
November 14 , 1951 
May 27 , 1958
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